RISSワークショップ
- 開催日時
- 2019年10月15日(火) 18:00-20:00
- 報告者
- Jauer CHEN （東京国際大学 国際戦略研究所 准教授）
- 論題
- “Causal Random Forests Model using Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression”
- 要旨
- We propose an econometric procedure based mainly on the generalized random forests method of Athey, Tibshirani and Wager (2019, The Annals of Statistics). Not only does this process estimate the conditional quantile treatment effect nonparametrically, but our procedure yields a measure of variable importance in terms of heterogeneity among control variables. We also apply the proposed procedure to reinvestigate the distributional effect of 401(k) participation on net financial assets, and the quantile earnings effect of participating in a job training program.
RISSワークショップ
- 開催日時
- 2019年10月9日(水) 17:00-18:30
- 報告者
- 室岡健志（大阪大学 国際公共政策研究科 准教授）
- 論題
- “Fragile Self-Esteem” (joint with Koszegi and George Loewenstein)
- 要旨
- We develop a model in which a person’s self-esteem is determined by sampling from her store of ego-relevant memories in a fashion that in turn depends on her self-esteem. This feedback mechanism can create multiple “self-esteem personal equilibria,” making self-esteem fragile ? subject to swings that are out of proportion to the objective evidentiary value of new information. Self-esteem is especially likely to be fragile, as well as unrealistic in either the positive or the negative direction, if self-esteem is an important ingredient of overall utility. We show that fragile self-esteem has diverse consequences, such as producing a negative relationship between effort and incentives, and various forms of information-avoidance, with consequences for domains such as education and job search.
RISSワークショップ
- 開催日時
- 2019年10月3日(木) 17:00-18:30
- 報告者
- Jean-Baptiste Michau (Ecole Polytechnique, Department of Economics, Professor)
- 論題
- “Helicopter Drops of Money under Secular Stagnation”
- 要旨
- What are the effects of helicopter drops of money under secular stagnation? This paper shows that, if the government cannot sustain a Ponzi debt scheme under full employment, then helicopter drops of money cannot transfer real wealth to households under secular stagnation. In that case, despite being in a permanent liquidity trap, a one-off helicopter drop triggers an upward jump in the price level, without any real effect on the economy. Conversely, if a Ponzi scheme can be sustained, then the helicopter drop can stimulate aggregate demand by raising household wealth. If the stagnation real interest rate is larger than the economic growth rate, the economy converges to full employment and a sustainable Ponzi scheme and, otherwise, it gradually reverts back to stagnation. Finally, continuous helicopter drops of money under stagnation must induce the economy to reach a full employment steady state, with or without a Ponzi scheme.
RISSワークショップ
- 開催日時
- 2019年9月25日(水) 17:00-18:30
- 報告者
- 砂川 武貴 （神戸大学経済学部）
- 論題
- “Credible Forward Guidance”（joint with Taisuke Nakata）
- 要旨
- We analyze credible forward guidance policies in a sticky-price model with an effective lower bound (ELB) constraint on nominal interest rates by solving a series of optimal sustainable policy problems indexed by the duration of reputational loss. Lower-for-longer policies? while effective in stimulating the economy at the ELB?are potentially time-inconsistent, as the associated overheating of the economy in the aftermath of a crisis is undesirable ex-post. However, if reneging on a lower-for-longer promise leads to a loss of reputation and prevents the central bank from effectively using lower-for-longer policies in future crises, these policies can be time-consistent. We find that, even without an explicit commitment technology, the central bank can still credibly keep the policy rate at the ELB for an extended period? though not as extended under the optimal commitment policy?and meaningfully mitigate the adverse effects of the ELB constraint on economy activity.
ISER-RISS Experimental Economics Workshop
- 開催日時
- 2019年7月19日(金) 10:00～17:10
- 場所
- 大阪大学社会経済研究所B棟2階215会議室
- 共催
- 大阪大学社会経済研究所
- 報告者・論題
- 10:00-10:40
Takehito Masuda, Osaka University
「Strategic Ambiguity and Probabilistic Sophistication」
10:50-11:50
Kenju Kamei, Durham University
「The Perverse Costly Signaling Effect on Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future」
14:00-1440
Eungik Lee, New York University
「Probability weighting and cognitive ability」
14:50-15:50
Takashi Hayashi, University of Glasgow
「General Equilibrium Performance of Partial Equilibrium Mechanisms: an Experiment」
16:10-17:10
Taizo Motonishi, Kansai University
「Is Financial Literacy a Dangerous Thing?: Financial Literacy, Behavioral Factors, and Financial Choices of Households」 - 備考
- 詳細はこちら
お申込みはリンク先よりお願いいたします。【締切：7月11日17:00】
RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics
- 資料
- 開催日時
- 2019年7月17日(水) 16:00-17:30
- 報告者
- Konrad Grabiszewski （Mohammad bin Salman College (MBSC), Saudi Arabia）
- 論題
- "Adverse Selection and Safety Regulation"
RISSワークショップ
- 開催日時
- 2019年6月17日(月) 18:00-19:30
- 報告者
- 粟屋 祐（Assistant Professor, University of Rochester）
- 論題
- "Startups and Upstarts"（Vijay Krishnaとの共著）
- 要旨
- We study a continuous-time R&D race between an established firm and a startup under asymmetric information. R&D investment brings success stochastically but only if the innovation is feasible. The only asymmetry between the firms is that the established firm has better information about the feasibility of the innovation. We show that there is an equilibrium in which the poorly-informed startup wins more often, and has higher expected profits, than the better-informed incumbent. When the informational asymmetry is large, this is the unique equilibrium outcome. Even though better information is available competitive disadvantage, the value of information is positive.
契約理論研究会
- 開催日時
- 2019年6月15日(土) 13:30-17:30
- 報告者・論題・要旨
- 報告１：Wataru Tamura (Nagoya University): "Using Uncontrolled Trials with Selection Bias and Scaling up"
This study examines the design of program evaluation and policymaking based on uncontrolled trials. When program participation is nonrandomized, a simple before-and-after comparison may have selection bias. I consider a two-period model of pilot trials in which the policymaker can intervene in participation behavior in the second period trial. I show that modest scaling up by monetary intervention can help consistently estimate the population average treatment effect. Unlike monetary intervention, scaling up by information disclosure about the average outcome in the initial small-scale trial can mitigate but not eliminate the selection bias.
報告２：Kenichi Amaya (Kagawa University): "Evolution of credible pre-play communication"
パレート順序づけされる複数のナッシュ均衡があるゲームでは、プレイヤー間の事前のコミュニケーションがあれば効率的な均衡が実現できるだろうという直感があり、進化ゲーム理論を用いてこの直感を支持する研究がなされて来ました。一方で、Aumann (1990)は、ゲームの利得構造によっては事前のメッセージで行動の意図は伝わらないと主張し、これを支持する実験結果も存在します。本研究は、進化ゲームの枠組みでAumannの主張に基礎づけを与えようとする一つの試みです。メッセージの解釈の可能性に制限を置いたモデルを考えると、Aumannの主張を支持する結果が得られることを示します。 - 備考
- 詳細はこちら
Workshop on Behavioral Contract Thoery
- 開催日時
- 2019年4月20日(土) 10:00-17:40
- 共催
- Contract Theory Workshop
- 報告者・論題
- 10:05-10:50
Hideshi Itoh (Waseda U)
「Image Concerns in Teams」
10:50-11:35
Matthias Fahn (JKU Linz)
「Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships」
13:00-13:45
Heiko Karle (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management)
「Consumer Search and the Uncertainty Effect」
13:45-14:30
Takeshi Murooka (Osaka U)
「Zero Prices: Optimal Pricing of Experience Goods under Consumer Loss Aversion」
14:50-15:35
Fabian Herweg (U Bayreuth)
「Salience in Retailing: Vertical Restraints on Internet Sales」
15:35-16:20
Antonio Rosato (UTS)
「Projection of Private Values in Auctions」
16:40-17:40
Keynote: Paul Heidhues (DICE)
「Identifying Procrastination from the Timing of Choices」
CEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (第15回)
- 資料
- 開催日時
- 2019年3月11日(月) 15:00-17:10
- 共催
- 関西大学経済実験センター
- 報告者・論題
- 15:00～16:00
丹治 伶峰（大阪大学経済学研究科 修士課程）
「Reference Dependence and Monetary Incentive -Evidence from Major League Baseball-」
16:10～17:10
川村 哲也（日本経済大学経営学部 専任講師)
「Higher cognitive ability promotes cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games and deviation in finitely repeated games: Experimental evidence”」