RISS Workshop
- Date
- December 15,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Kenju Kamei（Associate professor,University of Durham）
- Title
- “Free Riding and Workplace Democracy – Heterogeneous Task Preferences and Sorting” (with Thomas Markussen at Univ. Copenhagen)
- Abstract
- A novel laboratory experiment is used to show that mismatching between task preferences and task assignment undermines worker productivity and leads to free riding in teams. We elicit task preferences from all workers. Workers’ endogenous sorting into tasks significantly improves productivity under individual-based remuneration (performance pay). Under team-based remuneration (revenue sharing), free riding is significant, but almost exclusively among those working on undesired tasks. Task selection by majority voting in teams alleviates free riding, but only partly so, because some workers are still assigned to undesired tasks. Our findings have broad implications for research using real effort tasks.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- December 1,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Kengo Kurosaka（Associate professor,The Faculty of Economic Sciences,Hiroshima Shudo University）
- Title
- "Endogenous Timing and Income Inequality in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment”
- Abstract
- This paper theoretically and experimentally investigates the effects of potential donors' heterogeneous incomes on the timing and level of contributions to public goods when timings are endogenously determined by contributors. To this end, we use the conventional voluntary provision model of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986) except for Cobb-Douglas preferences augmented with a two-stage game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The following three results are obtained. First, when income is extremely unequal, potential contributors are indifferent between simultaneous and sequential moves in the contribution game, even if they have different preferences toward a public good. Second, as income inequality decreases, the simultaneous-move contribution game is more likely to emerge because each potential contributor prefers to act as a leader. Third, most of the theoretical predictions regarding the timing decisions and the level of contributions to public goods are supported by our laboratory experiment.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- November 26,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Yutaka Shoji（Ph.D. program,Kyoto University）
- Title
- "How consulting function of banks influence their performance? -A simulation analysis-"
- Abstract
- Currently, profitability is one of the most important issues in Japanese regional bank management. In the situation of low interest rate, supporting to customer firm management have practiced as a means of revenue improvement, because main revenue source of regional banks is loans to customer firms.
However, little is known about the relationship between supporting to customer and the profitability of regional bank.
This study analyzes this relationship by using computer simulation. To simulate, we model a regional bank’s financing and supporting activity and plural firms’ administrative activity.
The result of simulation shows that the relationship between supporting and profitability of regional bank vary depending on degree of environmental change, supporting ability of regional bank, and selection criterion of supporting firms.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- November 12,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Michiko Ogaku（Associate professor, Faculty of Economics,Nagasaki University）
- Title
- “The Incentive Effect of Coarse and Refined Reporting: Theory and Experiment”
joint with Yukihiko Funaki, Edward Halim and Yohanes E. Riyanto - Abstract
- We compare the incentive effect of two-grade reporting rules, namely, coarse and refined reporting. As a backdrop, we consider students whose performance in an exam will be disclosed to a potential employer. The disclosure rule is either a coarse-reporting in the form of pass or fails grade or a refined-reporting in the form of a raw score between 0 and 100. We are interested in analyzing which reporting rule would motivate students to work harder? Existing theories provide two predictions. First, a refined-reporting will provide a stronger incentive than a coarse-reporting if the former can better reflect the differences in effort levels of students with varying abilities. Second, a coarse-reporting provides a stronger incentive than a refined-reporting if the former allows a mediocre ability type to be pooled together with better types. We bring these theoretical predictions into a laboratory economic experimental test and show that subjects' behavior is consistent with the first prediction. Our result sheds some light on the optimal design of performance evaluation.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- October 9,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Yoshiro Tsutsui（Professor,Kyoto Bunkyo University）
- Title
- "How does risk preference change under the stress of COVID-19? Evidence from Japan"
- Abstract
- Though recent studies have reported that risk preference changes with large events, they have not reached a consensus on its direction. We collected panel data of Japanese individuals in five waves over three months when COVID-19 spread and then dwindled. By measuring risk preference through questions on the willingness to pay for insurance, we found that individuals became more risk tolerant over the period, which may be interpreted as “habituation” to repeated stress, as is known in neuroscience. Moreover, people were more averse to mega risk than moderate risk, as the former demonstrated stronger correlation with the perception of COVID-19.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- September 30,2020 16:30-18:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Masao Nagatsuka（lecturer, Faculty of Economics,Osaka Gakuin University）
- Title
- “The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights and Reciprocity”
- Abstract
- This study examines how intrinsic values of owing decision rights change when people are placed in a reciprocal environment. In recent years, an allocation of decision rights in firms has become an important issue in organizational management. Job specific theory suggests that intrinsic motivation through a sense of psychological ownership can increase organizational productivity. Recent researches in experimental economics also have shown that the decision right is one of the key factors for organizational productivity. As for putting the decision rights in opponent's hands, previous experimental research has shown that reciprocal relationship within memberships lead to decrease productivity due to averse being controlled. However, the relationship between owning decision right and reciprocity has not yet been clarified. Thus, we designed an experiment to test whether reciprocal environment affect intrinsic values of decision rights. Our findings indicated that people who were assigned in reciprocal treatment had an altered value for owing decision rights. Results in this paper provides new insights into the relationship between an allocation of decision rights and reciprocity, and thus may be relevant to actual organizational design.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- August,7,2020 15:30-17:00
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Tomoharu Mori（Associate professor,College of Comprehensive Psychology,Ritsumeikan University）
- Title
- “The Impact of Test Score Labels on University Choice: A Regression Discontinuity Design Approach”
- Abstract
- We used data from Japanese university entrance exams to examine how the test result score labels affect students' application behavior. Students know their raw score (a continuous variable) and the score label (a discrete variable) that indicates their likelihood of success after the first test at the same time. We used a regression discontinuity design to show that score labels affect students' application behavior, with behavior jumping around the score label threshold. We further test for the heterogeneity of the jumps, taking advantage of the large data set.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- June 16,2020 18:00-19:30
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Kazushige Matsuda（GraduateSchool of Economics,Hitotsubashi University）
- Title
- “College Education and Income Contingent Loans in Equilibrium: Theory and Quantitative Evaluation” (with Karol Mazur)
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the welfare and efficiency implications of income-contingent loans (ICLs) for financing risky college graduation. We show that the laissez-faire allocation is constrained inefficient. Furthermore, we show that although ICLs can restore the second best efficiency of the economy, the social planner may achieve the same outcomes using progressive income tax systems. Building on these insights, we construct an overlapping generations life-cycle economy with heterogeneous agents and calibrate it to the US education and labor markets. While the current design of ICLs induces significant redistribution across wealth-ability groups, it does not increase overall utilitarian welfare, as it is largely substituted by the existing progressive income tax system.
RISS Workshop
- Date
- June 10,2020 17:00-18:30
- Venue
- Zoom
- Lecturer
- Toshihiko Nanba（Postdoctoral Fellow,Kansai University）
- Title
- “The Cost of Gaming in Quota Contracts”
- Abstract
- This paper studies the effect of system gaming in the dynamic moral hazard model. It is well known that the gaming is an important problem when firms use a nonlinear incentive contract such as quota-based contracts.However, it is not known how the gaming affects the type of the optimal contract. In this paper, we characterize the optimal incentive contract and show that if the agent's productivity is relatively high, quota-based contracts is more profitable for firms than linear contract even when the agent can manipulate outputs. Moreover, we compare this gaming situation with non-gaming situation in which the agent can not game the system in order to investigate the effect of gaming. We also show that if the agent is less productive, then the gaming effect is more profitable for firms.
Research Seminar
- Date
March, 7, 2020 13:00-18:00This seminar is postponed.- Sponsers
- 関西大学ソシオネットワーク戦略研究機構・国際ソシオネットワーク戦略学会
- Theme
- 社会科学における実験研究とRISSの役割
- Purpose
- 近年、経済学のみならず社会科学全般において実験研究が盛んに行われている。経済実験室を有するRISSには、共同利用・共同研究拠点として、こうした流れを加速させることが期待される。 そこで本セミナーでは、商学・政治学の研究者の参加を得て、社会科学における実験研究の到達点を共有するとともに、経済実験室の利用者による研究成果報告を得ることで、 社会科学に対するRISSの役割と貢献のあり方を考える。
- Program
- 開会の挨拶
13:00-13:05
本西泰三 機構長 （関西大学経済学部・教授）
総合司会
13:05-13:10
名取良太 副機構長 （関西大学総合情報学部・教授）
Session 1
Chair 名取良太 （関西大学総合情報学部・教授）
13:10-13:55
「Optimal Timing for Retargeting: Evidence from Field Experiments」（Authors： Takeshi Moriguchi, Xueming Luo, Jing Li, Xianghua Lu）
守口 剛 （早稲田大学商学学術院・教授）
13:55-14:40
「政治学における実験室実験の現状と課題」
谷口尚子 （慶應義塾大学システムデザイン・マネジメント研究科・准教授）
14:40-15:25
「サーベイ実験を用いた2019年沖縄県民投票の分析：選択肢デザイン効果と投票参加効果」（著者：久保慶明・岡田勇・柳至）
久保慶明 （琉球大学人文社会学部・准教授）
岡田 勇 （名古屋大学大学院国際開発研究科・准教授）
15:25-15:45 Short Break
Session 2
Chair 小川一仁 （関西大学社会学部・教授）
15:45-16:10
「多サイト経済実験はどのようにすれば可能か：被験者の認知能力と属性の制御」（著者：小川一仁・尾﨑祐介・川村哲也・高橋広雅・田口聡志・藤井陽一朗・渡邊直樹）
小川一仁 （関西大学社会学部・教授）
16:10-16:35
「製品選択場面における眼球運動の分析手法について」（著者：川杉桂太、村上始、渡辺藍丸、竹村和久）
川杉桂太 （早稲田大学大学院生）
16:35-17:00
「A School Choice Experiment:Cognitive Ability and Information」（Authors： Naoki Watanabe, Tetsuya Kawamura, Kazuhito Ogawa）
渡邊直樹 （慶應義塾大学大学院経営管理研究科・准教授）
17:00-17:10 Short Break
17:10-17:35
「小刻みな税率引き上げが消費に与える影響：くじ消費実験による分析」
竹本 亨 （帝塚山大学経済経営学部・教授）
17:35-18:00
「Reciprocity is different: Experimental evidence from trust game between Japanese domestic and international students.」 （Authors： Tetsuya Kawamura, Yoichiro Fujii, Yusuke Osaki, Gou Otani and Ryuji Saito）
尾﨑祐介 （早稲田大学商学学術院・准教授） - Details
- 関西大学 研究所事務グループ（ソシオ機構）
E-mail riss@ml.kandai.jp
Tel 06-6368-1228