第24回 日本知能情報ファジィ学会 しなやかな行動の脳工学研究部会研究会 関西大学ソシオネットワーク戦略研究機構共催 シンポジウム講演会
- Date
- December 24,2020 12:50-16:30
- Venue
- Zoom
- Theme
- 「通信が人をつむぐレジリエントで持続可能な社会デザインの実現に向けて」
- Hosted
- 関西大学ソシオネットワーク戦略研究機構
- Sponsers
- 日本知能情報ファジィ学会 しなやかな行動の脳工学研究部会
- Program
- ● 12:50～13:00 開催挨拶：本西 泰三（関西大学 経済学部）
● 13:00～14:00 講演１：
「テレビ番組のネット配信について－ Tverの利用実態と放送の「公共性」 －」
春日 教測（甲南大学 経済学部）
司会：本西 泰三（関西大学 経済学部）
ネットを通じた動画配信はコロナ禍における自宅時間増とも相まって、地上波局が大きな存在感を示していた日本においても着実に進展している。従来の放送局が配信する番組についても、見逃し視聴・同時配信の充実が進展してきたが、制度的には依然として異なる面も多い。本発表では2015年秋に試行されて以降進展してきた見逃し視聴サービスの一つ「Tver」の利用動向について調査したデータに基づき、視聴者数や視聴本数への影響、さらに遅れて加入した公共放送（NHK）の利用動向を分析し、現状について把握したい。また視聴者が期待もしくは忌避する、広告スキップや再生速度の変更、個人情報収集に関する意向についても考察対象とする。技術的にはネット化が容易な動画配信も、「放送の公共性」という視点を取り入れると、多くの問題に直面することとなる。欧州の制度や日本における取り組みを紹介し、「融合」を達成するための課題についても論点を紹介することとしたい。
● 14:10～15:10 講演２：
「どこでもセンサ・安心安全ネットワーク都市 ―移動するセンサからのアプローチ―」
熊澤 宏之（大阪産業大学 工学部）
司会：三好 哲也（阪南大学 経営情報学部）
本発表では二つの研究報告を行う。
１．近年のスマートフォンやカーナビゲーションの普及により、人や車などの移動体が種々センサ並びに通信機能を持ち、移動しながら自ら情報を発信することが可能となってきた。これらは移動するセンサと捉えることができ、移動体の位置及び時刻情報と関連付けられたセンサデータは、従来のインフラに固定して設置されたセンサから得られる情報と比較して、極めて柔軟かつきめ細かな情報が得られ、そのデータ活用として様々な応用が考えられる。本発表では、このような移動するセンサから得られる情報から、人がどのような交通手段で移動しているかを検知する方式の研究報告を行う。
２．高精細なカメラや種々センサを搭載したドローンが安価に入手可能になり、新たな情報獲得手段として注目されている。その応用例として、農園の上空をドローンで飛行して撮像した画像から、農園に植えられている農園の果樹の識別を行うことを試みている。果樹の識別には深層学習の一つであるCNN (Convolutional Neural Network)を用いており、いくつかの検討結果について報告する。
● 15:20～16:20 講演３：
「国際博覧会とICT〜近年の動向からの考察と2025年大阪・関西万博に向けての展望」
岡田 朋之（関西大学 総合情報学部）
司会：林 勲（関西大学 総合情報学部）
1851年のロンドン万博に始まる国際博覧会（万博）の歴史の中で、1876年フィラデルフィア万博におけるグラハム・ベルの電話に代表されるように、情報通信技術（ICT）や映像メディアなどの先進テクノロジーが公にされる場として、また実装の場として大きな意義と役割を果たしてきた。1970年大阪万博においてもワイヤレス電話や自動運転車が登場し、2005年の愛知万博では8Kテレビが世界で初公開されたことやARを用いたアトラクションが人気を博したことを記憶されている方も少なくないであろう。そうした華々しい領域だけでなく、万博とICTの関係性は開催した各国の政策にも左右されてきた面も少なくない。21世紀に入り、万博にはグローバルな課題に対峙し、それへの解決策がより一層求められるようになった。
そのなかでICTが果たしてきた役割と、数年後に開催が迫りつつある2025年大阪・関西万博において求められているであろう、テクノロジーの関与や提示の望ましいあり方について、本講演ではこれまでの各博覧会の会場での踏査の成果をもとに検討をこころみたい。また現在も継続中であるコロナ禍により、従来のような大規模な集客を前提としたメガイベントのあり方も大幅な見直しが求められており、この問題も合わせて考察をおこなう予定である。
● 16:20～16:30 閉会挨拶：林 勲（関西大学 総合情報学部） - Entry fee
- Free
RISS Workshop
- Date
- December 15,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Kenju Kamei（Associate professor,University of Durham）
- Title
- “Free Riding and Workplace Democracy – Heterogeneous Task Preferences and Sorting” (with Thomas Markussen at Univ. Copenhagen)
- Abstract
- A novel laboratory experiment is used to show that mismatching between task preferences and task assignment undermines worker productivity and leads to free riding in teams. We elicit task preferences from all workers. Workers’ endogenous sorting into tasks significantly improves productivity under individual-based remuneration (performance pay). Under team-based remuneration (revenue sharing), free riding is significant, but almost exclusively among those working on undesired tasks. Task selection by majority voting in teams alleviates free riding, but only partly so, because some workers are still assigned to undesired tasks. Our findings have broad implications for research using real effort tasks.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- December 1,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Kengo Kurosaka（Associate professor,The Faculty of Economic Sciences,Hiroshima Shudo University）
- Title
- "Endogenous Timing and Income Inequality in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment”
- Abstract
- This paper theoretically and experimentally investigates the effects of potential donors' heterogeneous incomes on the timing and level of contributions to public goods when timings are endogenously determined by contributors. To this end, we use the conventional voluntary provision model of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986) except for Cobb-Douglas preferences augmented with a two-stage game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The following three results are obtained. First, when income is extremely unequal, potential contributors are indifferent between simultaneous and sequential moves in the contribution game, even if they have different preferences toward a public good. Second, as income inequality decreases, the simultaneous-move contribution game is more likely to emerge because each potential contributor prefers to act as a leader. Third, most of the theoretical predictions regarding the timing decisions and the level of contributions to public goods are supported by our laboratory experiment.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- November 26,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Yutaka Shoji（Ph.D. program,Kyoto University）
- Title
- "How consulting function of banks influence their performance? -A simulation analysis-"
- Abstract
- Currently, profitability is one of the most important issues in Japanese regional bank management. In the situation of low interest rate, supporting to customer firm management have practiced as a means of revenue improvement, because main revenue source of regional banks is loans to customer firms.
However, little is known about the relationship between supporting to customer and the profitability of regional bank.
This study analyzes this relationship by using computer simulation. To simulate, we model a regional bank’s financing and supporting activity and plural firms’ administrative activity.
The result of simulation shows that the relationship between supporting and profitability of regional bank vary depending on degree of environmental change, supporting ability of regional bank, and selection criterion of supporting firms.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- November 12,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Michiko Ogaku（Associate professor, Faculty of Economics,Nagasaki University）
- Title
- “The Incentive Effect of Coarse and Refined Reporting: Theory and Experiment”
joint with Yukihiko Funaki, Edward Halim and Yohanes E. Riyanto - Abstract
- We compare the incentive effect of two-grade reporting rules, namely, coarse and refined reporting. As a backdrop, we consider students whose performance in an exam will be disclosed to a potential employer. The disclosure rule is either a coarse-reporting in the form of pass or fails grade or a refined-reporting in the form of a raw score between 0 and 100. We are interested in analyzing which reporting rule would motivate students to work harder? Existing theories provide two predictions. First, a refined-reporting will provide a stronger incentive than a coarse-reporting if the former can better reflect the differences in effort levels of students with varying abilities. Second, a coarse-reporting provides a stronger incentive than a refined-reporting if the former allows a mediocre ability type to be pooled together with better types. We bring these theoretical predictions into a laboratory economic experimental test and show that subjects' behavior is consistent with the first prediction. Our result sheds some light on the optimal design of performance evaluation.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- October 9,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Yoshiro Tsutsui（Professor,Kyoto Bunkyo University）
- Title
- "How does risk preference change under the stress of COVID-19? Evidence from Japan"
- Abstract
- Though recent studies have reported that risk preference changes with large events, they have not reached a consensus on its direction. We collected panel data of Japanese individuals in five waves over three months when COVID-19 spread and then dwindled. By measuring risk preference through questions on the willingness to pay for insurance, we found that individuals became more risk tolerant over the period, which may be interpreted as “habituation” to repeated stress, as is known in neuroscience. Moreover, people were more averse to mega risk than moderate risk, as the former demonstrated stronger correlation with the perception of COVID-19.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- September 30,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Masao Nagatsuka（lecturer, Faculty of Economics,Osaka Gakuin University）
- Title
- “The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights and Reciprocity”
- Abstract
- This study examines how intrinsic values of owing decision rights change when people are placed in a reciprocal environment. In recent years, an allocation of decision rights in firms has become an important issue in organizational management. Job specific theory suggests that intrinsic motivation through a sense of psychological ownership can increase organizational productivity. Recent researches in experimental economics also have shown that the decision right is one of the key factors for organizational productivity. As for putting the decision rights in opponent's hands, previous experimental research has shown that reciprocal relationship within memberships lead to decrease productivity due to averse being controlled. However, the relationship between owning decision right and reciprocity has not yet been clarified. Thus, we designed an experiment to test whether reciprocal environment affect intrinsic values of decision rights. Our findings indicated that people who were assigned in reciprocal treatment had an altered value for owing decision rights. Results in this paper provides new insights into the relationship between an allocation of decision rights and reciprocity, and thus may be relevant to actual organizational design.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- August,7,2020 15:30-17:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Tomoharu Mori（Associate professor,College of Comprehensive Psychology,Ritsumeikan University）
- Title
- “The Impact of Test Score Labels on University Choice: A Regression Discontinuity Design Approach”
- Abstract
- We used data from Japanese university entrance exams to examine how the test result score labels affect students' application behavior. Students know their raw score (a continuous variable) and the score label (a discrete variable) that indicates their likelihood of success after the first test at the same time. We used a regression discontinuity design to show that score labels affect students' application behavior, with behavior jumping around the score label threshold. We further test for the heterogeneity of the jumps, taking advantage of the large data set.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- June 16,2020 18:00-19:30
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Kazushige Matsuda（GraduateSchool of Economics,Hitotsubashi University）
- Title
- “College Education and Income Contingent Loans in Equilibrium: Theory and Quantitative Evaluation” (with Karol Mazur)
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the welfare and efficiency implications of income-contingent loans (ICLs) for financing risky college graduation. We show that the laissez-faire allocation is constrained inefficient. Furthermore, we show that although ICLs can restore the second best efficiency of the economy, the social planner may achieve the same outcomes using progressive income tax systems. Building on these insights, we construct an overlapping generations life-cycle economy with heterogeneous agents and calibrate it to the US education and labor markets. While the current design of ICLs induces significant redistribution across wealth-ability groups, it does not increase overall utilitarian welfare, as it is largely substituted by the existing progressive income tax system.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- June 10,2020 17:00-18:30
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Toshihiko Nanba（Postdoctoral Fellow,Kansai University）
- Title
- “The Cost of Gaming in Quota Contracts”
- Abstract
- This paper studies the effect of system gaming in the dynamic moral hazard model. It is well known that the gaming is an important problem when firms use a nonlinear incentive contract such as quota-based contracts.However, it is not known how the gaming affects the type of the optimal contract. In this paper, we characterize the optimal incentive contract and show that if the agent's productivity is relatively high, quota-based contracts is more profitable for firms than linear contract even when the agent can manipulate outputs. Moreover, we compare this gaming situation with non-gaming situation in which the agent can not game the system in order to investigate the effect of gaming. We also show that if the agent is less productive, then the gaming effect is more profitable for firms.