- 研究会
RISSワークショップ（2020年12月1日）を開催いたします。
日時： 2020年12月1日（火） 16時30分～18時00分
場所： オンライン・セミナー
報告者： 黒阪健吾氏 （広島修道大学経済科学部准教授）
タイトル："Endogenous Timing and Income Inequality in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment"
要旨：This paper theoretically and experimentally investigates the effects of potential donors' heterogeneous incomes on the timing and level of contributions to public goods when timings are endogenously determined by contributors. To this end, we use the conventional voluntary provision model of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986) except for Cobb-Douglas preferences augmented with a two-stage game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The following three results are obtained. First, when income is extremely unequal, potential contributors are indifferent between simultaneous and sequential moves in the contribution game, even if they have different preferences toward a public good. Second, as income inequality decreases, the simultaneous-move contribution game is more likely to emerge because each potential contributor prefers to act as a leader. Third, most of the theoretical predictions regarding the timing decisions and the level of contributions to public goods are supported by our laboratory experiment.
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