新着情報

RISSワークショップ(2019年6月17日)を開催いたします。

2019/06/14

RISSワークショップ

共催:経済学会

日  程: 2019年6月17日(月) 18:00 ~

場  所: 関西大学千里山キャンパス
      ソシオネットワーク戦略研究機構 6階 マルチメディア・ラボ

報告タイトル: Startups and Upstarts(Vijay Krishnaとの共著)

報告者: 粟屋祐 氏 (Assistant Professor, University of Rochester)

報告要旨
We study a continuous-time R&D race between an established firm and a startup under asymmetric information. R&D investment brings success stochastically but only if the innovation is feasible. The only asymmetry between the firms is that the established firm has better information about the feasibility of the innovation. We show that there is an equilibrium in which the poorly-informed startup wins more often, and has higher expected profits, than the better-informed incumbent. When the informational asymmetry is large, this is the unique equilibrium outcome. Even though better information is available competitive disadvantage, the value of information is positive.