ワークショップ・セミナー

International Workshop for Lab and Field Experiments

開催日時
2021年3月17日(水)・18日(木)
場所
関西大学 梅田キャンパス(予定) This workshop will be held online.
共催
日本経済学会・大阪大学社会経済研究所行動経済学研究センター・関西大学ソシオネットワーク戦略研究機構
SCOPE
Experiments, both laboratory and field, were once considered to be impossible in economics. They are now, however, considered to be a main research method in economics. These changes are reflected in the list of recent winners of Nobel Prize in economics: on one hand, Vernon Smith (winner in 2002) and Al Roth (winner in 2012) have deep connections with the development of experimental studies in the lab., on the other hand, Elenor Ostrom (winner in 2009), Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Michael Kremer (winners in 2019) with field experiments.
While laboratory experiments mainly aim to test theoretical implications or functioning of various economic mechanisms in highly controlled settings, field experiments aim to do so in more natural settings. Furthermore, field experiments, especially, through randomized controlled trials, aim to evaluate the effectiveness of various economic policies.
Despite this global development in the field of economics, researchers employing experimental methods in their research are still merely a small minority among Japanese economists. To boost the field of experimental economics in Japan by providing an international forum for researchers to exchange their ideas and problems, we invite you to submit your research covering a broad range of topics related to economic experiments to be presented at this two-day international workshop. We welcome any topics of laboratory and field experiments, and encourage especially young researchers to submit their work.
Selected papers presented at this workshop will be published in a special issue of Japanese Economic Review which is scheduled to be published in January 2022.
KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
John Duffy (Professor, Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, United States)
Lata Gangadharan (Professor of Economics and Joe Isaac Chair of Business and Economics, Monash University, Australia)
TIME SCHEDULE
Submission opens for the workshop: October 4, 2020
Submission deadline for the workshop: December 4, 2020
Notice of acceptance for presentation: January 10, 2021
Deadline for registration: February 17, 2021
Workshop: March 17-18, 2021
Submission deadline for the special issue in JER: May 14, 2021
備考
詳しい内容につきましてはCall for Papersをご覧ください。(大阪大学社会経済研究所のサイトへリンクします)

RISSワークショップ

開催日時
2020年12月1日(火) 16時30分~18時00分
場所
Zoomにて開催いたします
報告者
黒阪健吾(広島修道大学経済科学部准教授)
議題
"Endogenous Timing and Income Inequality in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment”
要旨
This paper theoretically and experimentally investigates the effects of potential donors' heterogeneous incomes on the timing and level of contributions to public goods when timings are endogenously determined by contributors. To this end, we use the conventional voluntary provision model of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986) except for Cobb-Douglas preferences augmented with a two-stage game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The following three results are obtained. First, when income is extremely unequal, potential contributors are indifferent between simultaneous and sequential moves in the contribution game, even if they have different preferences toward a public good. Second, as income inequality decreases, the simultaneous-move contribution game is more likely to emerge because each potential contributor prefers to act as a leader. Third, most of the theoretical predictions regarding the timing decisions and the level of contributions to public goods are supported by our laboratory experiment.
備考
※URLはメールにてご案内いたします。メーリングリストに登録のない研究者で参加をご希望の方は、ご所属・ご氏名・メールアドレスを<riss@ml.kandai.jp>までお知らせください。

RISSワークショップ

開催日時
2020年11月26日(木)  16時30分~18時00分
場所
Zoomにて開催いたします
報告者
庄司 豊 (京都大学博士課程)
議題
「金融機関の業績に顧客経営支援が及ぼす影響に関するシミュレーション分析」
要旨
Currently, profitability is one of the most important issues in Japanese regional bank management. In the situation of low interest rate, supporting to customer firm management have practiced as a means of revenue improvement, because main revenue source of regional banks is loans to customer firms.
However, little is known about the relationship between supporting to customer and the profitability of regional bank.
This study analyzes this relationship by using computer simulation. To simulate, we model a regional bank’s financing and supporting activity and plural firms’ administrative activity.
The result of simulation shows that the relationship between supporting and profitability of regional bank vary depending on degree of environmental change, supporting ability of regional bank, and selection criterion of supporting firms.
備考
※URLはメールにてご案内いたします。メーリングリストに登録のない研究者で参加をご希望の方は、ご所属・ご氏名・メールアドレスを<riss@ml.kandai.jp>までお知らせください。

RISSワークショップ

開催日時
2020年11月12日(木) 16時30分~18時00分
場所
Zoomにて開催いたします
報告者
大角道子(長崎大学経済学部准教授)
議題
“The Incentive Effect of Coarse and Refined Reporting: Theory and Experiment”
 joint with Yukihiko Funaki, Edward Halim and Yohanes E. Riyanto
要旨
We compare the incentive effect of two-grade reporting rules, namely, coarse and refined reporting. As a backdrop, we consider students whose performance in an exam will be disclosed to a potential employer. The disclosure rule is either a coarse-reporting in the form of pass or fails grade or a refined-reporting in the form of a raw score between 0 and 100. We are interested in analyzing which reporting rule would motivate students to work harder? Existing theories provide two predictions. First, a refined-reporting will provide a stronger incentive than a coarse-reporting if the former can better reflect the differences in effort levels of students with varying abilities. Second, a coarse-reporting provides a stronger incentive than a refined-reporting if the former allows a mediocre ability type to be pooled together with better types. We bring these theoretical predictions into a laboratory economic experimental test and show that subjects' behavior is consistent with the first prediction. Our result sheds some light on the optimal design of performance evaluation.
備考
※URLはメールにてご案内いたします。メーリングリストに登録のない研究者で参加をご希望の方は、ご所属・ご氏名・メールアドレスを<riss@ml.kandai.jp>までお知らせください。

RISSワークショップ

開催日時
2020年10月9日(金) 16時30分~18時00分
場所
Zoomにて開催いたします
報告者
筒井義郎 (京都文教大学教授)
議題
"How does risk preference change under the stress of COVID-19? Evidence from Japan"
「新型コロナのストレスによって、リスク選好はどのように変化したか?」
要旨
Though recent studies have reported that risk preference changes with large events, they have not reached a consensus on its direction. We collected panel data of Japanese individuals in five waves over three months when COVID-19 spread and then dwindled. By measuring risk preference through questions on the willingness to pay for insurance, we found that individuals became more risk tolerant over the period, which may be interpreted as “habituation” to repeated stress, as is known in neuroscience. Moreover, people were more averse to mega risk than moderate risk, as the former demonstrated stronger correlation with the perception of COVID-19.
備考
※URLはメールにてご案内いたします。メーリングリストに登録のない研究者で参加をご希望の方は、ご所属・ご氏名・メールアドレスを<riss@ml.kandai.jp>までお知らせください。

RISSワークショップ

開催日時
2020年9月30日(水) 16:30-18:00
場所
Zoomにて開催いたします
報告者
長塚昌生 (大阪学院大学経済学部講師)
論題
“The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights and Reciprocity”
要旨
This study examines how intrinsic values of owing decision rights change when people are placed in a reciprocal environment. In recent years, an allocation of decision rights in firms has become an important issue in organizational management. Job specific theory suggests that intrinsic motivation through a sense of psychological ownership can increase organizational productivity. Recent researches in experimental economics also have shown that the decision right is one of the key factors for organizational productivity. As for putting the decision rights in opponent's hands, previous experimental research has shown that reciprocal relationship within memberships lead to decrease productivity due to averse being controlled. However, the relationship between owning decision right and reciprocity has not yet been clarified. Thus, we designed an experiment to test whether reciprocal environment affect intrinsic values of decision rights. Our findings indicated that people who were assigned in reciprocal treatment had an altered value for owing decision rights. Results in this paper provides new insights into the relationship between an allocation of decision rights and reciprocity, and thus may be relevant to actual organizational design.
備考
※URLはメールにてご案内いたします。メーリングリストに登録のない研究者で参加をご希望の方は、ご所属・ご氏名・メールアドレスを<riss@ml.kandai.jp>までお知らせください。

RISSワークショップ

開催日時
2020年8月7日(金) 15:30-17:00
場所
Zoomにて開催いたします
報告者
森知晴 (立命館大学総合心理学部准教授)
論題
“The Impact of Test Score Labels on University Choice: A Regression Discontinuity Design Approach”
要旨
We used data from Japanese university entrance exams to examine how the test result score labels affect students' application behavior. Students know their raw score (a continuous variable) and the score label (a discrete variable) that indicates their likelihood of success after the first test at the same time. We used a regression discontinuity design to show that score labels affect students' application behavior, with behavior jumping around the score label threshold. We further test for the heterogeneity of the jumps, taking advantage of the large data set.
備考
※URLはメールにてご案内いたします。本機構研究員以外のメーリングリストに登録のない研究者で参加をご希望の方は、ご所属・ご氏名・メールアドレスを<riss@ml.kandai.jp>までお知らせください。

RISSワークショップ

開催日時
2020年6月16日(火) 18:00-19:30
場所
Zoomにて開催いたします
報告者
松田一茂 (一橋大学大学院経済学研究科)
論題
“College Education and Income Contingent Loans in Equilibrium: Theory and Quantitative Evaluation” (with Karol Mazur)
要旨
This paper investigates the welfare and efficiency implications of income-contingent loans (ICLs) for financing risky college graduation. We show that the laissez-faire allocation is constrained inefficient. Furthermore, we show that although ICLs can restore the second best efficiency of the economy, the social planner may achieve the same outcomes using progressive income tax systems. Building on these insights, we construct an overlapping generations life-cycle economy with heterogeneous agents and calibrate it to the US education and labor markets. While the current design of ICLs induces significant redistribution across wealth-ability groups, it does not increase overall utilitarian welfare, as it is largely substituted by the existing progressive income tax system.
備考
※URLはメールにてご案内いたします。本機構研究員以外のメーリングリストに登録のない研究者で参加をご希望の方は、ご所属・ご氏名・メールアドレスを<riss@ml.kandai.jp>までお知らせください。

RISSワークショップ

開催日時
2020年6月10日(水) 17:00-18:30
場所
Zoomにて開催いたします
報告者
難波敏彦 (本機構PD)
論題
“The Cost of Gaming in Quota Contracts”
要旨
This paper studies the effect of system gaming in the dynamic moral hazard model. It is well known that the gaming is an important problem when firms use a nonlinear incentive contract such as quota-based contracts.However, it is not known how the gaming affects the type of the optimal contract. In this paper, we characterize the optimal incentive contract and show that if the agent's productivity is relatively high, quota-based contracts is more profitable for firms than linear contract even when the agent can manipulate outputs. Moreover, we compare this gaming situation with non-gaming situation in which the agent can not game the system in order to investigate the effect of gaming. We also show that if the agent is less productive, then the gaming effect is more profitable for firms.
備考
※URLはメールにて前日にご案内いたします。本機構研究員以外の研究者で参加をご希望の方は、前日までにご所属・ご氏名・メールアドレスを<riss@ml.kandai.jp>までお知らせください。

研究セミナー

資料
PDF
開催日時
2020年3月7日(土) 13:00~18:00 (開場12:30) 延期いたします
共催
関西大学ソシオネットワーク戦略研究機構・国際ソシオネットワーク戦略学会
テーマ
社会科学における実験研究とRISSの役割
趣旨
近年、経済学のみならず社会科学全般において実験研究が盛んに行われている。経済実験室を有するRISSには、共同利用・共同研究拠点として、こうした流れを加速させることが期待される。 そこで本セミナーでは、商学・政治学の研究者の参加を得て、社会科学における実験研究の到達点を共有するとともに、経済実験室の利用者による研究成果報告を得ることで、 社会科学に対するRISSの役割と貢献のあり方を考える。
プログラム
開会の挨拶
13:00-13:05
 本西泰三 機構長 (関西大学経済学部・教授)

総合司会
13:05-13:10
 名取良太 副機構長 (関西大学総合情報学部・教授)

Session 1
 Chair 名取良太 (関西大学総合情報学部・教授)

13:10-13:55
「Optimal Timing for Retargeting: Evidence from Field Experiments」(Authors: Takeshi Moriguchi, Xueming Luo, Jing Li, Xianghua Lu)
 守口 剛 (早稲田大学商学学術院・教授)

13:55-14:40
「政治学における実験室実験の現状と課題」
 谷口尚子 (慶應義塾大学システムデザイン・マネジメント研究科・准教授)

14:40-15:25
「サーベイ実験を用いた2019年沖縄県民投票の分析:選択肢デザイン効果と投票参加効果」(著者:久保慶明・岡田勇・柳至)
 久保慶明 (琉球大学人文社会学部・准教授)
 岡田 勇 (名古屋大学大学院国際開発研究科・准教授)

15:25-15:45 Short Break

Session 2
 Chair 小川一仁 (関西大学社会学部・教授)

15:45-16:10
「多サイト経済実験はどのようにすれば可能か:被験者の認知能力と属性の制御」(著者:小川一仁・尾﨑祐介・川村哲也・高橋広雅・田口聡志・藤井陽一朗・渡邊直樹)
 小川一仁 (関西大学社会学部・教授)

16:10-16:35
「製品選択場面における眼球運動の分析手法について」(著者:川杉桂太、村上始、渡辺藍丸、竹村和久)
 川杉桂太 (早稲田大学大学院生)

16:35-17:00
「A School Choice Experiment:Cognitive Ability and Information」(Authors: Naoki Watanabe, Tetsuya Kawamura, Kazuhito Ogawa)
 渡邊直樹 (慶應義塾大学大学院経営管理研究科・准教授)

17:00-17:10 Short Break

17:10-17:35
「小刻みな税率引き上げが消費に与える影響:くじ消費実験による分析」
 竹本 亨 (帝塚山大学経済経営学部・教授)

17:35-18:00
「Reciprocity is different: Experimental evidence from trust game between Japanese domestic and international students.」 (Authors: Tetsuya Kawamura, Yoichiro Fujii, Yusuke Osaki, Gou Otani and Ryuji Saito)
 尾﨑祐介 (早稲田大学商学学術院・准教授)
お申込・お問合せ先
関西大学 研究所事務グループ(ソシオ機構)
E-mail riss@ml.kandai.jp
Tel 06-6368-1228

氏名・所属機関名・職名を記載の上、電子メールにてお申し込み下さい。 なお、事前の申込みなしでもご参加いただくことができます(当日お名前等を頂戴します)。