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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2020”N3ŒŽ7“ú(“y) 13:00`18:00 iŠJê12:30j
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
ƒe[ƒ} ŽÐ‰ï‰ÈŠw‚É‚¨‚¯‚éŽÀŒ±Œ¤‹†‚ÆRISS‚Ì–ðŠ„
ŽïŽ| ‹ß”NAŒoÏŠw‚݂̂Ȃ炸ŽÐ‰ï‰ÈŠw‘S”Ê‚É‚¨‚¢‚ÄŽÀŒ±Œ¤‹†‚ª·‚ñ‚ɍs‚í‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚éBŒoÏŽÀŒ±Žº‚ð—L‚·‚éRISS‚ɂ́A‹¤“¯—˜—pE‹¤“¯Œ¤‹†‹’“_‚Æ‚µ‚āA‚±‚¤‚µ‚½—¬‚ê‚ð‰Á‘¬‚³‚¹‚邱‚Æ‚ªŠú‘Ò‚³‚ê‚éB ‚»‚±‚Å–{ƒZƒ~ƒi[‚ł́A¤ŠwE­Ž¡Šw‚ÌŒ¤‹†ŽÒ‚ÌŽQ‰Á‚𓾂āAŽÐ‰ï‰ÈŠw‚É‚¨‚¯‚éŽÀŒ±Œ¤‹†‚Ì“ž’B“_‚ð‹¤—L‚·‚é‚Æ‚Æ‚à‚ɁAŒoÏŽÀŒ±Žº‚Ì—˜—pŽÒ‚É‚æ‚錤‹†¬‰Ê•ñ‚𓾂邱‚ƂŁA ŽÐ‰ï‰ÈŠw‚ɑ΂·‚éRISS‚Ì–ðŠ„‚ÆvŒ£‚Ì‚ ‚è•û‚ðl‚¦‚éB
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  • ŠJ‰ï‚̈¥ŽA
    13:00-13:05
    @–{¼‘׎O@‹@\’·@iŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”E‹³Žöj
  • ‘‡Ži‰ï
    13:05-13:10
    @–¼Žæ—Ç‘¾@•›‹@\’· iŠÖ¼‘åŠw‘‡î•ñŠw•”E‹³Žöj
  • Session 1
    @Chair@–¼Žæ—Ç‘¾ iŠÖ¼‘åŠw‘‡î•ñŠw•”E‹³Žöj
  • 13:10-13:55
    uOptimal Timing for Retargeting: Evidence from Field ExperimentsviAuthorsF Takeshi Moriguchi, Xueming Luo, Jing Li, Xianghua Luj
    @ŽçŒû „ i‘ˆî“c‘åŠw¤ŠwŠwp‰@E‹³Žöj
  • 13:55-14:40
    u­Ž¡Šw‚É‚¨‚¯‚éŽÀŒ±ŽºŽÀŒ±‚ÌŒ»ó‚Ɖۑèv
    @’JŒû®Žq iŒcœä‹`m‘åŠwƒVƒXƒeƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“Eƒ}ƒlƒWƒƒ“ƒgŒ¤‹†‰ÈEy‹³Žöj
  • 14:40-15:25
    uƒT[ƒxƒCŽÀŒ±‚ð—p‚¢‚½2019”N‰«“ꌧ–¯“Š•[‚Ì•ªÍF‘I‘ðŽˆƒfƒUƒCƒ“Œø‰Ê‚Æ“Š•[ŽQ‰ÁŒø‰Êvi’˜ŽÒF‹v•ÛŒc–¾E‰ª“c—EE–öŽŠj
    @‹v•ÛŒc–¾ i—®‹…‘åŠwl•¶ŽÐ‰ïŠw•”Ey‹³Žöj
    @‰ª“c —E i–¼ŒÃ‰®‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@‘ÛŠJ”­Œ¤‹†‰ÈEy‹³Žöj
  • 15:25-15:45@Short Break
  • Session 2
    @Chair@¬ìˆêm iŠÖ¼‘åŠwŽÐ‰ïŠw•”E‹³Žöj
  • 15:45-16:10
    u‘½ƒTƒCƒgŒoÏŽÀŒ±‚͂ǂ̂悤‚É‚·‚ê‚Ή”\‚©F”팱ŽÒ‚Ì”F’m”\—Í‚Æ‘®«‚̐§Œävi’˜ŽÒF¬ìˆêmE”öú±—S‰îEì‘º“N–çE‚‹´L‰ëE“cŒû‘ŽuE“¡ˆä—zˆêúàE“n粒¼Ž÷j
    @¬ìˆêm iŠÖ¼‘åŠwŽÐ‰ïŠw•”E‹³Žöj
  • 16:10-16:35
    u»•i‘I‘ðê–Ê‚É‚¨‚¯‚éŠá‹…‰^“®‚Ì•ªÍŽè–@‚ɂ‚¢‚āvi’˜ŽÒFì™Œj‘¾A‘ºãŽnA“n•Ó—•ŠÛA’|‘º˜a‹vj
    @ì™Œj‘¾ i‘ˆî“c‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@¶j
  • 16:35-17:00
    uA School Choice Experiment:Cognitive Ability and InformationviAuthorsF Naoki Watanabe, Tetsuya Kawamura, Kazuhito Ogawaj
    @“n粒¼Ž÷ iŒcœä‹`m‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@Œo‰cŠÇ—Œ¤‹†‰ÈEy‹³Žöj
  • 17:00-17:10@Short Break
  • 17:10-17:35
    u¬‚݂Ȑŗ¦ˆø‚«ã‚°‚ªÁ”ï‚É—^‚¦‚é‰e‹¿F‚­‚¶Á”ïŽÀŒ±‚É‚æ‚镪Ív
    @’|–{ ‹œ i’é’ËŽR‘åŠwŒoÏŒo‰cŠw•”E‹³Žöj
  • 17:35-18:00
    uReciprocity is different: Experimental evidence from trust game between Japanese domestic and international students.v iAuthorsF Tetsuya Kawamura, Yoichiro Fujii, Yusuke Osaki, Gou Otani and Ryuji Saitoj
    @”öú±—S‰î i‘ˆî“c‘åŠw¤ŠwŠwp‰@Ey‹³Žöj
‚¨\žE‚¨–⍇‚¹æ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw Œ¤‹†ŠŽ––±ƒOƒ‹[ƒviƒ\ƒVƒI‹@\j
E-mail@riss@ml.kandai.jp
Tel@06-6368-1228

Ž–¼EŠ‘®‹@ŠÖ–¼EE–¼‚ð‹LÚ‚̏ãA“dŽqƒ[ƒ‹‚É‚Ä‚¨\‚µž‚݉º‚³‚¢B ‚È‚¨AŽ–‘O‚̐\ž‚Ý‚È‚µ‚Å‚à‚²ŽQ‰Á‚¢‚½‚¾‚­‚±‚Æ‚ª‚Å‚«‚Ü‚·i“–“ú‚¨–¼‘O“™‚𒸑Ղµ‚Ü‚·jB

RISSƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒv

@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï ‘æ16‰ñŒ¤‹†‰ï
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2020”N2ŒŽ26“ú(…) 17:00-18:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
•ñŽÒ àV“c—LŠóŽq i—´’J‘åŠw ŒoÏŠw•” uŽtj
˜_‘è "Deep Regional Trade Agreements and Cross-border Technology Transfer: Theory and Evidence"
—vŽ| In this study, we examine whether deep regional trade agreements (RTAs) facilitate cross-border technology transfer. As a mode of technology transfer, we focus on licensing. We first derive a micro-founded structural gravity equation for cross-border licensing from a model in which heterogeneous firms choose to supply their goods to foreign markets by exports, foreign direct investment, or licensing. We show several comparative statics results regarding the effects of changes in fixed costs of serving the destination country, the freeness of trade, and the strength of intellectual property right (IPR) protection on exports of licensing fees. We then empirically test predictions from our model by using data on bilateral exports of royalties and licensing fees for 181 countries/regions for the period 1995-2012. Various dummy variables are used to measure the impact of shallow and deep RTAs. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we find that a shallow RTA without IPR provision may reduce total exports of licensing and that a deep RTA with legally enforceable IPR provision will increase total exports of licensing. The net effect of forming a deep RTA is positive.

RISSƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒv

@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï ‘æ15‰ñŒ¤‹†‰ï
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2020”N1ŒŽ29“ú(…) 17:00-18:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
•ñŽÒ “n•Ó½ iVU University Amsterdamj
˜_‘è "Endogenous repo cycles" (with Vyacheslav Arbuzov, Yu Awaya, and Hiroki Fukai), June 2019
—vŽ| This paper presents a simple and tractable equilibrium model of repos, where col-lateralized credit emerges under limited commitment. We show that even if there is no time variation in fundamentals, repo markets can fluctuate endogenously over time. In our theory, repo market fragilities are associated with endogenous fluctuations in trade probabilities, collateral values, and debt limits. We show that the collateral premium of a durable asset will become the lowest right before a recession and the highest right after the recession and that secured credit is acyclical.

RISSƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒv

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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N11ŒŽ26“ú(‰Î) 17:30-19:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
•ñŽÒ ”öŽR‘å•ã i“Œ‹ž‘åŠw@‘åŠw‰@ŒoÏŠwŒ¤‹†‰ÈiŒoÏŠw•”jj
˜_‘è hAdversarial Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Gamesh (with Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi)

RISSƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒv

@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï ‘æ13‰ñŒ¤‹†‰ï
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N11ŒŽ12“ú(‰Î) 18:00-19:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
•ñŽÒ {‰i”ü•ä i‹ž“s‘åŠw ŒoÏŒ¤‹†Š ŠwUPDj
˜_‘è hRisk Aversion, Longevity, and Fertility in an Overlapping Generations Modelh
—vŽ| This study analyzes how population aging affects an economy through the behavior of the young and the oldf financial assets selecting. We construct an overlapping generations model where an economy grows by capital and production goods created by individual activities. Outcomes of this activities are stochastically determined. Moreover, old individuals are supposed to be more risk averse than young individuals. We show that how capital accumulated in an economy with population aging depends on the degree of risk averse of old individuals. Both increasing longevity and decreasing fertility do not promote capital accumulation in an economy where old individuals are much more risk averse. Moreover, populating aging decreases output of final goods in such an economy.

RISSƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒv

@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï ‘æ11‰ñŒ¤‹†‰ï
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N10ŒŽ15“ú(‰Î) 18:00-20:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
•ñŽÒ Jauer CHEN i“Œ‹ž‘Û‘åŠw ‘Ûí—ªŒ¤‹†Š y‹³Žöj
˜_‘è hCausal Random Forests Model using Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressionh
—vŽ| We propose an econometric procedure based mainly on the generalized random forests method of Athey, Tibshirani and Wager (2019, The Annals of Statistics). Not only does this process estimate the conditional quantile treatment effect nonparametrically, but our procedure yields a measure of variable importance in terms of heterogeneity among control variables. We also apply the proposed procedure to reinvestigate the distributional effect of 401(k) participation on net financial assets, and the quantile earnings effect of participating in a job training program.

RISSƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒv

@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï ‘æ10‰ñŒ¤‹†‰ï
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N10ŒŽ9“ú(…) 17:00-18:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
•ñŽÒ Žº‰ªŒ’Žui‘åã‘åŠw ‘ÛŒö‹¤­ôŒ¤‹†‰È y‹³Žöj
˜_‘è hFragile Self-Esteemh (joint with Koszegi and George Loewenstein)
—vŽ| We develop a model in which a personfs self-esteem is determined by sampling from her store of ego-relevant memories in a fashion that in turn depends on her self-esteem. This feedback mechanism can create multiple gself-esteem personal equilibria,h making self-esteem fragile ? subject to swings that are out of proportion to the objective evidentiary value of new information. Self-esteem is especially likely to be fragile, as well as unrealistic in either the positive or the negative direction, if self-esteem is an important ingredient of overall utility. We show that fragile self-esteem has diverse consequences, such as producing a negative relationship between effort and incentives, and various forms of information-avoidance, with consequences for domains such as education and job search.

RISSƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒv

@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï ‘æ9‰ñŒ¤‹†‰ï
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N10ŒŽ3“ú(–Ø) 17:00-18:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
•ñŽÒ Jean-Baptiste Michau (Ecole Polytechnique, Department of Economics, Professor)
˜_‘è hHelicopter Drops of Money under Secular Stagnationh
—vŽ| What are the effects of helicopter drops of money under secular stagnation? This paper shows that, if the government cannot sustain a Ponzi debt scheme under full employment, then helicopter drops of money cannot transfer real wealth to households under secular stagnation. In that case, despite being in a permanent liquidity trap, a one-off helicopter drop triggers an upward jump in the price level, without any real effect on the economy. Conversely, if a Ponzi scheme can be sustained, then the helicopter drop can stimulate aggregate demand by raising household wealth. If the stagnation real interest rate is larger than the economic growth rate, the economy converges to full employment and a sustainable Ponzi scheme and, otherwise, it gradually reverts back to stagnation. Finally, continuous helicopter drops of money under stagnation must induce the economy to reach a full employment steady state, with or without a Ponzi scheme.

RISSƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒv

@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï ‘æ8‰ñŒ¤‹†‰ï
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N9ŒŽ25“ú(…) 17:00-18:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
•ñŽÒ »ì •‹M i_ŒË‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”j
˜_‘è hCredible Forward Guidancehijoint with Taisuke Nakataj
•ñŽÒ We analyze credible forward guidance policies in a sticky-price model with an effective lower bound (ELB) constraint on nominal interest rates by solving a series of optimal sustainable policy problems indexed by the duration of reputational loss. Lower-for-longer policies? while effective in stimulating the economy at the ELB?are potentially time-inconsistent, as the associated overheating of the economy in the aftermath of a crisis is undesirable ex-post. However, if reneging on a lower-for-longer promise leads to a loss of reputation and prevents the central bank from effectively using lower-for-longer policies in future crises, these policies can be time-consistent. We find that, even without an explicit commitment technology, the central bank can still credibly keep the policy rate at the ELB for an extended period? though not as extended under the optimal commitment policy?and meaningfully mitigate the adverse effects of the ELB constraint on economy activity.

ISER-RISS Experimental Economics Workshop

@@ ‹¤ÃF‘åã‘åŠwŽÐ‰ïŒoÏŒ¤‹†Š
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N7ŒŽ19“ú(‹à)@10:00`17:10
êŠ ‘åã‘åŠwŽÐ‰ïŒoÏŒ¤‹†ŠB“2ŠK215‰ï‹cŽº
•ñŽÒE˜_‘è
  • 10:00-10:40
    Takehito Masuda, Osaka University
    uStrategic Ambiguity and Probabilistic Sophisticationv
  • 10:50-11:50
    Kenju Kamei, Durham University
    uThe Perverse Costly Signaling Effect on Cooperation under the Shadow of the Futurev
  • 14:00-1440
    Eungik Lee, New York University
    uProbability weighting and cognitive abilityv
  • 14:50-15:50
    Takashi Hayashi, University of Glasgow
    uGeneral Equilibrium Performance of Partial Equilibrium Mechanisms: an Experimentv
  • 16:10-17:10
    Taizo Motonishi, Kansai University
    uIs Financial Literacy a Dangerous Thing?: Financial Literacy, Behavioral Factors, and Financial Choices of Householdsv
”õl Ú×‚Í‚±‚¿‚ç

‚¨\ž‚݂̓Šƒ“ƒNæ‚æ‚肨Šè‚¢‚¢‚½‚µ‚Ü‚·By’÷ØF7ŒŽ11“ú17:00z

RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics

@@@
ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N7ŒŽ17“ú(…) 16:00-17:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\ 6ŠK@ƒ}ƒ‹ƒ`ƒƒfƒBƒAEƒ‰ƒ{
•ñŽÒ Konrad Grabiszewski iMohammad bin Salman College (MBSC), Saudi Arabiaj
˜_‘è "Adverse Selection and Safety Regulation"

RISSƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒv

@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï ‘æ5‰ñŒ¤‹†‰ï
@@@
ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N6ŒŽ17“ú(ŒŽ) 18:00-19:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
•ñŽÒ ˆ¾‰® —SiAssistant Professor, University of Rochesterj
˜_‘è "Startups and Upstarts"iVijay Krishna‚Æ‚Ì‹¤’˜j
—vŽ| We study a continuous-time R&D race between an established firm and a startup under asymmetric information. R&D investment brings success stochastically but only if the innovation is feasible. The only asymmetry between the firms is that the established firm has better information about the feasibility of the innovation. We show that there is an equilibrium in which the poorly-informed startup wins more often, and has higher expected profits, than the better-informed incumbent. When the informational asymmetry is large, this is the unique equilibrium outcome. Even though better information is available competitive disadvantage, the value of information is positive.

Œ_–ñ—˜_Œ¤‹†‰ï

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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N6ŒŽ15“ú(“y) 13:30-17:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw”~“cƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX KANDAI Me RISE i7ŠK 701j
•ñŽÒE˜_‘èE—vŽ|
  • •ñ‚PFWataru Tamura (Nagoya University): "Using Uncontrolled Trials with Selection Bias and Scaling up"
    • This study examines the design of program evaluation and policymaking based on uncontrolled trials. When program participation is nonrandomized, a simple before-and-after comparison may have selection bias. I consider a two-period model of pilot trials in which the policymaker can intervene in participation behavior in the second period trial. I show that modest scaling up by monetary intervention can help consistently estimate the population average treatment effect. Unlike monetary intervention, scaling up by information disclosure about the average outcome in the initial small-scale trial can mitigate but not eliminate the selection bias.

  • •ñ‚QFKenichi Amaya (Kagawa University): "Evolution of credible pre-play communication"
    • ƒpƒŒ[ƒg‡˜‚¯‚³‚ê‚é•¡”‚̃iƒbƒVƒ…‹Ït‚ª‚ ‚éƒQ[ƒ€‚ł́AƒvƒŒƒCƒ„[ŠÔ‚ÌŽ–‘O‚̃Rƒ~ƒ…ƒjƒP[ƒVƒ‡ƒ“‚ª‚ ‚ê‚ÎŒø—¦“I‚ȋύt‚ªŽÀŒ»‚Å‚«‚邾‚낤‚Æ‚¢‚¤’¼Š´‚ª‚ ‚èAi‰»ƒQ[ƒ€—˜_‚ð—p‚¢‚Ä‚±‚Ì’¼Š´‚ðŽxŽ‚·‚錤‹†‚ª‚È‚³‚ê‚Ä—ˆ‚Ü‚µ‚½Bˆê•û‚ŁAAumann (1990)‚́AƒQ[ƒ€‚Ì—˜“¾\‘¢‚É‚æ‚Á‚Ä‚ÍŽ–‘O‚̃ƒbƒZ[ƒW‚ōs“®‚̈Ӑ}‚Í“`‚í‚ç‚È‚¢‚ÆŽå’£‚µA‚±‚ê‚ðŽxŽ‚·‚éŽÀŒ±Œ‹‰Ê‚à‘¶Ý‚µ‚Ü‚·B–{Œ¤‹†‚́Ai‰»ƒQ[ƒ€‚̘g‘g‚Ý‚ÅAumann‚ÌŽå’£‚ÉŠî‘b‚¯‚ð—^‚¦‚悤‚Æ‚·‚éˆê‚‚̎Ž‚Ý‚Å‚·BƒƒbƒZ[ƒW‚̉ðŽß‚̉”\«‚ɐ§ŒÀ‚ð’u‚¢‚½ƒ‚ƒfƒ‹‚ðl‚¦‚é‚ƁAAumann‚ÌŽå’£‚ðŽxŽ‚·‚錋‰Ê‚ª“¾‚ç‚ê‚邱‚Æ‚ðŽ¦‚µ‚Ü‚·B
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Workshop on Behavioral Contract Thoery

@@‹¤ÃFContract Theory Workshop
@@@
ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N4ŒŽ20“ú(“y) 10:00-17:40
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw”~“cƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX KANDAI Me RISE i4ŠKMe RISEƒ‰ƒ{F@‘½–Ú“IŽºj
•ñŽÒE˜_‘è
  • 10:05-10:50
    Hideshi Itoh (Waseda U)
    uImage Concerns in Teamsv
  • 10:50-11:35
    Matthias Fahn (JKU Linz)
    uReciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationshipsv
  • 13:00-13:45
    Heiko Karle (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management)
    uConsumer Search and the Uncertainty Effectv
  • 13:45-14:30
    Takeshi Murooka (Osaka U)
    uZero Prices: Optimal Pricing of Experience Goods under Consumer Loss Aversionv
  • 14:50-15:35
    Fabian Herweg (U Bayreuth)
    uSalience in Retailing: Vertical Restraints on Internet Salesv
  • 15:35-16:20
    Antonio Rosato (UTS)
    uProjection of Private Values in Auctionsv
  • 16:40-17:40
    Keynote: Paul Heidhues (DICE)
    uIdentifying Procrastination from the Timing of Choicesv
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Ú×‚Í‚±‚¿‚ç

‚±‚¿‚ç‚̃tƒH[ƒ€‚©‚çŽQ‰Á“o˜^‚ð‚¨Šè‚¢‚¢‚½‚µ‚Ü‚·B ŽQ‰Á“o˜^ƒtƒH[ƒ€

—[H‰ïê‚ÌŠm•Û“™‚Ì‚½‚߁A“o˜^‚Ì’÷‚ߐ؂è‚Í4/4i–؁j‚Æ‚³‚¹‚Ä‚¢‚½‚¾‚«‚Ü‚·B

CEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ15‰ñ)

@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[
@@@
ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N3ŒŽ11“ú(ŒŽ) 15:00-17:10
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
•ñŽÒE˜_‘è
  • 15:00`16:00
    ’OŽ¡ —à•ôi‘åã‘åŠwŒoÏŠwŒ¤‹†‰È CŽm‰Û’öj
    uReference Dependence and Monetary Incentive -Evidence from Major League Baseball-v
  • 16:10`17:10
    ì‘º “N–çi“ú–{ŒoÏ‘åŠwŒo‰cŠw•” ê”CuŽt)
    uHigher cognitive ability promotes cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games and deviation in finitely repeated games: Experimental evidencehv

RISS-CEE ƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒv

@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[
@@@
ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N2ŒŽ28“úi–؁j13:00-17:45
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
•ñŽÒE˜_‘è
  • 13:00`14:00
    –{¼ ‘׎O@iŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”‹³Žöj
    uIs Financial Literacy a Dangerous Thing?: Financial Literacy, Behavioral Factors, and Financial Choices of Consumersv
  • 14:15`15:15
    ˆ¢äÝ Os@iŠÖ¼Šw‰@‘åŠw¤Šw•”‹³Žöj
    u“ŠŽ‘M‘õ‚ÌŽ‘‹àƒtƒ[‚ƌl“ŠŽ‘‰ÆŠˆ“®v
  • 15:30`16:30
    •“c •qŽj@i“Œ‹žŒoÏ‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”y‹³Žöj
    u”ñŒöŠJv
  • 16:45`17:45
    Ž³‘q Šw@i’·è‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”‹³Žöj
    uL‚͉ߏè‚È‚Ì‚©A‰ß¬‚È‚Ì‚©H|L‚Ö‚Ì’ïRŠ´‚ªL—Ê‚É—^‚¦‚é‰e‹¿‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚镪Í|v

International Symposium on Socionetwork Strategies in the Market of Data

@@‹¤ÃFƒf[ƒ^ƒWƒƒƒPƒbƒg„iWGAƒCƒmƒx[ƒVƒ‡ƒ“EƒVƒXƒeƒ€Œ¤‹†ŠÂi`‹ðl‚̗ց`j
@@@
ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N2ŒŽ22“úi‹àjE23“úi“yj11:00-18:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@“Œ‹žƒZƒ“ƒ^[
ƒe[ƒ} uƒf[ƒ^Žsê“ÁWVFˆÙ•ª–ìƒf[ƒ^˜AŒg‹Zp‚ƃCƒmƒx[ƒVƒ‡ƒ“v‚¨‚æ‚шê”Ê
•ñŽÒE˜_‘è

22“úi‹àj
  • [“Á•Êu‰‰]
  • 10:00-10:20
    Yukio Ohsawa (University of Tokyo)
    Welcoming Words: "Data market as a factory of socionetwork strategies"

  • ƒZƒbƒVƒ‡ƒ“1Fƒf[ƒ^Žsê‚Ì“®Œü‚ƎЉï“I‰e‹¿
  • 10:20-10:40
    ‘–îŽdWÍi“Œ‘åjE¬Œû—TiNRCjE”ò‘òÈ“ñiBR&MjE‘åàVK¶i“Œ‘åj
    “ú–{E•ÄE‰¢BE’†‘‚̃f[ƒ^ŽsêƒrƒWƒlƒX‚Ì“®Œü
  • 10:40-11:00
    ¬’r½i¬’r½ƒ}ƒCƒNƒ”gj
    ƒf[ƒ^‚Ì–@“I•ÛŒì ` •½¬30”N•s³‹£‘ˆ–hŽ~–@‰ü³‚ÌÐ‰î `
  • 11:00-11:10
    ƒfƒBƒXƒJƒbƒVƒ‡ƒ“
  • 11:10-11:30
    [Œ©‰Ã–¾i—§‹³‘åj
    ƒI[ƒvƒ“•W€‚Æ•W€‚̃I[ƒvƒ“‰»
  • 11:30-11:50
    Ž›“‡‘GE]K—S‰îE’r“c‰hŽŸE²X–ؑזFi•xŽm’ʁj
    ƒf[ƒ^ƒWƒƒƒPƒbƒg‚ƃuƒƒbƒNƒ`ƒF[ƒ“‚É‚æ‚éƒf[ƒ^‚ðŠˆ—p‚µ‚½ˆÙ‹ÆŽí‹¤‘n‚ÌŽÀÛ

  • [µ‘ҍu‰‰]
  • 13:00-13:40
    Îˆä‰Ä¶—˜i’}”g‘åŠwj
    ƒf[ƒ^—¬’ÊŽsê‚É‚¨‚¯‚é–@“I‰Û‘è`ƒf[ƒ^Eƒ|[ƒ^ƒrƒŠƒeƒB‚Əî•ñ‹âs‚𒆐S‚É

  • ƒZƒbƒVƒ‡ƒ“2Fƒf[ƒ^Žsê‚ðŽx‚¦‚é‹Zp‚ÆŒø‰Ê
  • 14:00-14:20
    ŠÝ@–F‹PE‘åàVK¶E‘–îŽdWÍi“Œ‘åj
    ‘“àŠ”Ž®Žsê‚É‚¨‚¯‚é\‘¢“I•Ï‰»‚Ì•ªÍ
  • 14:20-14:40
    ‘–îŽdWÍi“Œ‘åjEˆÀ“¡—L‹IE‹k’mŽuEÔÎ˜NiABeamjE‘åàVK¶i“Œ‘åj
    ƒf[ƒ^’ñ‹ŸŽÒ‚Æ—˜—pŽÒ‚̃}ƒbƒ`ƒ“ƒO‚É‚æ‚éç®çŽx‰‡ƒc[ƒ‹TEEDA
  • 14:40-14:50
    ƒfƒBƒXƒJƒbƒVƒ‡ƒ“
  • 14:50-15:10
    å“c‰ë‘åi“ú‘åjE‘–îŽdWÍEŠâ²‘¾˜HE‘åàVK¶i“Œ‘åj
    ƒf[ƒ^ƒWƒƒƒPƒbƒg‚ÆWord2vec‚É‚æ‚éƒhƒƒCƒ“ˆË‘¶Œêœb‚̐§–ñ‚ð’ጸ‚µ‚½ƒf[ƒ^•ª—Þ
  • 15:10-15:30
    Šâ‰i‰F‰›i“Œ‘å/”—ƒVƒXƒeƒ€jE‘–îŽdWÍE‘åàVK¶i“Œ‘åj
    ƒf[ƒ^ƒWƒƒƒPƒbƒg‚É‚¨‚¯‚éˆê•”‚̕ϐ”ƒ‰ƒxƒ‹‚ւ̃Aƒmƒe[ƒVƒ‡ƒ“‚ð—p‚¢‚½”\“®“I‚ȕϐ”ƒ‰ƒxƒ‹„’è

  • [µ‘ҍu‰‰]
  • 15:50-16:20
    –{¼‘׎OiŠÖ¼‘åŠwj
    Is Financial Literacy a Dangerous Thing?: Financial Literacy, Behavioral Factors, and Financial Choices of Consumers

  • [µ‘ҍu‰‰]
  • 16:20-16:50
    –î“cŸriŠÖ¼‘åŠwj
    The review of Socionetowrk strategies and interdisciplinary research
•ñŽÒE˜_‘è

23“úi“yj
  • Opening Remarks
  • 10:00
    ‘–îŽdWÍi“Œ‹ž‘åŠwj

  • [µ‘ҍu‰‰]
  • 10:00-10:40
    Kazushige TaniguchiiInter-American Development Bankj
    Cross-Sectoral and Innovative Use of Data for Sustainable Development

  • ƒZƒbƒVƒ‡ƒ“3Fƒf[ƒ^Žsê‚É‚¨‚¯‚é˜AŒgE•ªÍŽ–—á‡@
  • 10:40-11:00
    “c糌›‘¾˜NEŒ“Šâ@Œ›i“d’Ê‘åj
    “ú–{ŒêŽ«‘‚ÌŒê‹`•¶‚©‚ç‚̃Iƒ“ƒgƒƒW[Ž©“®\’z
  • 11:00-11:20
    —é–؁@—ȁEŒ“Šâ@Œ›i“d’Ê‘åj
    “ú–{Œê•¶‚ÌŒW‚èŽó‚¯–Ø‚©‚ç‚̈Ӗ¡\‘¢ƒpƒ^[ƒ“ƒ}ƒCƒjƒ“ƒO
  • 11:20-11:30
    ƒfƒBƒXƒJƒbƒVƒ‡ƒ“
  • 11:30-11:50
    ãŒ´’¼E‘–îŽdWÍE‘åàVK¶i“Œ‘åj
    ƒf[ƒ^—˜—pŽÒ‚Ì”FŽ¯‚ÉŠî‚¢‚½ƒf[ƒ^ƒWƒƒƒPƒbƒg‚Ì—ÞŽ—“x•]‰¿
  • 11:50-12:10
    “ޗljª@½E‘–îŽdWÍE‘åàVK¶i“Œ‘åj
    ƒX[ƒp[ƒ}[ƒPƒbƒg‚É‚¨‚¯‚éí—ª—§ˆÄŽx‰‡‚Ì‚½‚ß‚ÌŽž‹æŠÔ•ªÍŽè–@‚̍\’z

  • [µ‘ҍu‰‰]
  • 13:20-14:00
    Dries BenoitiGhent Universityj
    Social Network Analysis for Evaluating Referral Campaigns

  • ƒZƒbƒVƒ‡ƒ“4Fƒf[ƒ^Žsê‚É‚¨‚¯‚é˜AŒgE•ªÍŽ–—á‡A
  • 14:20-14:40
    Š–ì—m•½i–¼ŒÃ‰®Žs‘åj
    ‹@ŠBŠwK‚É‚æ‚éŠÅŒì‚ð•K—v‚Æ‚·‚éŠÂ‹«‚ł̃xƒbƒhã“®ì‚̃pƒ^[ƒ“Ž¯•Ê‚ÌŽŽ‚Ý
  • 14:40-15:00
    â’n‘׋Ii“Œ‘åjE¬—Ñ‹Å—YiAIPjE¬‰Ô¹‹Piˆïé‘åjE‚–ì•Û^iÂŠw‘åjE˜aò@Œ‰i“Œ‘åj
    —lX‚ȃf[ƒ^‚ð—p‚¢‚½“®‰æƒ^ƒO‚Ì—\‘ª
  • 15:00-15:10
    ƒfƒBƒXƒJƒbƒVƒ‡ƒ“
  • 15:10-15:30
    ’|‘ºq‘¾E‘åàVK¶E‘–îŽdWÍi“Œ‘åj
    ’~ÏƒGƒlƒ‹ƒM[‚É‚æ‚é‘å’nk‚Ì‘O’›‚Ì•ªÍ
  • 15:30-15:50
    ‹v‘ã‹I”VEˆä•Ÿ­•¶EÂŽR—T‰îi‹ãH‘åj
    —vŒ’è‹`ƒc[ƒ‹iŠg’£ƒS[ƒ‹ƒOƒ‰ƒtj‚ÉŠî‚­ƒXƒe[ƒNƒzƒ‹ƒ_‡ˆÓŒ`¬‚Ì‚½‚߂̃f[ƒ^‘I’èi—\”õŽÀŒ±j

  • [µ‘ҍu‰‰]
  • 16:10-16:50
    Dirk Van den PoeliGhent Universityj
    On the value of additional data for improved business decision making

  • [µ‘ҍu‰‰]
  • 16:50-17:30
    Janos KertesziCentral European University (CEU)j
    Innovation spreading in online social networks

  • Closing
  • 17:30-17:40
    ‘–îŽdWÍi“Œ‹ž‘åŠwj
”õl Ú×‚Í‚±‚¿‚ç

RISS Seminar Series

@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï ‘æ14‰ñŒ¤‹†‰ï
@@@
ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N1ŒŽ31“ú(–Ø) 15:00-16:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
uŽtE˜_‘è Giacomo Rondina(University of California, San Diego, Department of Economics, Associate Teaching Professor)
uSamuelson's Dictum: Evidence, Theory, and Implicationsv

CEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics(‘æ14‰ñ)

@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[
@@@
ŠJÃ“úŽž 2019”N1ŒŽ17“ú(–Ø)@15:00-17:20
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
uŽtE˜_‘è 15:00-16:00
“ÃŽõi‘åã•{—§‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@ŒoÏŠwŒ¤‹†‰È”ŽŽm‰Û’ö)
uƒ~ƒjƒ}ƒ€ƒQ[ƒ€‚É‚¨‚¯‚é˜A‘±ŽžŠÔƒ`[ƒvƒg[ƒN‚ÌŒø‰Êv
16:20-17:20
–q–ì–MºiÛ“ì‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”y‹³Žöj
u‘¾•½—mí‘ˆŠJíŽž‚Ì“ú–{Žw“±•”‚̈ӎvŒˆ’èv

RISS Seminar Series

@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï ‘æ9‰ñŒ¤‹†‰ï
@@@
ŠJÃ“úŽž 2018”N12ŒŽ12“úi…j17:00`18:00
¦‹³Žö‰ïI—¹Œã‚ÉŠJŽn‚¢‚½‚µ‚Ü‚·BŠJŽnŽžŠÔ‚ª‘OŒã‚·‚éê‡‚ª‚²‚´‚¢‚Ü‚·‚̂ŁA—\‚ß‚²—¹³‚­‚¾‚³‚¢Bu‰‰ŽžŠÔ‚Í‚PŽžŠÔ‚Ì—\’è‚Å‚·B
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
¦Œo¤Œ¤‹†“‘¤i6ŠKj‚©‚ç‚à‚²“üŽº‚¢‚½‚¾‚¯‚Ü‚·B
uŽtE˜_‘è Desmond (Ho-Fu) Lo@(Associate Professor, Santa Clara University))
uCoordination and Organization Design: Theory and Micro-evidencev

RISSŒ¤‹†‰ï

@@‹¤ÃFMonetary Economic Workshop
@@@
ŠJÃ“úŽž 2018”N11ŒŽ17“ú(“y) 14:00-18:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
uŽtE˜_‘è –{¼‘׎O(ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ŒoÏŠw•”@‹³ŽöERISS‹@\’·)
uIs Financial Literacy a Dangerous Thing?: Behavioral Factors and Financial Choices of Consumersv
a’[‘טa(ŠÖ¼‘åŠw@ŒoÏŠw•”@y‹³Žö)
uFirm Heterogeneity and the Dynamics of Credit Rationing in Japanv

RISS-CEE‹¤Ã ƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒv@@ƒ}ƒbƒ`ƒ“ƒO—˜_‚ÌŒ»Ý‚Æ‚»‚̎ЉïŽÀ‘•‚ÉŒü‚¯‚Ä

@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2018”N11ŒŽ11“ú(“ú) 9:30-17:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
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  • Opening Address
  • 9:30|10:00
    –{¼‘׎OiŠÖ¼‘åŠwjA¬ìˆêmiŠÖ¼‘åŠwj

  • Session‚P
  • Chair:@ŒF–ì ‘¾˜Yi‰¡•l‘—§‘åŠwj
  • 10:00|10:40
    ŠÛ’J ‹±•½i‹ž“s‘åŠwj
    Should matching markets be centralized or decentralized, or else? (co-authored with Taro Kumano and Morimitsu Kurino)
  • 10:40|11:20
    Žðˆä —Ç—Si‘åã‘åŠwj
    Strategy-proofness and efficiency in assignment problem with discrete payments (co-authored with Shigehiro Serizawa)
  • 11:20|11:40
    Self-Introduction and Short Break

  • Session2
  • Chair:@ŒI–ì ·ŒõiŒcœä‹`m‘åŠwj
  • 11:40|12:20
    Isa Hafalir (University of Technology Sydney)
    Integrating School Districts: Balance, Diversity, and Welfare (co-authored with Fuhito Kojima and Bumin Yenmez)
  • 12:20|13:00
    â“Œ Œj‰îiMB‘åŠwj
    Existence of a Stable Outcome under Observable Substitutability across Doctors in Many-to-Many Matching with Contracts (co-authored with Toshiyuki Hirai)

  • Session3
  • Chair:@’·‹v —̈ëiŠÖ¼‘åŠwj
  • 13:40|14:20
    ŒË“c Šwi‘ˆî“c‘åŠwj
    Singles Monotonicity and Stability in One-to-One Matching Problems (co-authored with Yoichi Kasajima)
  • 14:20|15:00
    ‰äÈ –õiŽñ“s‘åŠw“Œ‹žj
    Testable implications of fair allocations

  • Session4
  • Chair:@“nç² ’¼Ž÷iŒcœä‹`m‘åŠwj
  • 15:20|16:00
    ‘Œ’J —S‰îi_ŒË‘åŠwj
    Spurious Strategy-Proofness: Peer Effects and Counterfactuals in Market Design
  • 16:00|16:40
    ”‹Œ´ ½i“Œ‹žH‹Æ‘åŠwj
    Double Implementation in dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex Post Equilibria with Private Values

  • Closing Note
  • 16:40|17:00
    ¼‰ºŒhˆê˜YiŠÖ¼‘åŠwj

  • Commentators
  • “n•Ó—²—TiŽñ“s‘åŠw“Œ‹žjA˜aŒõƒiŠwK‰@‘åŠwj
”õl ƒvƒƒOƒ‰ƒ€(PDF)

ŒöŠJuÀ

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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2018”N8ŒŽ4“ú(“y) 11:00-15:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw”~“cƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX
uŽtE˜_‘è ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
u’N‚ª‘¼l‚Ƃǂ̂悤‚É‹¦—Í‚·‚é‚Ì‚©Hv
–{¼‘׎OiŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŒoÏŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISS‹@\’·j
u¼‹\“IEƒ{ƒbƒ^ƒNƒŠ‹à—Z¤•i‚©‚çg‚ðŽç‚é‚ɂ́Hv
”õl ˆê”ÊŽQ‰ÁŽÒ‘ΏÛ
ŽQ‰Á—¿–³—¿E\ž•s—v

CEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ13‰ñ)

@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[
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êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è ¬ŽR—F‰îiŽÅ‰YH‹Æ‘åŠw ŠÂ‹«ƒVƒXƒeƒ€Šw‰È ‹³Žöj
uƒXƒ}[ƒgƒtƒHƒ“ƒQ[ƒ€ƒ†[ƒU[‚̉ۋàs“®‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚é’²¸v
‘C“c•mi‘åã‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŒoÏŒ¤‹†Š uŽtj
uHigher order risk attitudes and prevention under different timings of lossv joint with Eungik Lee

CEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ12‰ñ)

@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2018”N7ŒŽ5“ú(–Ø) 14:00-15:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è Alex R. Horenstein (Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Miami)
uTree construction and backward induction: a mobile experimentv

RISS Seminar Series

@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï ‘æ2‰ñŒ¤‹†‰ï
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2018”N5ŒŽ30“ú(…) 17:00-18:30
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uŽtE˜_‘è ¼“‡ –@–¾ i‘åã‘åŠwŽÐ‰ïŒoÏŒ¤‹†Š‹³Žöj
uA Manufacturer's incentive to Open Its Direct Channel and Its Impact on Welfarev

RISS Seminar on Empirical Micro Analysis

@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw‰ï
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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2018”N4ŒŽ25“ú(…) 17:00-18:30
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êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
6ŠK@ƒ}ƒ‹ƒ`ƒƒfƒBƒAEƒ‰ƒ{
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Ži‰ï Îˆä ŒõiŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”‹³Žöj
uŽtE˜_‘è Desmond (Ho-Fu) Lo
iAssociate Professor of Marketing, Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara Universityj
uEffort and Compensation in Relational Contractsv

CEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ11‰ñ)

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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2018”N1ŒŽ15“ú(ŒŽ) 15:00-17:20
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è ’|–{‹œi’é’ËŽR‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”‹³Žöj
uAn impact of others' other-regarding preferences in dictator gamesv
”öè—S‰îi‘åãŽY‹Æ‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”y‹³Žöj
uWhich determines "Dictating the Risk", risk preference or social image? |Experimental evidence|v

‘æ21‰ñŽÀŒ±ŽÐ‰ï‰ÈŠwƒJƒ“ƒtƒ@ƒŒƒ“ƒX

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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2017”N10ŒŽ21“ú(“y)A22“ú(“ú)
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX@‘æ3ŠwŽÉ
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‰¡”ö‰pŽji‘—§ŠÂ‹«ŠwŒ¤‹†Šj
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22“úi“újƒL[ƒm[ƒgƒXƒs[ƒ`
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21“úi“yj‚̃vƒƒOƒ‰ƒ€
22“úi“új‚̃vƒƒOƒ‰ƒ€
”õl Ú×‚Í‚±‚¿‚ç@iŠO•”ƒTƒCƒgj

CEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ10‰ñ)

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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2017”N7ŒŽ15“ú(“y) 18:00-19:00A16“ú(“ú) 10:00-11:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·j
uŽtE˜_‘è 15“úi“yj
ì‘º“N–ç(ŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[PD)
uThe Higher (Lower) The Cognitive Ability, The More Generous The Elderly (Young): Evidence from Dictator Game Experimentsv
uA School Choice Experiment: Studentsf Cognitive Ability and Their Behaviorv
16“úi“új
Yan Chen(ƒ~ƒVƒKƒ“‘åŠw‹³Žöj
uIdentity and Impact on Public Goods Contributions: A Field Experiment on Wikipediav

‘æ40‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

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ŠJÃ“úŽž 2017”N3ŒŽ29“ú(ŒŽ) 15:00-18:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
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‘æ39‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uCEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ9‰ñ)v
@@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2016”N12ŒŽ19“ú(ŒŽ) 14:00-18:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è ì‘º“N–ç(ŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[PD)
uCognitive ability and human behavior in the experimental ultimatum gamesv
‰Ô–ؐLsiƒj[ƒX‘åŠw‹³Žöj
uOn the Roots of the Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights: Evidence from France and Japanv
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uReconsidering whether women are less selfish than men: group gender composition matters in dictator gamesv

‘æ38‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uRISS Seminar Series on Agent-Based Modelsv

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2016”N12ŒŽ10“ú(“y) 13:00-14:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¼‰ºŒhˆê˜Y (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŒoÏŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISS‹@\’·)
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‘æ37‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uCEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ8‰ñ)v
@@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2016”N10ŒŽ18“ú(‰Î) 16:30-17:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è Keith K.P. Wong iDirector and Professor, School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kongj
uHedging and the Competitive Firm under Ambiguous Price and Background Riskv

‘æ36‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uCEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ7‰ñ)v
@@@ ‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2016”N7ŒŽ28“ú(–Ø) 14:00-16:10
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è “cŒû‘Žui“¯ŽuŽÐ‘åŠw¤Šw•”‹³Žöj
uVoluntary disclosure does not promote the trust between investor and manager: An experimental studyv
ŽR“c—²ŽuiŽRŒû‘åŠw‘Û‘‡‰ÈŠw•”y‹³Žö)
uPlaying Lowest Unique Integer Gamesv

‘æ35‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uCEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ6‰ñ)v
@@ @‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2015”N12ŒŽ11“ú(‹à) 13:00-18:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” y‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è James KonowiChair of Economics and Ethics, Kiel University, German, and Professor of Economics, Loyola Marymount University, USAj
uEquity versus Equality: Experimental Analysis of Justice Rulesv
Nick FeltovichiProfessor, Department of Economics, Monash University, Australiaj
uHow does the effect of pre-play suggestions vary with group size? Experimental evidence from a threshold public-good gamev
Tetsuya KawamuraiPD, Center for Experimental Economics, Kansai Universityj
uHow to Promote Crowd Funding for R&D in New Sources of Energy-Evidence from Online Field Experiment-v
Tomoharu MoriiPD, Center for Experimental Economics, Kansai Universityj
uThe Effect of Age, Gender, and Earned Income in the Trust Game: A Laboratory Experiment in Japanv

‘æ34‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uCEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ5‰ñ)v
@@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2015”N7ŒŽ31“ú(‹à) 14:00-16:10
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” y‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è ŽRª³Žqi‹ß‹E‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”j
uThe Ripples in the Growth of Swimmersv
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u“Œ“ú–{‘åkÐ”íÐ‚É‚¨‚¯‚鍂—îŽÒ‚Ì‘ID‚ÆŒ’Nv

‘æ33‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@uRISS Occasional Seminar on Social Psychologyv
@@@‹¤ÃFKSPiŠÖ¼ŽÐ‰ïS—ŠwŒ¤‹†‰ïj

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2015”N7ŒŽ18“ú(“y) 14:00-17:00
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‘æ32‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uCEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ4‰ñ)v
@@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2015”N6ŒŽ12“ú(‹à) 14:00-16:10
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” y‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è “¿ŠÛ‰Ä‰Ìi‹ž“s‘åŠwŒoÏŠwŒ¤‹†‰È•‘®ƒvƒƒWƒFƒNƒgƒZƒ“ƒ^[uŽtj
uWhat is eFairf Distribution under Collaboration?: Evidences from Lab-Experimentsv
’·‹v—̈ëiŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”‹³Žöj
uAn axiomatic approach to the design of moral codesv

‘æ31‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ u4th RISS Seminar Series on Data Sciencev
@@@ ‹¤ÃFCRESTƒf[ƒ^\‘¢ƒOƒ‹[ƒv

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2015”N2ŒŽ23“ú(ŒŽ) 13:00-14:00
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u—¬’Ê‹Æ‚É‚¨‚¯‚éƒrƒbƒOƒf[ƒ^Šˆ—p‚Ö‚ÌŽæ‚è‘g‚݁v

‘æ30‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uCEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ3‰ñ)v
@@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2015”N1ŒŽ10“ú(“y) 14:00-16:10
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” y‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
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uRisk aversion and the Great East Japan Earthquakev
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u–¢¥ŽÒ‚Ì—öˆ¤s“®•ªÍv

‘æ29‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@ uRISS Occasional Seminar on Quantitative Political Sciencev

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N12ŒŽ26“ú(‹à) 14:00-16:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï “y‘qŠÎŽ¢iŠÖ¼‘åŠw–¼—_‹³ŽöERISS”ñí‹ÎŒ¤‹†ˆõj
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u’n•û­Ž¡ƒf[ƒ^ƒx[ƒX‚¨‚æ‚Ñ’n•û­Ž¡ƒ|[ƒ^ƒ‹ƒTƒCƒg‚ÌŠJ”­‚Æ—˜—pv
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uŽQ‹c‰@‘I‹“ƒf[ƒ^ƒx[ƒX‚ÌŠJ”­‚Æ—˜—pv

‘æ28‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ u3rd RISS Seminar Series on Data Sciencev
@@ @‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwƒf[ƒ^ƒTƒCƒGƒ“ƒXŒ¤‹†ƒZƒ“ƒ^[

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N11ŒŽ29“ú(“y) 13:00-14:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“àƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï –î“cŸriŠÖ¼‘åŠw¤Šw•”‹³ŽöEƒf[ƒ^ƒTƒCƒGƒ“ƒXŒ¤‹†ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·j
uŽtE˜_‘è ”Ñ“c —miŠ”Ž®‰ïŽÐƒAƒCƒ‹j
uƒrƒWƒlƒX‚ƌڋqƒNƒ‰ƒXƒ^ƒŠƒ“ƒO‚ÌŽÀ‘Hv

‘æ27‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uCEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics (‘æ2‰ñ)v
@@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N10ŒŽ31“ú(‰Î) 14:00-17:30
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Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” y‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõEŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è ”öè—S‰îi‘åãŽY‹Æ‘åŠwŒoÏŠw•”y‹³Žö^ŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[Œ¤‹†ˆõj
u‚ŽŸƒŠƒXƒN‰ñ”ðEx‚ÌŽÀŒ±\Å‹ß‚ÌŒ¤‹†“®Œü‚ɂ‚¢‚ā\v

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‘æ26‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ u2nd RISS Seminar Series on Data Sciencev
@@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwƒf[ƒ^ƒTƒCƒGƒ“ƒXŒ¤‹†ƒZƒ“ƒ^[

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N10ŒŽ21“ú(‰Î) 16:30-18:20
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï –{¼‘׎O (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŒoÏŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISS•›‹@\’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è Desmond LoiSanta Clara Universityj
uContract Design to Dis-incentivize Dedicated Investments: Theory and Evidencev
uThe Effect of Customer Mobility on Company Survival: Evidence from Independent and Chain Restaurantsv

‘æ25‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uRISS Seminar Series on Cognitive Economics ‘æ1‰ñv

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N9ŒŽ27“ú(“y) 14:00-15:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
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Ži‰ï ¼‰ºŒhˆê˜Y (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŒoÏŠw•” ‹³ŽöERISS‹@\’·)
uŽtE˜_‘è ¼‘º‹³Žqi’¹ŽæŠÂ‹«‘åŠwŒo‰cŠw•”Œo‰cŠw‰Èy‹³Žöj
uŒoÏ“I‚È”»’f‚ÉŠÖ‚í‚é”F’m”\—Í‚ÌŒŸ“¢ \Œö“I”N‹à‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éˆÓŽ¯’²¸(2012”N“x)\v

‘æ24‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uFirst Joint Seminar on Economics of ICTv
@@@‹¤ÃF“Œ‹ž‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@@î•ñŠwŠÂ@ŠwÛî•ñŠw•{EŠÖ¼‘åŠwƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N9ŒŽ27“ú(“y) 11:00-13:00
êŠ “Œ‹ž‘åŠwHŠw•”2†ŠÙ9ŠK93B
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\ŠÖ¼‘åŠwRISSî•ñ’ʐM‹Zp’²¸Œö•å‚Ìà–¾‚ÆŽ¿‹^‰ž“š\
‰LŽ”N“ŒiŠÖ¼‘åŠwRISSî•ñ’ʐM‹Zpƒ†ƒjƒbƒg’·E­ô‘n‘¢Šw•”“Á”C‹³Žöj

‘æ‚Q•”FŒö‹¤­ô‚Ì‚½‚߂̃f[ƒ^ƒ}ƒCƒjƒ“ƒO
‰LŽ”N“ŒiŠÖ¼‘åŠwRISSî•ñ’ʐM‹Zpƒ†ƒjƒbƒg’·E­ô‘n‘¢Šw•”“Á”C‹³Žöj

‘æ23‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uCEE and RISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics ‘æ1‰ñv
@@@‹¤ÃFŠÖ¼‘åŠwŒoÏŽÀŒ±ƒZƒ“ƒ^[

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N8ŒŽ29“ú(‹à) 14:00-16:40
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” y‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõ)
uŽtE˜_‘è Œ¢Ž”‰ÀŒái‘åã‘åŠwŽÐ‰ïŒoÏŒ¤‹†Š•‹³j
uThe effect of market exchange on the devision of labour (with Kengo Kurosaka)v

¬ìˆêmiŠÖ¼‘åŠwŽÐ‰ïŠw•”y‹³Žöj
uNon-anonymous donation improves social welfare: a dictator game experiment (with Tatsuhiro Shichijo, Takao Kusakawa)v

‘æ22‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@u1st RISS Seminar Series on Economics of ICTv

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N4ŒŽ18“ú(‹à) 13:30-15:30
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠw“Œ‹žƒZƒ“ƒ^[
ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
ŠÖ¼‘åŠw‚’΃Lƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX@‘æ2‰ï‹cŽºiTV‰ï‹cŽºj
Ži‰ï ‰LŽ”N“ŒiŠÖ¼‘åŠw–¼—_‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõj
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uMacroeconomic Contribution of the Cloud Computing Systemv

‘æ21‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uRISS Occasional Seminar ‘æ1‰ñƒZƒ~ƒi[v
@@@‹¤ÃF‹ž“sŽY‹Æ‘åŠwæ’[‰ÈŠw‹ZpŒ¤‹†Š

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N2ŒŽ28“ú(‹à) 13:15-14:45
êŠ ‹ž“sŽY‹Æ‘åŠw 5†ŠÙ
uŽtE˜_‘è Chung-Ching Tai (Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Tunghai University)
uAssessing the Effects of Working Memory Capacity on Market Performance: An Experimental Studyv

‘æ20‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ uRISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics@‘æ4‰ñƒZƒ~ƒi[v

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N2ŒŽ17“ú(ŒŽ) 14:00-15:40
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” y‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõ)
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uEye movement, drift-diffusion model and the choicev

‘æ19‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@uRISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics@‘æ3‰ñƒZƒ~ƒi[v

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N1ŒŽ25“ú(“y) 14:00-17:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” y‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõ)
uŽtE˜_‘è ÔŽ}®Ž÷iŠÖ¼‘åŠwŽÐ‰ïŠw•”•‹³j
u“ú–{‚É‚¨‚¯‚éƒRƒ~ƒ…ƒjƒeƒB–â‘è‚ÌŒŸ“¢v

’·’ˏ¹¶i‘åã‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@j
uTemperament and Character in Competitive Biddingv

‘æ18‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@ u‘æ1‰ñ RISS Seminar Series on Data Sciencev
@@@‹¤ÃFƒf[ƒ^ƒ}ƒCƒjƒ“ƒO‰ž—pŒ¤‹†ƒZƒ“ƒ^[iDMƒ‰ƒ{)

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2014”N1ŒŽ20“ú(ŒŽ) 14:00-16:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï –î“cŸr (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ¤Šw•” ‹³ŽöEDMƒ‰ƒ{ƒZƒ“ƒ^[’·)
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uVisual Representations Enhancing Insightv

‘æ17‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@uRISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics@‘æ2‰ñƒZƒ~ƒi[v

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2013”N11ŒŽ30“ú(“y) 14:00-17:00
êŠ ŠÖ¼‘åŠwç—¢ŽRƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX“à@ƒ\ƒVƒIƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒNí—ªŒ¤‹†‹@\
Ži‰ï ¬ìˆêm (ŠÖ¼‘åŠw ŽÐ‰ïŠw•” y‹³ŽöERISSŒ¤‹†ˆõ)
uŽtE˜_‘è “¡‘q’Wi’}”g‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@j
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uStrategic Determination of Renegotiation Costv

‘æ16‰ñRISS‘Ž‡Œ¤‹†‰ï

@@@uRISS Seminar Series on Experimental Economics@‘æ1‰ñƒZƒ~ƒi[v

ŠJÃ“úŽž 2013”N9ŒŽ20“ú(‹à) 14:30-17:15
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