RISSワークショップ（2020年6月16日）を開催いたします。
RISSワークショップ
日時： 2020年6月16日（火）18：00～19：30
場所： オンライン・セミナー
報告者： 松田一茂 （一橋大学）
タイトル："College Education and Income Contingent Loans in Equilibrium:
Theory and Quantitative Evaluation" (with Karol Mazur) "
要旨： This paper investigates the welfare and efficiency implications of
income-contingent loans (ICLs) for financing risky college graduation.
We show that the laissez-faire allocation is constrained inefficient.
Furthermore, we show that although ICLs can restore the second best
efficiency of the economy, the social planner may achieve the same
outcomes using progressive income tax systems. Building on these
insights, we construct an overlapping generations life-cycle economy
with heterogeneous agents and calibrate it to the US education and
labor markets. While the current design of ICLs induces significant
redistribution across wealth-ability groups, it does not increase
overall utilitarian welfare, as it is largely substituted by the
existing progressive income tax system.
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