RISSワークショップ（2020年6月10日）を開催いたします。
RISSワークショップ
日時： 2020年6月10日（水）17:00～18:30
場所： Zoomにて開催いたします
報告者： 難波 敏彦 （本機構PD）
タイトル： "The Cost of Gaming in Quota Contracts"
要旨：
This paper studies the effect of system gaming in the dynamic moral hazard model. It is well known that the gaming is an important problem when firms use a nonlinear incentive contract such as quota-based contracts.However, it is not known how the gaming affects the type of the optimal contract. In this paper, we characterize the optimal incentive contract and show that if the agent's productivity is relatively high, quota-based contracts is more profitable for firms than linear contract even when the agent can manipulate outputs. Moreover, we compare this gaming situation with non-gaming situation in which the agent can not game the system in order to investigate the effect of gaming. We also show that if the agent is less productive, then the gaming effect is more profitable for firms.
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