

*An Effective Way of Teaching the Expression of
Future Matters in English;
Part Two: Objective versus Rhetorical Uses of
Simple Future Tenses:
Chapters Two and Three*

英語における未来表現の効果的な教授法の試み
第2部：単純未来表現における客観的用法と修辭的用法の対比
第2～第3章

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前号記載の第2部第1章では、筆者が見分けている「不可避の結果の予報表現」の4種類のうち、特に「<後>という時間の区分に起こる不可避の結果の予報表現」と「抑制不可能な衝動の不可避の結果の予報表現」（以下の29ページの図参照）という2種類それぞれの客観的応用と修辭的応用の対比の本論の続きとして、第2章では「不屈の決意に起因する不可避の結果の予報表現」の客観的[準修辭的?]応用の特徴と発語脈絡上の使用条件を記述した後、他者の行動に見いだせられた習慣性の強い出来事の一貫したパターンに対する発語者側の情動的態度の修辭的転用、および（/Cinderella **shall** go to the ball!/が典型的使用例になる）発語者の決意と能力・権力などによって不可避の結果が他者に強いられることを宣言し、助動詞の特殊な使い分けを特徴とする拡張的表現に次々と焦点を当て、後者のやや複雑な含意を明らかにする。また、第3章では、「<後>という時間の区分に起こる不可避の結果の予報表現」と対照的1対を成す「<直ぐ>という時間の区分に起こる不可避の結果の予報表現」の3通りの表現の使い分けの基準を考察し、実際の計画性を隠すような修辭的応用を取り上げる。（ページ数制限のため、計画の宣言表現（1種類）、予定の報告表現（4種類）、それぞれについての論札は、続編の章に委ねざるを得ない。）

Key words

- ① objective vs. rhetorical applications ② predictions of inevitable results
③ indomitable determination ④ the two segments of future time

キーワード

- ①客観的応用対修辭的応用 ②不可避の結果の予報表現 ③不屈の決意 ④未来の時間的2区分

Chapter Two: Predictions of Inevitable Results of Indomitable Determination

Let us start from two pairs, of possible options concerning expression of almost the same items of content:

- | | |
|---------------------------|---|
| F1 c Instant-verb: | Whatever you say, I will marry her and be happy! |
| F2 | Whatever you say, I am going to marry her and be happy. |
| F1 c State-verb: | I will not tolerate such behavior in my subordinates! |
| F2 | I am not going to tolerate such behavior in my subordinates! |

2.1. F1 c compared with F2

- a) **F1 c** Instant-verb: Whatever you say, I **will** marry her and be happy!

It is obvious that the Addresser **ought** to be **declaring a plan of action** – that of marrying the woman that he loves. That is to say that, if he treats what he wants to communicate **objectively**, he ought instead to choose **F2**, and say (or write),

- F2** Whatever you [may] say, I **am going to marry** her and [**am going to**] **be** happy.

On the other hand, */whatever you [may] say/* shows that his **Addressee** has already expressed stout opposition to this plan, and has told him that he should **not** carry it out, and probably also **why** he should not (*e.g.* the woman in question is not regarded as being suited to the Addresser). All such **opposition** creates within the Addresser **Special** communicative **Needs**: he needs to express the idea that, **by now, no one** can prevent his future marriage to that particular woman.

On the other hand, as a way of expressing an intention, **F2** is not particularly **forceful**. The reason for this lack of force is that the executant of the plan is expressed as having **complete ownership** of the future action; and, therefore, **might very well** be persuaded to change or abandon it, before it can be carried out.

Therefore, in order to communicate to his Addressee that he **cannot possibly** be persuaded to give up the idea of marrying the woman that he has chosen, he has avoided

expressing **any degree whatsoever** of ownership of this plan and, instead, has attributed the **cause** of this future action to his own **general nature**:

a) **F1 c**: Whatever you say, I **will** marry her and be happy!

In effect, the Addresser is extremely strongly implying that ‘my **nature** (or **character**) cannot, of course, be changed by anything you say to me; and that nature (or character) **leaves even me, myself, no choice at all** but to marry her in the future.’ This future act is thus expressed as being by now **involuntary**, and therefore as **inevitable**.

This is the most forceful way in which, in English, an Addresser can express **indomitable determination** with regard to the future – paradoxically through implying that her future action is now **beyond her own control** – let alone the control, or interference, of anyone else.

And the indomitableness of that determination is conveyed by the specially-stressed enunciation of */will/* that **always accompanies use of F1 c in positive statements**:

I **will** marry her
· ● . . .

This emphatic utterance of */will/* is not normally used with either **F1 a** or **F1 b**. (The only kind of utterance in which it **is** used with **F1 a** or **F1 b** is in a **non-abrupt contradiction** as in B’s response in the next example; and this is a **Special-needs** utterance:

F1 a **A:** She won’t mind if you borrow her car.
F1 a **B:** But she **will** [mind]!

We can ascertain that this, **F1 c**, is not merely a form of **F1 a**, because the prediction is not limited to the farther future – in fact, it applies from ‘now’, and thenceforth.

Next, let us examine a similar **negative** statement:

b) **F1 c** State-verb: I **will not tolerate** such behavior in my subordinates!

In example (b), the Addresser, again, might have used, instead of **F1 c, F2**:

F2 I am *not* going to tolerate such behavior in my subordinates!

She is obviously the boss of a number of subordinates, and therefore she has **complete ownership** over what she is willing to tolerate in their conduct, and what she is not. So, *if* she were to apply the system of expressions of the future with **strict objectivity**, she would have to choose **F2**.

Yet, instead, she chooses **F1 c** – because, again, she has **Special communicative Needs**.

Her real desire is not in the least merely to announce **a plan that can easily be changed or abandoned**; no, what she wishes to do is, instead, to give her Addressee[s] (possibly one or more of those subordinates) a **very clear** warning, that the same kind of behavior in the future will bring about an **involuntary** result – which is presumably her becoming angry, and possibly imposing some form of punishment, or penalty, as well.

Therefore her judgment of such behavior is presented as neither a considered course of action (**F2** – which might easily be **re**considered, case by case) nor any weak capitulation to an uncontrollable compulsion (**F1 b**). This is further stressed by the emphatic utterance of */not ~/* – which **always accompanies negative statements expressed with F1 c**:

I will *not* tolerate **OR** I will *not* tolerate

• • ● • • • • • • • ● ● • •

This response is being expressed as, by now, lying outside the domain of her own (or any one else's) control: it is an '**ownership-impossible**' response, and she **merely** predicts that it will be the **involuntary result** of any further examples of 'such behavior'. And the '**mereness**' of the prediction, paradoxically, underlines the immovability of her determination.

And, here again, we can ascertain that this is not merely a form of **F1 a**, because the prediction is not limited to any farther segment of future time – it applies from '**now**' onwards.

**2.2. Rhetorical use of F1 c, in summaries of patterns of occurrence:
involuntary → voluntary**

c) **F1 c** Process-verb: He **will** [always] **come** late to class, damn him!

The emphatic utterance of */will/* –

He **will** [**always**] come late to class

· ● ○ · · ○ · ○

– is the characteristic of positive statements expressing future matters through using **F1 c**; and it is not normally used with either **F1 a** or **F1 b**. But why hasn't the Addresser used **F1 b**? After all, 'his' so frequently being late for class is presumably something that 'he' 'cannot help' happening. So isn't the most **objective, Default choice F1 b**?

Here, we must first of all distinguish between **F1 b** – which (normally) **objectively** predicts a **single** inevitable result of some **uncontrollable compulsion**, as in the following example,

F1 b If Takeo goes to Namba tomorrow, he *will* only *end up* playing all-night mah jongg again.

and this **rhetorical** use of **F1 c**, as seen in example (c), which **summarises** one feature of someone's habitual behavior (*i.e.* it expresses an abstracted **pattern of occurrence**), and thus of their character or **nature**. Such a **summary** of course **implies** '... and the very same thing can only happen **next** time, too,' and thus is (or can be used to express) an indirect prediction; but, fundamentally, it concerns not the future but the enduring (and – alas – unchanging) **nature** of the executant of whom the behaviour thus summarized is not so much predicted as **predicated**.

Secondly, we should not overlook the fact that the Addresser of example (c), too, is evidently **angry**, or at least **exasperated**; and she implicitly expresses this by describing 'him' as though he were not merely lazy, or unlucky, or careless, but were behaving according to an **indomitable determination** deliberately to be late for all his classes. Because any such determination is, objectively speaking, highly unlikely to be appropriately attributed to the person referred to, this paradoxical choice of expression has the rhetorical effect of **drawing attention to the Addresser's implicit attitude**; and this, too, is something that is absent from any use of **F1 b**.

Finally, in this special pattern of use of **F1 c**, there is implied no limit of application to time at all – not even to the future; so this obviously differs from **F1 a**, too.

Another example of this kind of **extended** use of **F1 c** is seen in example (d), below:

d) **F1 c** Process-verb: Our grandmother **will no longer eat** properly. I think she's lost her appetite.

Again, we always find the characteristic emphatic utterance of both the negative adverb-phrase, */no longer/*, the auxiliary verb, */will/*, and the main verb, */eat/*, all of which uses of emphasis are characteristic only of ***negative statements in which F1 c is used:***

will no longer eat properly



Here too, although the Addresser immediately explains that the cause lies in the nature of her grandmother's state of health, she **summarizes** a pattern in her grandmother's (recent) behavior, and expresses a subjective attitude of (probably not anger, but certainly) dismay, and perhaps concerned exasperation, by **choosing** to express her grandmother's failure to feel hungry as **though it were** the result of a stubborn, **indomitable determination** not to eat. As in the case of (c), above, while this is very unlikely to be objectively true, using this meets the Addresser's Special communicative Needs.

2.3. Extension of F1 c: proclamation of the imposition of the Addresser's will on one or more executants other than herself

Usually, the person that feels some **indomitable determination** to cause a change, or to bring about a state, is also a participant in that change or state:

a) **F1 c:** Whatever you say, I **will** marry her and be happy!

Here the Addresser is **both** the person who feels the determination and the **executant** of the future instant-change.

b) **F1 c** State-verb: I **will not tolerate** such behavior in my subordinates!

In (b), the Addresser is both the person that feels the determination and the subject of the state.

c) **F1 c** Process-verb: He **will** [always] **come** late to class, damn him!

Again, in (c), the Subject is both the person **rhetorically expressed as** feeling the indomitable determination, and also the executant that acts according to that determination.

And in (d), too, the same applies:

- d) **F1 c** Process-verb: Our grandmother **will no longer eat** properly. I think she's lost her appetite.

There is, however, also a special **extension** of **F1 c**, in which the person that feels and expresses the **indomitable determination** is one whose only (if crucial) relation to the change or state is that of **causing it to come about**.

In order to illustrate me, let me take as example the plot of the fairy tale 'Cinderella'.

Cinderella is, of course, the beautiful daughter of her father's first wife; but her mother has died, her father has remarried, and he now has two other daughters by his second wife; and none of these three women is particularly attractive. As they are all jealous of Cinderella's beauty, they treat her as a mere servant-girl, and prevent her father from giving her any fine clothes, or even a bedroom of her own. (Her nickname comes from the cinders among which she is forced to sleep, down in the kitchen, in front of its hearth, in order to keep warm.)

The Crown Prince of the kingdom in which Cinderella's family lives wishes to marry, and he decides to hold a ball at his palace, and to invite to it all the unmarried but marriageable girls of good family in the kingdom, so as to choose from among them a wife.

Along with her sisters, Cinderella too receives an invitation; but she has no fine clothes to wear to the ball, and so cannot possibly attend it.

On the night of the ball, her stepmother and stepsisters leave her behind them, weeping at home. Whereupon there suddenly appears in the kitchen a mysterious old lady, who **proclaims**,

Cinderella **shall** go to the ball!

This old lady is, in fact, Cinderella's godmother; and she also has a fairy's magic powers. She loves her poor goddaughter, and so she is determined that Cinderella shall have a chance of winning the Crown Prince's heart.

As you know, she uses her powers to create a beautiful ball-gown, a pair of glass (originally *fur*) slippers to dance in, and a coach with six horses, to carry Cinderella to and back from the palace. This magic will, however, last only until midnight.

F1 a-b were, of course, **originally** expressed like this:

| | |
|------------------------|---------------------|
| I shall go | we shall go |
| you will go | you will go |
| s/he/it will go | they will go |

(Many older, educated competent users of standard British English and Educated Australian still observe these distinctions – at least in writing and considered speech.)

On the other hand, **F1 c** was expressed like this, with */will/* and */shall/* used in opposite ways:

| | |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| I will go | we will go |
| you shall go | you shall go |
| she shall go | they shall go |

In the case of the **first**-person subjects (*/I/* and */we/*), the subject [or subjects] that is[are], we might say, **possessed by the indomitable determination** in question is [are] also the executant[s] of the future change, or subject[s] of the future state. But, in the case of **other**-person subjects (*/you/*, */she/*, */you/*, and */they/*), the **Addresser** is the **agent** that is both **possessed by the indomitable determination** and also will **bring about** the change or state, yet is **not** the **executant** (or executants) of that change or state. Thus, the executant's own **execution** is implicitly proclaimed to be **involuntary**.

And, although the distinction between */shall/* and */will/* with the **first**-person is gradually disappearing from most varieties of contemporary English, in the case of **second** or **third** persons, this special **F1-c** use of */shall/* is still in currency (though, alas, apparently likewise fast dying out). Again, in positive statements, */shall/* is uttered emphatically; and, in negative statements, either */not/* or else, more rarely, and according to context, the main verb is emphasized:

F1 c Cinderella shall **not** go [**OR not go**] to the ball!

Next let us consider three **other** choices, with which an Addresser could express **almost** the same content:


F3 a Cinderella **is to go** to the ball!

F3 b ii The matter has been settled: Cinderella **goes** to the ball, after all!

F3 c Cinderella **is going** to the ball after all!

2.4. Extension of F1 c compared with F3 a

As the following chart shows, there are also other ways in which an Addresser **can** express something that she is determined should happen.



And one of these is by using **F3 a**, a report of a schedule of involuntary action that has been unilaterally imposed, and so is impossible to change; so let us first compare the pragmatic effect of using **F1 c** with that of using **F3 a**:

- e) **F1 c** Cinderella **shall go** to the ball!
- f) **F3 a** Cinderella **is to go** to the ball!

But by employing what criterion does any Addresser choose between these two expressions?

Of course, just as in the other examples we have already compared above, her choice will be determined by her **communicative needs**. The use, in example (e), of **F1 c** implicitly but clearly **acknowledges** that the Addresser herself is both the person that is **possessed by** the indomitable determination and also the person who is going to **bring about** the change or state, even though she is not its **actual executant**, or subject.

In many situations, this can rhetorically function as both an effectual admission of **agency** of the change and also an acceptance of **responsibility** for bringing it about. Thus, it implicitly says to Cinderella, 'You can trust me, for **I** have both the **determination** and the **power** to bring this about, and **I** will and can **make sure that it happens**.'

Just as in the case of a use of any of **F1 a~b** and **d**, the **executant** (here, Cinderella herself)

has of course **no ownership** of her future action: her Godmother **predicts** that she will attend the ball ***whether she likes it or not*** [= **involuntarily**] (though of course Cinderella does want to go – very much); and the Fairy Godmother’s indomitable determination, which springs from her loving **nature**, so possesses her that **neither** does ***she herself*** have **any ownership** over causing this to come about: she ‘cannot stop herself’ from doing so [= **involuntary**].

Thus, this pattern of use of **F1 c** likewise predicts an **ownership-impossible** future matter. (Or, more accurately speaking, the Addresser acknowledges complete ownership of the **change** that Cinderella will carry out, but none at all of the **cause** of that change, which is expressed as arising inevitably [= **involuntarily**] from the Addresser’s own nature.) Given these unmistakable implications, must we not conclude that not even **this** use of F1 c constitutes what can properly be termed a genuinely ‘**volitional**’ future tense: for it carries with it too many implications of **inevitability**, for not just executant/subject, but also for the person that cannot but bring about the change or state in question.

On the other hand, the use of **F3 a** in example (f),

f) **F3 a** Cinderella **is to go** to the ball!

conceals the **agent** that has **unilaterally imposed** the **schedule** that it **reports**. All that it implies is, ‘As things now stand, this is what **must come about** [= **involuntary**], because **someone** (or some group) **has decided it**.’ The Addressee is merely informed that the schedule reported **is indeed** owned, but not in the least necessarily by the Addresser (or by Cinderella, the executant, either): that is to say, it does not commit the Addresser to revealing whether or not she herself has any degree of ownership of the schedule: that schedule is consequently expressed as being **ownership-opaque**.

Thus, use of **F3 a** avoids implying any connection between the schedule and the Addresser herself. Moreover, it contains **no** implicit expression of either the Addresser’s own (indomitable) **determination**, or her **agency** in bringing about this future change – let alone acknowledging any **responsibility**, on the Addresser’s part, for so doing.

2.5. Extension of F1 c compared with F3 b ii

Much the same applies to another possible expression of a schedule, **F3 b ii: timetable**:

g) **F3 b ii** The matter has been settled: Cinderella **goes** to the ball after all!

In a particular situation, such as the Fairy Godmother's visit to help poor, neglected Cinderella, this too could effectively be used as an indirect expression of the Godmother's will. Yet, again, it effectually avoids indicating any of (1) the Addresser's **ownership** of the schedule reported, (2) indomitable **determination** behind the designing of that schedule, (3) **agency** in bringing it about, or (4) **responsibility** for doing so, on the part of the Addresser. Cinderella's future attendance at the ball is expressed as though it were some future punctual departure of a train – an instance of a schedule **very broadly multilaterally-owned**:

F3 b ii I've just looked at the timetable; and our train **leaves** in fifteen minutes.

At the same time, **F3 b ii** is so frequently used to express the schedules of important people that an Addresser such as the Fairy Godmother might well choose it, with the **rhetorical** purpose making poor, despised Cinderella feel more important, at least in the eyes of one person – the Addresser, her loving Godmother – and so encourage her to feel that she might possibly become important in the eyes of the Crown Prince, too (as will, of course, happen).

Moreover, while **F3 a** emphasizes that the executant (Cinderella herself) has no ownership whatsoever of this schedule, **F3 b ii** lacks that emphasis, instead implying that she has at least a **small** share of such ownership; thus, its pragmatic impact is **gentler**.

2.6. Extension of F1 c compared with F3 c

Yet another choice – one that is possible but less likely to be made in the Fairy Godmother's situation – is **F3 c, a report of a flexible schedule**: one that is not so hard to change:

F3 c Cinderella **is going** to the ball after all!

But, precisely **because** the schedule reported is expressed as being **flexible**, and yet the Fairy Godmother has arrived in Cinderella's kitchen to make sure that, whatever else may happen, she does at least attend the ball, and wants to **reassure** Cinderella that her godmother **will not fail** to bring this about, no Addresser in such a situation is likely to choose **F3 c**; for it is

too **weak** in pragmatic impact to satisfy her communicative needs.

In order to supplement this weakness, an Addresser such as the Fairy Godmother might choose a Special-needs **emphatic** utterance of the auxiliary verb, /is/:

F3 c Cinderella **is** going to the ball after all!

But this is far more likely to be used by some other, non-participant Addresser, who has realized that one schedule has suddenly been changed to another – one such as Cinderella's kitchen-cat (given that it can use human speech):

F3 c Oh, **good!** Cinderella **is** going to the ball after all! How **happy** that makes me!

Thus, in choosing from among **F1 c**, **F3 a**, **F3 b ii** and **F3 c**, an Addresser will (usually quite unconsciously) assess her own communicative needs (which may include the need to meet the social and/or psychological needs of **her Addressee**); and, should she need to **acknowledge** her own **determination, agency**, and **responsibility**, while denying any ownership **of the cause of the agency**, she will choose **F1 c**:

F1 c Cinderella **shall go** to the ball!

Should, however, she wish to **avoid** doing this, but does need to remind her Addressee that Cinderella herself **has no choice** in the matter (= no **ownership** of the **schedule**), she will choose **F3 a**:

F3 a Cinderella **is to go** to the ball!

And, were she to needs both to avoid the same acknowledgement and yet to avoid reminding her Addressee that that person herself has no ownership of the schedule, she will choose **F3 b ii**:

F3 b ii The matter has been settled: Cinderella **goes** to the ball after all!

The choice that she is, however, **least** likely to make, if she is an active participant, and not

just an onlooker, is weak (because the **schedule** that is thus expressed is merely **flexible**) **F3 c**:

F3 c Cinderella **is going** to the ball after all!

Finally, we should note that **threat**, which is only implicit in many quasi-objective uses of **F1 c** such as this,

b) **F1 c** I **will not tolerate** such behavior in my subordinates!

is [or at least used to be] often expressed quite explicitly through this extended use of **F1 c**:

F1 c (a) Process-verb; (b) State-verb He **shall do** this, or [he **shall**] **live** to regret having failed to.

2.7. Necessary contextual condition for use of F1 c: opposition

The **normal**, the **rhetorical**, and the **specially-extended** uses of **F1 c** are, however, all limited to a certain ***type of discourse-context***:

Normal

a) **F1 c**: Whatever you say, I **will** marry her and be happy!

Here, the person that feels the indomitable **determination** and is also the **executant** of the future change faces **opposition** – from his Addressee.

b) **F1 c** State-verb: I **will not tolerate** such behavior in my subordinates!

Again, the person that feels the indomitable **determination** and is also the **subject** of the future state implicitly faces **opposition** – in the form of a tendency in her subordinates to behave in some way that she herself finds intolerable.

Rhetorical

c) **F1 c** Process-verb: He **will** [always] **come** late to class, damn him!

As */damn him/* emphasizes, the behavior of the executant, 'he', is something that annoys the Addresser, presumably because this always makes it more difficult for the Addresser (if she is a teacher) to teach, or (if she is a student) to learn. Thus, the executant's behavior is **felt** by the Addresser, if **not necessarily so intended** by its executant – as **opposition** – ultimately to her own interests or needs.

d) **F1 c** Process-verb: Our grandmother **will no longer eat** properly.

Again, the grandmother's behavior is **felt** by the Addresser, if **not necessarily intended** by its executant – as **opposition** – ultimately to her own interests, because it makes her uneasy and anxious for her elderly relation.

Special extension

F1 c Cinderella **shall go** to the ball!

Here again, Cinderella's step-mother and step-sisters have so far prevented Cinderella from being able to respond to the Crown Prince's invitation. The person that feels the indomitable determination – Cinderella's Fairy Godmother, who does want Cinderella to be afforded at least a proper chance of winning the Prince's heart – perceives the behavior of the other three women as **opposition** to her own will, or desire.

And, even when this extension is used to express a **threat**, there is almost always some contextual reason for the Addresser to presuppose, and therefore reflect through this choice of expression, that the intended executant may feel some degree of **resistance** to carrying out the imposed change, or becoming the subject of the imposed state:

F1 c He **shall do** this, or [he **shall**] **live** to regret having failed to.

Thus, in all cases, the Addresser chooses **F1 c** because there is a **conflict of wills**: the will of one or more persons is **actually** opposed – or is **rhetorically expressed** as **opposed** – to the will of the Addresser herself. **Unless** such conditions prevail, however, no competent Addresser will choose to use any form of **F1 c**.

These conclusions can be summarized by means of the following chart:

| Future Expression | Version | Identity between agent possessed by determination and executant/ subject? | Identity between agent possessed by determination and Addresser? | Degree of flexibility | Conflict of wills? | Acknowledgement of responsibility for bringing about future matter? | Formal characteristics |
|-------------------|------------------------------------|---|--|-----------------------|--------------------|---|--|
| F1 c | normal (<i>quasi-objective</i> ?) | Yes | Yes | nil | Yes | Yes | emphasis of normal choice of auxiliary verb [+ negating element] |
| | rhetorical use | | No | nil? | Yes | [No!] | |
| | extended rhetorical use | No | Yes | nil | Yes | Yes | emphasis of reversed / <i>will/shall</i> / [+ negating element] |
| F2 | objective use | Yes | Yes | large | No | Yes | [Normal] |
| F3 a | objective use | No | No | nil | No[?] | No | |
| F3 b ii | objective use | Partial | [Not relevant] | small | No | [Not relevant] | |
| F3 c | objective use | Partial | | fairly large | No | | |

Chapter Three: Predictions of Inevitable Results occurring ‘soon’

- F1 d** State-verb: This TV programme **is going to prove** boring. (Let’s change channels, shall we?)
- F1 d** Instant-verb: This building **is going to collapse** at any minute!
- F1 d** State-verb: If you break with her in the near future, she **is going to feel** very unhappy.
- F1 d** Process-verb: This little kitten **is going to die**, if we don’t give it some milk very soon!
- F1 d** Instant-verb: Oh dear, I think I’m **about to faint!**

3.1. F1 a, F1 b, F1 c, and F1 d compared

While **F1 b** and **F1 c** share *a lack of any limit* concerning the segment of future time within which the change or state that is predicted will come about, **F1 a** and **F1 d** do indeed

share such a limit, yet at the same time also mutually differ, with respect to the matter of in **which of two segments of future time** the change or state is predicted as inevitably coming about.

3.1.1. F1 a and F1 d compared


As can be seen from the chart on page 29, **F1 a** places the change or state predicted within that of the two **segments** of future time which lies further from ‘**now**’ than does that upon which any use of **F1 d** is predicated. We should not, however, fail to note that the **relative total extents** of future time that determine choice between **F1 a** and **F1 d** will differ – context by context.

So let us compare some examples:

- a) **F1 d** State-verb: This TV programme **is going to prove** boring. (Let’s change channels **pretty soon**, shall we?)
- b) **F1 a** State-verb: This TV programme **will prove** boring. (Let’s change channels **once we do** get bored, shall we?)

Example (a) would be used only if the Addresser and the Addressee were already watching the programme, and the Addresser was predicting that a feeling of boredom with it **was just about to** overcome her mind. That is to say, the **total extent of future time** about which she is thinking is only that to be taken up by the broadcast of the programme – that is to say, anything (normally) between 30 minutes and 90 minutes.

She implicitly divides that total extent into two segments: ‘**soon**’ and ‘**later on**’, as approximately shown below:



And, by choosing **F1 d**, she places the onset of this predicted feeling of boredom in the ‘**soon**’-


segment within that total extent.

If, however, she and her Addressee are likewise **already watching** the programme, but, as in example (b), above, she uses instead **F1 a**, she places that start in the 'later-on'-segment of that total extent.

Let us now, however, instead imagine that she is speaking **a long time before** the programme **even begins**, and uses example (b):

- b) **F1 a** State-verb: I bet that TV programme **will prove** boring. (Let's change channels as soon as we get bored, shall we?)

In this case, the **end** of the **total extent of future time** is still the end of the programme; but its **start** is long after 'now'; so the scale of that extent is much larger:



The use of **F1 a**, **/will prove/**, only places the start of that state **somewhere** within the segment understood as lying between 'start of programme' and 'end of programme' – but it could occur **anywhere** between those two points, within in that more-distant segment of future time.

In this case, what the Addresser **cannot** (normally) use is **F1 d**. For the **start** of the programme as yet remains **within a segment of future time that is** (relatively) **far off**; so, even should she feel that she can, even **now**, predict that the programme **must inevitably** bore her (as an involuntary result of its, or perhaps her own, **nature**) – and even immediately after it has started – nevertheless, that event cannot (normally) be expressed as occurring in the relevant 'soon'-segment.

Next, let us make a further comparison:

- c) **F1 d** Instant-verb: This building **is going to collapse** at any minute!
 d) **F1 a** Instant-verb: This building **will** [eventually] **collapse**.

Example (c) places this instant-change in a ‘**soon**’-segment of future time; and so what it implies is that the Addresser and Addressee must leave the building and its immediate surroundings **as soon as possible** – or else they must inevitably be crushed by huge fragments of that building, which will come falling upon them, as it **involuntarily** collapses.

On the other hand, what is implied by (d) is that the building will (**involuntarily**) become dangerous only at some point within that segment of future time which as yet remains more distant – the ‘**later-on**’-segment; and therefore there is no need to leave the building immediately. In this case, however, although the **total extent of future time** is indeterminate, it is obviously **much larger** than it is, in any use of (c) or (d).

Let us finally make one more comparison:

e) **F1 d** State-verb: If you break with her *in the near future*, she **is going to feel** very unhappy.

f) **F1 a** State-verb: If you *ever* break with her, she **will feel** very unhappy.

In example (e), the **total extent of future time** implied, which, by using */the near future/* – which implies the other area, */the more distant future/* –, she explicitly divides into two segments, is again indeterminate, and probably about as long as it is in example (d), above. Nevertheless, here, the ‘**soon**’-segment is much larger than it is in (c), above.

On the other hand, in example (f), the **extent of total time** is far greater than it is in any of the previous examples of **F1 a**, above, since it presumably extends right as far as the eventual death of either the Addressee or the woman referred to.

As they are both predictions of **involuntary** future matters, both **F1 a** and **F1 d** are often used to express **warnings**. What should be noted, in the case of example (e), is that, although the Addresser does not **explicitly** say so, nevertheless – because the use of **F1 d always** divides some total extent of future time into a ‘**soon**’-segment and a ‘**later-on**’-one – this utterance **implies** that the Addresser feels that her Addressee **will** be able to end his relationship with the woman later on, and without making her **so** unhappy: that he has only to wait, until ‘**later on**’ has become ‘**now**’. That is to say, the application of a warning expressed using **F1 d** is (frequently) restricted to the more-clearly-de-limited ‘**soon**’-segment.

3.2. Other F1 d expressions of an involuntary and inevitable change or state that is going to happen ‘very soon indeed’: /be about to ~/ and /be just on the point of ~ing/

When the point within the ‘soon’-segment of total future time during which the involuntary change or state will come about is perceived as being **extremely close** to ‘now’, and the Addresser wishes to **emphasize** this, then, in order to express such a **prediction**, she may use, instead of /be going to ~/, /be about to ~/:

I d Instant-verb: Oh dear, I think I’m **about to faint!**

Another alternative, which places the future matter closer still to ‘now’, is /be just on the [very] point of ~ing/:

F1 d Instant-verb: Turn the gas down! That milk **is just on the point of coming to the boil!**

3.3. Rhetorical use of F1 d to declare(?) a plan that the executant is going to execute ‘very soon indeed’

As I have already pointed out, **F2** does not inherently express any restriction as to the part of the total extent of future time in which the plan will be executed. Just as in the case of **F1 d**, however, in the case of **F2** also, an Addresser can, if she so wishes, place that execution within the segment of future time that is expressed as ‘very soon indeed’ by using, instead of /be going to ~/, /be **about** to ~/:

F1 d? F2? instant-verb: Please be brief: I’m **just about to leave** for work.

OR **F1 d? F2?** instant-verb: Please be brief: I’m **on the point of leaving** for work.

Though these **can** function as **substitutes** for **F2**, I myself feel that they lack the full **declarative force** of real **F2**; instead, they often have the effect of a **warning** concerning a future matter that is **involuntary** and thus **inevitable** – which, again, is one kind of **prediction**. Thus, I myself have had to conclude that these are **really** common, illogical, yet

communicatively-effective uses of **F1 d**.

They are illogical because, objectively speaking, the Addresser has full ownership of her leaving her house; they are pragmatically effective because, instead of acknowledging that ownership, the Addresser expresses her departure as a matter that is (by now) **ownership-impossible: it has to happen in this way**. And thus it warns the Addressee that the Addresser is **not capable of** putting up with much delay.

| Future Expression | Form | Potential for rhetorical use? | Rhetorical implication | Use to express warning? | Limit of temporal application of warning |
|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| F1 a | shall/will ~ | No | [none] | Yes | No |
| F1 d | be going to ~ | | | | Yes |
| | be about to ~ | | | | |
| | be on the point of ~ing | | | | |

Conclusion to Chapters Two and Three

In Chapter Two, I have offered further support for my view – which I expressed in Part Two, Chapter One – which proposes that the English language perhaps lacks any way of expressing future matters that does not rely upon expressing **present potential** or **likelihood [F1]**, **present intention [F2]**, or [in the case of **F3**] some kind of **present social/political boundness** (thus, none of **F2-F3 a-c** offers any true expression of **future** matters).

And, like all of the other expressions of future matters that do not use the auxiliary verbs */will/shall/* – namely, **F1 d-F3 c** – the two minor alternatives to */be going to/* used to express **F1 d** (namely, */be about to ~/* and */be on the point of ~ing/*) would appear to offer further support for this view; and that, therefore, the English language lacks anything that could truly be called a ‘future tense’, let alone any truly **volitional future** tense (For even ‘Cinderella **shall** go to the ball!’ attributes to the force that is to bring about this future change the quality of being **involuntary**: such a determination is expressed as indomitable because it is one element that composes the given **nature** of the Addresser, and about which she would feel helpless, should she be asked to go against the compulsion to agency so expressed: such, she implies, she cannot reasonably be expected to manage to do.)

Thus, even **F1 a-c** – which all share use of the auxiliary verbs */will/shall/* – all clearly imply that the **causes** of the **involuntary** changes or states that these predict are **already** part of the

natures of the executants or agents of those changes, or the subjects of those states.

Concerning subsequent chapters

What remains to be discussed is the relation between the **objective** and **rhetorical** uses of **F2** and **F3 a~c**. For example, take the following use of *I be going to ~/* – which could be either **F2** or **F1 d**:

A: [*speaking in March* of that year]: When do we next play tennis against that club?
B: Late in June....
A: I bet it's *going to* rain.

Here, A's second turn cannot be expressing **F1 d** – for the temporal distance between March and June, within the total extent of time constituted by an academic year, surely places June in the relevant 'later'-segment of future time.

What A's second turn instead implies is that s/he suspects that it is so likely that rain will prevent this tournament that s/he subjectively feels that some ill-willed agent/executant ('the weather') will unilaterally **decide** to prevent the tournament, as a **plan** arising from **voluntary intent**.

As this cannot actually be the case, here again we shall consider such – and other – extremely common expressions of future matters that ought, if regarded **objectively**, to be unacceptable, and yet are constantly employed, because they prove so **rhetorically** effective.

Finally, let us place together the comparative charts so far obtained:

| | Rhetorical Substitute → | F1 a | F1 b | F3 a |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|---|--|
| Objective choice ↓ | | | | |
| F2 | | contingent decision disguised as inevitable result | plan of voluntary action expressed as uncontrollable compulsion | contingent decision disguised as ownership-opaque schedule |

| Future Expression | Version | Identity between agent possessed by determination and executant/subject? | Identity between agent possessed by determination and Addresser? | Degree of flexibility | Conflict of wills? | Acknowledgement of responsibility for bringing about future matter? | Formal characteristics |
|-------------------|---------------------------|--|--|-----------------------|--------------------|---|--|
| F1 c | normal (quasi-objective?) | Yes | Yes | nil | Yes | Yes | emphasis of normal choice of auxiliary verb [+ negating element] |
| | rhetorical use | | No | nil? | Yes | [No!] | |
| | extended rhetorical use | No | Yes | nil | Yes | Yes | emphasis of reversed / <i>will/shall</i> / [+ negating element] |
| F2 | objective use | Yes | Yes | large | No | Yes | [Normal] |
| F3 a | objective use | No | No | nil | No[?] | No | |
| F3 b ii | objective use | Partial | [Not relevant] | small | No | [Not relevant] | |
| F3 c | objective use | | | fairly large | No | | |

| Future Expression | Form | Potential for rhetorical use? | Rhetorical implication | Use to express warning? | Limit of temporal application of warning |
|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| F1 a | shall/will ~ | No | [none] | Yes | No |
| F1 d | be going to ~ | | | | Yes |
| | be about to ~ | | | | |
| | be on the point of ~ing | | | | |