特別寄稿

Literatures, Histories, and Literary Histories

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The thesis held in common for all three topics in my title is that they must be considered pluralistically, something more easily presented in English than in Japanese.[1] The fact that English is a language whose nouns have easy plurals and Japanese is not shows that the languages of the world are far from being codes like Celsius and Fahrenheit, which can be mathematically transformed into each other. Since the languages vary, the literatures do also, even if there is also the opposite danger of thinking the differences between languages and their literatures more radical than they are. That matter is one to return to.

Even within a single language-culture, we must think pluralistically. Ideas of English literature have varied from the wide sense of what is written—*literatura*, letters—to the narrow sense of a normative or elitist canon. The modern idea of literature —as a separate body of fine writing distinct from other kinds of composition—emerged in the eighteenth century. Of course there were precursive conceptions. In the Renaissance there was a conception of literature as that consisting of narrative (epic), drama, and lyric, an idea first expressed in England by Milton. Similar matters exist in respect to Japanese literature. In a well known study, Watsuji Tetsurō's "Nihon Bungei to Bukkyō Shisō," the preface accounts for differences between "bungaku" and "bungei" (roughly speaking, literary study and literary art). In Japan as in China, "bun" (Ch. "wen") originally referred to, encompassed, lyric and certain kinds of history. Japan more quickly added fresh kinds of writing to what was normatively considered "bun": prose narratives like the *Genji Monogatari* and, later, serious linked poetry, ***renga***. Japan differs from China in also adding valued kinds of drama, ***nō*** and ***kyōgen***. On the other hand, certain kinds of writing were excluded from normatively considered "bun." The exclusion was less rigorous than in China, but only in recent times has that ***haikai*** linked poetry of Bashō and Buson been added to the canon of genuine literature, along with the dramatic forms of ***jōruri*** and ***kabuki***. The prose of about 1600 to 1860 has been the last to be added, and even today there are some who express reservations over the inclusion of some of the less serious prose, even if Saikaku would be included by all. On the other hand, we discover in dictionaries something termed ***joryūbungaku*** (literature by women). There is no ***danryūbungaku*** (literature by men),

since literature supposedly was written by men—by definition. That would have surprised the Japanese divinities. It flies in the face of the fact that Princess Uchiko was the greatest poet in Japan during the first half of the ninth century. And of course Murasaki Shikibu is the author of the greatest work in the language. These parodoxes and aberrations of literary history are, however, to be found in every country.

The terms being used here—"English literature, " "Chinese literature, " and "Japanese literature"—are not entirely correspondent. English literature is not simply something written in English, since it excludes American and Commonwealth writing. According to the definer, it may or may not include literature in Scots, but it almost certainly will include the Scottish Chaucerians. It includes Latin poetry by Milton, but it excludes what (most) foreign visitors have written in English while in England. Chinese literature has been for centuries what was written by the dominant Han (J. "kan") people or in their kinds and in Chinese by foreigners, especially Koreans, when resident in China. A typical Chinese dynastic collection like *The Complete Tang Poems* (J. *Zentōshi*) includes poems by male poets designated solely by name and then by others following within decreasingly respected categories: priests, women, barbarians. Eighty-five per cent of extant classical Korean poetry is said to be in Chinese, but the Chinese do not seem to think poetry is Chinese unless it was written in China. Today Chinese literature has other tolerated literatures, those of its minority peoples like the Miao.

Very few literary histiorians bother to consider what their subject is. Konishi Jin'ichi, author of a five-volume *Nihon Bungeishi*, is an exception. In the "Josetsu" to his first volume, he asks: "What is Japan?" "What is literature (bungei)?" And "What is history?" We need not agree with all his answers, but the responsibility shown is perhaps unprecedented. Like other Japanese, Konishi is inclined to think language the determining factor: if it is written in Japanese, it must be Japanese literature. He goes so far as to include Ainu and Ryukyuan literature. There is also a Japanese tendency to accept as Japanese literature some things written in other languages (particularly Chinese, of course) when written on Japanese soil.

As these few examples show, we must speak of literatures pluralistically, because our thoughts and actions show that we so assume and behave. The great danger in doing so, however, is that we may be led to presume that a definition current in a given country is the proper, inevitable, only one. Europeans have sometimes argued that Japan and China have no true epic or tragedy, and that therefore those literatures are inferior. Until recently, Chinese have seen nothing but barbarians around them. Japanese often think that their language is not only different but spiritually special, unavailable (with its literature) to foreigners. Each of these assumptions is essentially chauvinistic and unworthy of rational opposition. Instead, we should feel humility at the varieties of the literatures and our ignorance of all but a fraction of what exists.

As with our conceptions of literatures, so must our conception of histories be plural. There are two reasons, one quite obvious, the other not only less obvious but far more difficult. Obviously there are multiple histories of the same matters, numerous histories of Japanese literature. The more difficult matter involves the meanings attached to "history," as in the phrase, "the history of Meiji Japan" (or of Meiji literature). "History" designates two quite different meanings in such phrases. One involves events, Meiji happenings presumed actually to have occurred—what writing seeks to describe, to present, or to narrate. The second sense of "history" is precisely that other written version: the description, the presentation, the narration. We may distinguish the two histories in terms of history as event and history as account.

Events occur, happen, whether they are recorded or not. If no account of them is made, we know nothing of them. Beyond a century or two ago, events become dim. Of the greatest writers in Japanese and English, Murasaki Shikibu and Shakespeare, we know very little. On the other hand, with contemporary events, we have opposed problems. The events themselves seem much more available, as it were, but there are so many accounts that we may be quite unclear as to what really happened.

These issues involve the most complex discussed here. Although skeptical philosophers say that we have no proof of the real existence of the world, we all presume that it exists. Of course our only proof of its existence is our knowledge of it, but that is as high as we can aspire to the reality of anything. We may as well say we assume the existence of history as event, because in fact we do so assume. But both the assumption and the existence of actual events differ from our knowledge of the event. People under a certain age cannot have any direct knowledge of the Second World War. Their only access to knowledge of that time comes from history as account—from books, films, and so forth.

The one subject that each of us knows first-hand and well is our own lives. Our memory of ourselves gives us a sense of our own identity, to which all else is *other*. Yet even this most intimate and privileged knowledge is far from perfect. If challenged by a policeman to say what we had done just eleven months ago, most of us would feel panic and confusion—at least until we looked up the date and consulted our diaries and other records. Some few events require no written reminders. We will remember witnessing the death of a parent. A woman will remember giving birth to a child. Great success or great suffering will remain in our minds. We also know that what may be well remembered may be remembered differently by a group of people sharing knowledge of an event. Five witnesses to a serious automobile crash will recall somewhat different things. And the world's literary masterpieces are regarded differently by their several readers, even while each of the witnesses and each of the readers agrees with the others that there was an automobile crash or that the *Genji Monogatari* is a

prose narrative with certain identifiable features.

We have, then, two basic histories. One is history in the prime sense: what occurred. The other is history in the secondary sense: our knowledge of what occurred. That knowledge derives to some degree from personal experience of events but to far greater degree from reliance on accounts by others. The obstacles to our knowledge belong both to our limited capacities to know and to the nature of the evidence available. It may be insufficient: the silences of earlier centuries. Or it may be over-abundant: the noise of our own times. Whatever the case, almost all that we consider history consists of things of which we have no direct knowledge whatever. Rather than know the events, we know what has been recorded, what was said or written of them. More than that, what we term the Second World War is known to us as history made up of earlier histories. Those old enough to remember that war as event know very little from direct experience. All but a fraction of their knowledge derives from accounts: from news-paper or radio accounts at the time and from subsequent writings based on layer after layer of previous accounts.

These inescapable facts are of great importance to a consideration of the relation of the literatures to the histories. For one thing, there is no insurmountable barrier between them. One of the classics of Japanese "diary literature" is the *Murasaki Shikibu Nikki* (*The Diary of Murasaki Shikibu*). The factual nature of her account can be verified in places by non-literary diaries kept by men in a sort of Chinese. On the other hand, her diary is also considered to be a source for the *Eiga Monogatari* (*A Tale of Flowering Fortunes*), a historical work. Unfortunately, we have only portions of her diary extant in separate form, but the situation described is accurate. The *Heike Monogatari* (*The Tale of the Heike*) is yet more complex. The version usually read today is a literary version of a complex historical sequence involving the downfall of the once triumphant Taira family. Many other versions exist, however, whether in Chinese or Japanese, and some are deemed historical rather than literary. On the other hand, the familiar version and other stories it influenced have really taken some figures out of history. For example, the figure of that ideal of Japanese chivalry, Minamoto Yoshitsune, has now become so much a matter of account rather than a real event that nobody really knows what his character and life were like. The accounts have superseded events. It is not surprising that an early eleventh-century work like Murasaki Shikibu's *Diary* should be fragmentary, lost in silences. It *is* surprising that for Yoshitsune, written about in *The Tale of the Heike* only two centuries later, there should be too much noise, too much writing, and too little certainty.

The evidence is not merely Asian. All of us presume that in the eighteenth century there occurred the French Revolution, although of course none of us witnessed the actual events. As students of English literature, we may derive our knowledge of that

historical event from literature, fore xample Wordsworth's *Prelude* ("Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, / But to be young was very Heaven!") or Dickens' *Tale of Two Cities* ("It was the best of times; it was the worst of times."). There is also Carlyle's long book, *The French Revolution*, from which I at least remember little more than the image of a great green wave for the Terror. The three examples show once again that we derive our knowledge of actual events not from the events themselves but from writing about them. That also shows that we may derive knowledge about actual events from literature. Carlyle's example is especially interesting. If we take away the italics from his title, we designate actual events. Add the italics and we have an account of the events. Not only that. Although formerly considered a history, the work is now considered literary.[2] In other words, the distinction between literature and history is not as great as the distinction between literature and history on the one hand and actual events on the other.

Of course we do posit a difference between literature and history also. We further posit some kind of relation between them. What is that relation? Two kinds of answers have been given, two explanations. One may be termed intellectual or spiritual. According to this view, thought determines action; mind determines reality; ideas determine what happens. What occurs as actual event is caused by the spirit of the time, *l'esprit du temps, die Zeitgeist*. The other explanation may be termed social. Now actual events determine literature and other manifestations of thought. Not only does action determine thought; reality determines mind; what happens determines ideas. According to the familiar Marxist version of this thesis (held also by many of conservative mind), the material means of production determine human response.

If, however, we recall the distinction between the two histories, neither explanation satisfies. We presume actual events out of a sense of the actualness of ourselves. That presumption of actuality is one that does not depend on our knowledge of it for its existence, so that the intellectual account is not tenable as a *causal* account of reality. It does hold as it were in the wake of actuality, however, since actual events are possessed by us only as we know them, and for actual events of almost all presumed kinds, our knowledge derives from accounts rather than from the events themselves. That in turn works against the social explanation, because it posits that what we know is caused by what is in actuality, when as we have seen our access to the actual is through our knowledge.

Let us consider an example, the origin of the English novel. The standard account relates it to an emergent middle-class readership. The "intellectual" explanation would hold that changes in thought brought about social changes, and that the novel is caused by the changes in thought. The "social" explanation would hold that changes in actuality determined the energence of the novel in England. The intellectual explanation is

problematical in assuming that mind may determine prime history, when we presume instead that things have existed and do exist even without their being known. The social explanation is problematical in offering as a cause what is accessible to us only insofar as it is known, something that varies from knower to knower.

The dilemma is easily enough resolved. The intellectual view cannot exist without the premise of the existence of the actual, and the social view could not exist for us without being known. In short, we must assume constant relation, interaction. There is what may be determed a dialectic between actuality and the known. Moreover, the two histories exist in ceaseless interaction. For our purposes, in accounting for anything, what exists does exist only as it is known, and whatever the problems with philosophical realism, what we know provides our sole access to actuality. Features of this issue will reappear almost at once as we move to our third topic.

The literary histories are also plural. They are plural in an obvious sense of being multiple for the same phenomena—thirteenth-century waka or English Romantic poetry, the Kamakura bakufu or Victorian politics. Whether histories of literature or of social matters, all are obviously examples of history as account. They account for literary or social events. At the same time, however, these accounts also have the status of events. They did occur, and there was a time before which they were not. We may refer to these literary or social histories therefore as events-accounts. In that they are alike. They differ, however, in that a literary history is an event-account of events that are writings—accounts of a kind—in the first instance: thirteenth-century waka, Romantic poetry. A social history is an event-account of what are, at the beginning, events: the Kamakura bakufu, Victorian politics. Actual social events occur and then can be returned to no more, as accounts may be, if they are not lost. We can return to a history of Kamakura bakufu, but not to the bakufu itself. The object of historical attention has ceased to be, and only accounts remain, insofar as they do remain. With the arts, however, the object of attention continues to exist (if it does continue), like the history of Heian waka or the Kamakura bakufu. Indeed, it has a cognitive status as something more than an account. So as to include the other arts as well, we may say that the object of literary attention is an expression, whether as a poem or as a work of architecture. And this expression continues to exist as the basis of primary interest long after it was first an event in history, whereas kinds of knowledge other than aesthetic normally do not feature the expression itself so much (as the object of attention) but rather what is expressed. This difference is only a relative one, but it is a significant one nonetheless.

To the extent that these differences exist and matter, we might assume that a history of literature or architecture might, in principle, have some differences from a history of German cities during the Reformation. Certainly literary histories must be considered

pluralististically. There are many accounts of the same things, whether thirteenth-century waka or Romantic lyrics. These poetic expressions (all literary works) differ from medieval merchant practices and early nineteenth-century administration of the English poor laws. They differ, as we have seen, because from their first appearance as events the waka and the English lyrics were already expressed knowledge. This clearly relates to the fact that the object of attention in a literary or other history may be the aesthetic expression, and to that extent there is bound to be a difference between their histories and those of medieval Japanese merchants or the English poor in Wordsworth's time. In practice, however, there may be more of a distinction than a difference. Literary historians commonly spend less time talking about aesthetic expressions—poems, plays, narratives—and more on social events, biography, dates of composition and publication, sources, and so forth. Very commonly the only major difference is not in the nature of the history but simply the label, whether "literary" or "political" or some other.

There are other considerations. One is that certain kinds of histories are themselves included as part of literature (*bun*) from the beginning, whether in Japan, China, or Korea. Also, it is noticeable that Japanese at least do not share that taste for closely defined and distinct categories that is clear in the West from the time of the Greek Academy. Finally, literature differs from the other arts in having a verbal medium, a version of natural language, that is shared with many other kinds of knowledge. It is easy to exaggerate the practical differences between a history of literature and of many other subjects, except of course for the specifics of what is accounted for.

Literary histories are pluralistic on other grounds than the possibility of several treating the same topic. In particular, they may vary in their handling of periodization. We distinguish literary periods for the same reason that we distinguish literary kinds or genres: to have units larger than the single particular and smaller than the whole. There is no need to discuss whether the medium-range concepts are logically valid or whether they are historical and critical fictions. (Presumably the only true history is that seen by the mind of God, to which periods, nations, and our other distinctions are irrelevant.) The fact is that we do periodize and think that we cannot do without periods. Japanese were on to this very early in their literary tradition, at least as early as the *Kokinshū*. Tsurayuki's Japanese preface selects six important poets from the past and then compares with them the poets of his age. Even the *ko-kin* of the title suggest a historical distinction. In England, however, the concept of a literary age does not explicitly appear until Dryden. One may say that many of our ancestors led happy, useful lives without the concept of a literary period. But one must also say that once such a conception is born there seems to be no avoiding its usage.

In other words, the real problem lies in the logic of periodizing. The discussion of the literatures and the histories has made clear that we cannot say that history is

the cause of literature. But what does our periodizing mean? Take the periods of English literature. Sometimes we talk of centuries, so postulating that literature (and other matters, presumably) change every hundred years after the birth of Christ: a religious event is the point of departure. The alternative to centuries is well known. In it the first English period is the Middle Ages. It is not clear to me why we begin with a middle, or why we should have to use the plural, "Ages," for this period alone. Next comes the Renaissance, a word meaning "rebirth." What was reborn is one thing, and another is when that rebirth ended. Years ago somebody wrote that the Middle Ages ended with the charting of the Royal Society (1662). More people seem to think that the Renaissance ends about then, followed by the Restoration and Eighteenth Century. There is no discernible logic to a period characterized by a political event (taken to end, apparently, in 1700, fifteen years after the death of the restored king) and then the first century to help designate a literary period in English. (Italians of course love centuries.) Next comes the Romantic period, a now positive term that had once been derogatory. Then comes the Victorian period, the first always named after a monarch. Thereafter we move bit by bit to the modern and nowadays to the postmodern. It is a mess.

Chinese and American literary historical periodizing is far neater but no more logical. The Chinese periodize by reigning dynasties, as if no poet could differ from other poets as long as the Tang (Tō) dynasty continued, but all poets had to change overnight when the Sung (Sō) dynasty began. American literature is periodized by wars, apparently on the self-congratulatory assumption that wars occur so seldom for the United States that when they do, literature has a moral obligation to change. Women have pointed out that to use wars as defining points is largely to exclude women's writing. On the other hand, a recent anthology of women's literature in English designates all before 1800 as a single early unit, which is inappropriate to literature by men.

The periodizing of Japanese literature is wonderfully rich and strange, since such different means have been devised. One is to use the names of dominant families, so that we sometimes hear of Fujiwara literature (more often of art) and frequently of Tokugawa literature. Apart from the inherent illogicality of either by itself or both together, those terms leave out all before the Fujiwara, all after the Tokugawa, and all between. Another system often encountered periodizes literature according to the seat of the capital or of governmental power. Who has not heard of Heian, Kamakura, Muromachi, and so forth? On this view, literature should have changed rapidly before the Heian period, since the capital was often moved, whether to here in Naniwa, there in Ōmi, or here and there in Yamato. Strange to say, there is not now a Tokyo literature. Instead, we shift periodizing to the reigning monarchs, giving us a Meiji period (forty-six years), a Taishō period (fourteen years), and a Shōwa period (sixty two years as

of this writing). Meiji Tennō was of course a prolific poet, but he cannot be said to dominate literature during his reign. Even if he could have, nobody would think so about Taisho Tennō (during whose reign so many fine events occurred). Japanese literature is periodized in a third way, which is the most logical of any mentioned so far: old or ancient (*kodai*), medieval (*chūsei*), recent (*kindai*) and modern (*gendai*). One can foresee a problem of that *gendai* getting longer and longer, but for the present we need not worry. What does cause trouble is the tendency to wish to adjust, as with the postulation of a period between ancient and medieval, a kind of old-middle (*chūko*). But the most serious difficulty is establishing the bounds of the Middle Ages. That period has been stretched back to the eighth century and brought forward to the verge of the nineteenth.

There is not much we can do about period names and their illogicality. We can and ought to remind ourselves every Monday morning that period names are labels for convenience and without genuine historical explanatory power. Unfortunately, that useful advice will be followed by nobody, including the one who offers it.

Another problem with literary history involves what may be termed narrative ends, where things tend, the logic of historical process. In Japanese literary history one such narrative end is the decline of the royal court, which appears to occur from the Jinshin no Ran in 672 to the Ōnin no Ran in 1467. That decline must have been imperceptible, since it required eight centuries to occur. An English end is similar in strangeness but opposite in tendency. That is the rise of the middle class. In various accounts, the middle class is rising in Chaucer's lifetime, and the process seems to have continued to the end of the nineteenth century, perhaps the First World War. Perhaps it continues yet in "bourgeois" countries. It has certainly taken the risers a long time to get up. Then there are the Marxists. For them, history certainly has an end. It begins in either a slave period or a feudal period. That is followed by the period of the bourgeiosie or capitalism, which is followed by socialism, which will culminate in communism. From all appearances, socialism seems likely to defer communism for a period as long as the combined decline of the Japanese court and the rise of the English bourgeoisie. In any event, it is extremely difficult to discover a bourgeois or capitalist period in the *past* histories of present socialist countries.

Laughable as our concepts and terms are, we must recognize that every literary historian has some end, even if the fact is denied. The most "scientific" historian of literature, compiling what is tantamount to a bibliography of authors, dates, and titles has precisely a positivistic end. The value of carefully ascertained detail varies not only from one historian to the next but also from one culture or nation and one (may I say it?) period to another. Positivistic literary history is out of fashion in Europe and North America, where the intellectual and ideological are favored. It seems to me that,

because of their love of particulars, Japanese continue to find greater appeal in positivistic history. As evidence I would point to the large number of references books (*jisho, jiten*) produced in Japan. Behind me in my study there are of course English, French, German, Greek, and Latin dictionaries, as there are also *Kōjien* and a *kanji* dictionary. But there are also two *kogo jiten*, a *nandoku chimei jiten*, a *nandoku seimei jiten*, and a *kotoba asobi jiten*. On other bookshelves, there stand many other useful *jiten* printed in Tokyo. In our library there are even *zuihitsu jiten*. And of course I have *jiten* devoted to Japanese history along with those devoted to Japanese literature (and its history).

Clearly, Japanese are devoted to historical writing, seeming to prize every fact ascertainable from the past. Even Japanese literature and other arts practiced are historical in a sense that I do not recognize in other literatures. Japanese have not only preserved *gagaku* and books lost in China but also the performance of their own arts. It is a kind of miracle that we can see *nō, bunraku*, and *kabuki* performed in lines of acting and staging that are unbroken from the past. There are even one or two people alive who have practiced Satomura school *renga*. This is not to mention the many groups devoted to composing *tanka* and *haiku*. One may almost say that in Japan the literatures include their own histories.

Japan is an appropriate place, then, to raise some issues that have come to feature in recent literary debate in the United States. Until a year or so ago, literary study was dominated—at least in terms of newsworthy, prestigious study exciting young minds—by a theoretical emphasis hostile to historical understading. Literary theories—once again the plural should be stressed—are essential to our study, I believe, because habits of theoretical inquiry enable us to conceptualize far more rigorously, to define what we do with greater precision and justice. But the denial of history—of all the histories—is, in my view, an intellectual, human betrayal. Our own lives show that to understand any of us, it is necessary to know what a given person has lived through, and we can only hope that our children and grandchildren will have a history, which is to say a future that will become their past.

There really has been a sudden and profound change in literary thinking in the United States. Two years ago Yale dominated the academic literary world, and Deconstruction dominated Yale. Deconstruction and related literary views are now on the defensive. Nobody is more sensitive to changes in literary thought than J. Hillis Miller, who was formerly at Yale and who remains a strong proponent of "theory in the sense of an orientation toward language as such," or in other words Deconstruction and related ideas. In his speech as president of the Modern Language Association in December, 1986, he spoke of what "everyone knows." In fact, few people did in any sense of full awareness. Here are some of his words:

> As everyone knows, literary study in the past few years has undergone a sudden, almost universal turn away from theory in the sense of an orientation toward language as such and has made a corresponding turn toward history, culture, politics, institutions, class and gender conditions—[3]

Why should such a change have taken place?

There are many reasons. One is that the insistent anti-historical line of Deconstruction and of some other theories created an opposition. It is no accident that varieties of neo-Marxist criticism gained strength as a kind of intellectual antidote to Deconstruction, for whatever else Marxism may be, it is founded on a view of history. Another reason involves the rise and maturation of women's studies. The effort to recover and publish what women had written, but was long ignored, involved historical research. And the efforts to explain both its being ignored and to what ends it was written required historical explanation.

Among other reasons that might be added there are two of interest. One is that the study of literary theories and the explanations of what they meant showed that the theories themselves had precursors and histories of development. The anti-historical was itself a historical phenomenon. More importantly, the formerly dominant theory did not allow for matters of great importance. These are human concerns that I shall call community, responsibility, and trust. To lose our common ground with other people, to lose our action and responsibility for it, and to lose belief in each other—these are losses too great for many people to wish to endure.

There are many new kinds of history come into being. One, termed the New Historicism, began in English renaissance studies.[4] Varieties of neo-Marxism and women's studies have already been mentioned. It is proper to term these *new* kinds of history, because they differ from the kind of literary history practiced before the entry of literary theory into our thought and writing. One may say that historical study is now more theoretical than before, more problematic, and—at its best—more difficult. Most of these remarks have been meant to show as much. And since my remarks have grown more personal, I shall close with two further observations in kind. One is that many years ago—in 1961—Robert H. Brower and I published a book on waka entitled *Japanese Court Poetry*. Considered today, that book really does belong to a generation ago, as is revealed by its combination of an older concept of literary history with a version of the anglo-American New Criticism. It would be most interesting to see what its replacement would be. The second observation is that for three years at Princeton we have had an informal group of people interested in issues involving both literature and history, along with the theoretical implications of the combination. Meetings of the group have brought together people from classics, art, East Asian studies, Near Eastern studies, and religion, but the strongest representation has been from history, comparative

literature, and English. That our mixed group should also be interested in theoretical issues shows that "theory" must also be considered pluralistically. It is appropriate, then, to end with a revision of my title: literatures, histories, literary histories, and theories.

NOTES

1) This is a version of a paper delivered at Kansai University on 23 June 1987. I wish to thank my generous hosts, particularly professor Akira Yasukawa, as also the attentive members of the audience for their questions.
2) This does not mean that Carlyle's *French Revolution* has been fictionalized. It is a modern Western assumtpion, not an Asian one, that literature must be fictional. For that matter, Aristotle says in the *Poetics* that tragic characters and literature may be either factual or fictional (Ch. 9, beginning, on "names").
3) *PMLA*, 102 (1987), 283.
4) See Jean Howard, "The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies", *English Literary Renaissance*, 16 (1986), 13—43. She reviews the work of a number of people identified with New Historicism. In the same issue (pp. 5—12), one of the group who is among the most widely cited, Louis Montrose, offers various principles and warnings. Some people criticize the New Historicism for being too ideological or for using too little or too restricted a basis of evidence to sustain the generalizations built upon it.