An Effective Way of Teaching the Expression of Future Matters in English;
Part Two: Objective versus Rhetorical Uses of Simple Future Tenses:
Chapters Six~Nine

英語における未来表現の効果的な教授法の試み
第２部：単純未来表現においての客観的用法と修辞的用法の対比
第６～第９章

A. Stephen Gibbs
アントニー・スティーヴン・ギブズ

Key words
① degree of subject/executant-ownership ② degree of flexibility as schedule
③ degree of transparency of ownership ④ degree of negotiability

キ－ドワ－ド
①主体・行為者の所有権の程度 ②予定としての弾力度 ③所有者の透明度
④交渉の可能性

Introduction
This serialized study has proposed that the variety of expressions of future matters offered by English can first of all be organized semantically into three groups: those that predict involuntary results [F1], those that declare plans that are unilaterally owned by
their subjects/executeants [F2], and those that report schedules of which no subject/executeant has complete ownership [F3]. Here, the remaining three of the four subcategories of F3 are compared and contrasted, and the criteria for appropriate use, both objective and rhetorical, of the whole system of future expression are summarized.

The following chart summarizes the distinctions that this entire study has sought to demonstrate as underlying the English system for expressing the future, and therefore offering learners a reliable guide as to appropriate choice of expression:

Chapter Six:
(F3 b i): report of a schedule of voluntary action
of which no executeant has complete ownership,
and so is relatively inflexible

6.1. Overview

1) F3 b i State verb: The captain of our soccer team is to have the privilege of meeting a famous soccer star.

2) F3 b i State verb: She and her father have decided that she is to work for his company.

3) F3 b i State-verb: They have agreed that, for now, they are to share an apartment.

4) F3 b i Instant-verb: The Emperor is to meet the President of the U.S.A.
tomorrow, at noon.

5) **F3 b i** Process-verb: He **is to drive** to New York, tomorrow, on business for his company.

All of these examples of **F3 b i** report schedules of **voluntary** states or changes of which **no single** subject/executant has, or group of subjects/executants have, **complete ownership**, and yet (unlike the case of **F3 a**) of which **no** subject/executant, or group of subjects/executants, has **no ownership whatsoever**.

In example (1), we may presume that both the captain and the star have both **agreed** to the meeting, as have the people that are going to make this meeting possible; in (2), ‘she’ and her father have reached a similar **agreement; so**, too, have the people who are going to share an apartment, in (3). And, with regard to (4), all of the Emperor, the major staff of the Imperial Household Agency, as well as the President, and **his** immediate staff, have presumably **agreed** upon the time (and place) of their meeting.

Since **every** subject/executant of such a schedule has (at least theoretically) some degree of ownership, by the same token the ownership of none is complete; and therefore such a schedule is understood to be hard to change – that is to say ‘**relatively inflexible**’. (Thus, it differs from **F3 c** in not only form but also semantic implications.) By contrast, any schedule expressed by means of **F3 c** is [intended as] understood to be “**entirely flexible**”.

(5), however, proves to be rather more ambiguous – as we shall see, following.

### 6.2. Similarities and ambiguity between uses of **F3 a** and uses of **F3 b i**

The identity between **F3 a** and **F3 b i** concerns only **form**, and not, therefore, also **meaning**. So, should we find ourselves in doubt of which may be intended by our Addresser, what means can we use, in order to distinguish between **F3 a** and **F3 b i**?

The key lies in the **state of knowledge** of the subject[s]/executant[s]. **Both** the captain of the soccer team and the soccer star, **both** ‘she’ and her father, **both** of ‘they’, and **both** the Emperor and the President presumably know what they have respectively agreed to schedule and execute. (Thus, there is also **transparency of ownership**.)

In the case of example (5), however, since only a **single** executant is mentioned, we can imagine two different uses for this utterance. One of these uses is that in the case in which ‘he’ **has not yet been consulted** about this business trip to New York – and **is not ever going to** be consulted – so that ‘he’ has been accorded **no ownership at all**: 
54) **Boss:** F3 a He is to drive to New York, tomorrow, on business for the company. Let him know.

**Secretary:** Certainly, sir.

But the other is a case in which ‘he’ has been consulted, and has agreed:

54) **A:** Robert, could you do this for me, tomorrow?

**B:** F3 b i Sorry, but I can’t! Tomorrow I am to drive to New York, on business for the company.

In the case of (54), in contrast with that of (52), it is more than likely that Robert has consented to the schedule; and at least he already knows about it, and has accepted it – whether truly consentingly or not. Indeed, in the case of (54), the executant himself may even have initially proposed it – which is never the case with F3 a:

**Robert:** F3 b ii 1) Sir, why don’t I drive to New York, and deal with that myself?

**Boss:** Good idea! F3 b i That’s what you are to do, then.

Because the subject/executee’s ownership of any schedule reported by either F3 a or F3 b i is always at least less than complete, both constrain the freedoms of those subjects/executees, if to different degrees: in the case of F3 b i, that constraint has (to some degree) been voluntarily undergone; in the case of F3 a, however, the constraint has been accepted only involuntarily, and Addressers will sometimes add something to their report, evidently with the specific purpose of showing that they intend F3 a, and not F3 b i:

61) **A:** Robert, could you do this for me, tomorrow?

**B:** F3 a Sorry, I can’t! Apparently, I am to drive to New York tomorrow, on business for the company.

OR

**F3 a I’ve just been told that I am to drive** to New York tomorrow, on business for the company.

OR

**F3 a Someone has decided that I am to drive** to New York tomorrow, on business for the company. [Opacity of ownership
Or B’s reply in (6) above may be used, but spoken in a tone of voice – one of dismay, or of irritation – that indicates that this schedule has in fact been **unilaterally imposed** in him.

This frequently-used practice of in some way clarifying that what is intended as **F3 a** is not, in fact, **F3 b i** shows that (1) most Addressers do, **at least pre-consciously**, distinguish between **F3 a** and **F3 b i**, and that (2) they are aware of potential ambiguity, and will, when such a problem arises, find some way of making clear what they in fact intend their Addressees to understand: that is to say, whether they are using **F3 a**, or **F3 b i**.

**Chapter Seven:**

**F3 b ii: report of future result of following a timetable, etc.**

(i.e. some schedule of a voluntary state, or voluntary action, that is owned too multilaterally to be particularly flexible)

**7.1. Semantic relation to the Simple Present tense: from regular repetition to future single instance**

A **timetable** is basically something that reports a schedule, made up of changes that occur not during **one** particular period of time but (usually) **every** day, or every week, etc., and thus is **repeated**. Any **repetition of a change** that has begun before ‘**now**’, and will continue after ‘**now**’, is always expressed with the **Simple Present** tense.

**Repetition of Process**

---

| ? | ? |

| \[the past\] | [now] |

---

**Repetition of Instant-change**

---

| ? | ? |

| \[the past\] | [now] |
And this is therefore the tense by means of which actual timetables that are in effect ‘now’ are normally expressed and discussed.

Since the form of F3 b ii is identical to that of the Simple Present tense,

7) F3 b ii Instant-verb: Her train gets in at 12:30.

it is potentially ambiguous in meaning: does the Addresser mean ‘every day’ [= repetition], or ‘later today [only]’ [= one, future instance]?

The answer that resolves this ambiguity can be provided only by context: if ‘she’ customarily uses the train as a commuter, and the Addresser is talking about that commuter’s daily schedule, then she is likely to mean ‘every day’; but if her traveling on that train is a unique or only occasional event [= instance], then it will be obvious to her Addressee that she means later ‘today’ (or, again, ‘tonight’). (Nevertheless, her Addressee will also understand from this that (1) the train itself will arrive, whether or not the person mentioned is actually riding on it; and that (2) such is due to the fact that this change occurs every day.)

There is, however, a very good reason for this ambiguity. For it seems extremely likely that F3 b ii is a direct development from the use of the Simple Present to express schedules of events that are presently being repeated.

In, however, the case of F3 b ii, what is being reported has already been reduced – to one, single instance.

Nevertheless, one can also well see how that might have come about. For only a small step lies between explaining [or stating] the decreed results of the application of a law [= a particular kind of schedule, or timetable] concerning the government of a republic, which comes into effect every time a particular event has occurred (e.g. the death of a president while still in office) [= repetition of a change], as in the example following,

8) Simple Present state-verb: If the President dies while still in office, the Vice-president governs the country, until a new general election can be held.

and reporting a future schedule of a single actual carrying-out [= instance of effect] of the same law, as in (9), below:

9) F3 b ii State-verb: Since the President is now dead, the Vice-president
governs the country, until a general election can be held.

Here, *since the President is now dead* tells the Addressee that the Addresser is not – as, in (8), she *is – explaining* a *general, repeated* schedule but, rather, is *reporting* one future *instance* of application of that schedule.

7.2. General schedule versus report of future instance of its application

In *many* uses of F3 b ii – though by no means in *all* such cases – an awareness of a *general, predetermined schedule* hovers behind its expression of a single future instance of a change.

Here is a very typical example:

10) A: F3 b ii Process-verb: What do we do now?
   B: F3 b ii Process-verb: We clean the windows.

In the context implied by example (10), A and B are obviously engaged in some kind of house-cleaning project. And, here, please note that *neither* does A ask,

F2 Process-verb: What are we going to do now?

– which, of course, implies that both Addresser and Addressee *share complete ownership* of a future plan, and therefore they are free to decide what they will *voluntarily* do next – *nor* does she ask,

F1 a Process-verb: What shall [OR will] we do now?

– which implies that, whatever they may sooner or later do, such can only be the *inevitable* result of the *nature* of some influential element within the situation, and thus a future *instance* of a process that is ‘ownership-impossible’, and therefore *involuntary*.

Instead, in (10), A asks B to consult his memory of some kind of predetermined, *general schedule* (for most projects have *some* degree of *preplanned schedule*). And A apparently expects B to have such a memory because he has cleaned other houses before, *following the same schedule*. But A has either (1) never followed this schedule before, or else (2) has temporarily forgotten the next stage in it; and so she is forced to ask what the schedule
dictates that they shall do next.

7.3. Just how general is any schedule reported as a timetable?

To try to answer this question, let us think about the following example:

11) **F3 b ii** Instant-verb: I start working in Kyūshū on the 25th of next month.

In the case of this utterance, what is clearer than it is in the instance of (10) is that one future instance of the application of a schedule is being reported as the result of a timetable. What nevertheless remains far from clear is whether this timetable has been created *for the Addresser alone* [individual], or has, so far, *always* been applied *to all people employed* as she happens now to be employed [general].

That is to say, example (11) can be interpreted in either of two ways: one is thus: (1) ‘The President of my company happens to have decided that I (*alone*) am *exceptionally* to start working in Kyūshū on the 25th of next month; and the other is something like (2), ‘I have now worked for this company for 18 months; and so I have reached the point in time at which *normally* all company workers are in turn sent to Kyūshū at the end of their nth month of employ.’

Interpretation (1) is far more likely; yet interpretation (2) is also possible.

The same ambiguity is found in the following example, too:

12) **Simple Present OR F3 b ii?** Instant-verb: The plane lands in fifteen minutes.

The plane mentioned *may* be successfully flying according to its preordained timetable, and so its landing, and its landing at whatever point in future time may be expressed by ‘fifteen minutes from now’, is something that always happens, every time a plane belonging to this airline makes this particular flight.

On the other hand, the plane may, *this* time, have been delayed by unfavorable atmospheric conditions, and so is reaching its destination later than usual; or, again, it *may* have been unexpectedly assisted by unusually helpful atmospheric conditions, and so cannot but arrive at its destination earlier than it normally does.

In neither of the latter cases is the plane actually following the timetable that has been decided for it; and yet **F3 b ii** may be used – perhaps to reassure the passengers that no really significant variance from the promised *timetable* has proven necessary.
An Effective Way of Teaching the Expression of Future Matters in English (Gibbs)

Here is a third example, in which a change is reported as the future result of following a predetermined schedule expressed as though it were a timetable

13) **F3 b ii** State-verb: Remember: whatever plan he suggests, you agree with it.

In this case, the Addresser and her Addressee have obviously agreed on a schedule of future behaviour, for the Addressee to use in dealing with ‘him’, that is both entirely individual, and yet is to be followed by the Addressee in dealing with all varieties of suggestion made by ‘him’. According to this ‘timetable’ – or, rather ‘manual’ – the Addresser requires her Addressee to confirm that the latter agrees to cooperate, by doing whatever ‘he’ may propose.

Such a schedule – which has presumably been devised by at least the Addresser, and possibly by her Addressee, too – is of course very far in nature from an actual timetable. Nevertheless, **F3 b ii** is commonly employed for such communicative purposes, too; and I think that the reason for its being chosen lies in the particular quality of the state of ownership that it implicitly expresses. So it is about this quality that we shall now think.

7.4. **Timetables and ownership**

A literal timetable is owned, because unilaterally decided, by whatever public transport-system, or private transport-company, may provide the schedule of regular transportation that the timetable expresses. As this ownership is, legally-speaking, unilateral, when a future change in a timetable is expressed, this unilateralness will frequently be reflected in an Addresser’s choice of **F2**:

**F2** Instant-verb: It says in the newspaper that they’re going to change our train timetable.

At the same time, and in a broader sense, the ultimate ownership of many (if not all) timetables is much larger: be those public or private, most transportation systems usually try to meet the needs of their markets – that is to say, the needs of the consumer-passengers that use it – and particularly the needs of regular commuters. And they do this through conducting traffic-flow surveys; and the results of any one particular survey may lead to a change in the timetable concerned, intended to cause it to meet those needs better.

Thus, the basic concept of a ‘timetable’ is, when considered not legally but semantically, that of a schedule that is broadly multilaterally-owned. And hence, whatever is expressed
as the future result of some kind of timetable is implicitly understood to be something that can be changed or abandoned only after some broad consensus has been reached, and is consequently extremely inflexible.

Important people often, and paradoxically, have less ownership of their own conduct than do we ordinary people – precisely because they are important to so many other people; consequently, in media communications such as news-programmes and newspaper-articles, F3 b ii is frequently chosen in order to report the future activities of such public figures as heads-of-state, and important members of governments:

F3 b ii Instant-verb: At noon on Wednesday, the Emperor meets with the President of the United States.

As I have previously observed, it is obvious that so many other people, apart from the two important figures mentioned, are also, if more or less indirectly, involved in both the sanctioning and the effects of this schedule that it is inevitably very hard, for the principal subjects/executants involved in the schedule, to change it [ = relatively inflexible] .

On the other hand, a timetable is basically something that is ‘owned by everyone’; and therefore, in contrast to F3 a and F3 b i, it may be called ‘ownership-transparent’ (even though the scale of that ownership is extremely large, and therefore the sense of just who those owners may be is extremely vague). This is a matter about which we shall think more, a little later.

Here, however, are three possible choices with which an Addressee can express almost the same content:

F2 Process-verbs: On the 1st of August I’m going to leave for England, where I’m going to stay in London for three nights, and then going to go up to my brother’s house in Leamington Spa ... ,

F3 b ii Process-verbs: On the 1st of August I leave for England, where I stay in London for three nights, and then go up to my brother’s house in Leamington Spa ... ,

F3 c Process-verbs: On the 1st of August I’m leaving for England, where I’m
staying in London for three nights, and then going up to my brother's house in Leamington Spa ...

What may be the difference in communicative effect, and particularly with respect to politeness as expressed toward the Addressee, between, on one hand, uses of F2 and F3 c, and, on the other, use of F3 b ii, in the above examples?

7.5. Expressing ‘timetables’ (F3 b ii), and politeness

This implication of importance also makes the use of F3 b ii potentially pragmatically dangerous, if it should be used thoughtlessly.

For, if I myself am reporting a schedule for my own summer holiday, of which I in fact have complete ownership – and my Addressee knows (or will naturally assume) that I do – and yet, instead of using F2, or F3 c, as in the following examples,

F2 Process-verbs: On the 1st of August I’m going to leave for England, where I’m going to stay in London for three nights, and then going to go up to my brother’s house in Leamington Spa ...

F3 c Process-verbs: On the 1st of August I’m leaving for England, where I’m staying in London for three nights, and then going up to my brother’s house in Leamington Spa ...

(the choice of F3 c being justified by the fact that my ticket has already been bought, and my brother has already fitted my arrival at his house into his own family’s schedule, and yet, though more people than just me now have ownership of this schedule, because I am intimate with them all, and am trusted and understood by them, it is ‘relatively flexible’) should – if most thoughtlessly – instead employ F3 b ii,

F3 b ii Process-verbs: On the 1st of August I leave for England, where I stay in London for three nights, and then go up to my brother’s house in Leamington Spa ...

I need to recognize the possibility that my Addressee may well assume that I regard myself as rather important – important enough for what is actually merely my own plan to be
reported as broadly multilaterally-owned – by hundreds or thousands of people that are all more or less concerned with my actions. And this may all too easily make my Addressee believe (rightly or wrongly) that I am a rather self-aggrandizing and pompous person.

This is not, however, always the case.

For example, if an Addressee has a number of close friends, made during her high school or university days, and, as one part of each of her summer holidays, she tries to make a tour of the country, to meet each of them again, and to spend some time with their families, then the idea of this tour starts as a plan, of which she initially has complete ownership (F2); on the other hand, each of these friends and her or his family of course have their own summer-holiday schedule; consequently, it will take a lot of discussion and arrangement to work out a schedule for her tour that ensures that she does not inconvenience any of them, and yet does, in fact, get to meet them all again.

Obviously, once this schedule has been fixed, it is owned by not just the Addressee but also those other people as well. In such a case, and providing her Addressee knows these background facts, such an Addressee can use F3 b ii without seeming to assume herself to be unduly important – for, in a way, she is important, if only to those people that say that have said that they want to see her again. And those friends have become just as much owners of the schedule as is she herself.

Nevertheless, because of the association of F3 b ii with the schedules of important or at least conspicuous public figures, I myself, as one individual Addressee, would almost never use it to express my own schedule; and I avoid it (I have realized) out of a wish to be polite to my Addressee, by avoiding any implicit presumption as to my own importance.

On the other hand, I certainly should use F3 b ii in order to express the schedule of anyone that merited expressions of care or respect; and, again, I should do this because its associations with the activities of important public figures makes it polite when used to report the schedules of others than oneself, or one’s own group.

7.6. Future states, too, can be reported as ‘timetabled’

Timetables basically concern changes – both instant-changes such as /The Hikari Express, Number 205, bound for Tôkyô, reaches Nagoya at 11:15/ and process-changes such as /After we have swept and washed the floors, we clean the windows/.

But there are rare instances in which a timetable of ‘no change’ [= the maintenance of a state] has instead to be followed. We have already met with one typical example of use of
F3 b ii with a state-verb:

9) F3 b ii State-verb: Since the President is now dead, the Vice-president governs the country, until a general election can be held.

And here is another fairly typical example:

14) F3 b ii State-verb: This room remains untouched until the police arrive.

In the context evident from (14), a crime has been committed in the room mentioned, and the Addressee is herself consulting a multilaterally-owned schedule – that of good forensic practice – and reporting what should happen, if that schedule is to be properly followed. And it happens that the future result of doing that must be ‘no change’.

While such uses of F3 b ii with state-verbs are rather rare, these are certainly not impossible.

7.7. F3 a/b i and F3 b ii contrasted: specificity vs. generality; opacity vs. clarity of ownership

What follows is a number of possible choices with which an Addressee can express almost the same content:

1) F3 b ii State-verb: Since the President is now dead, the Vice-president governs the country, until a general election can be held.

15) F3 b i [OR F3 a] State-verb: Since the President is now dead, the Vice-president is to govern the country, until a general election can be held.

24) F3 b ii State-verb: This room remains untouched until the police arrive.

25) F3 b i [OR F3 a?] State-verb: This room is to remain untouched until the police arrive.

34) F3 b ii Instant-verb: At noon on Wednesday, the Emperor meets with the President of the United States.

35) F3 b i Instant-verb: At noon on Wednesday, the Emperor is to meet with the
President of the United States.

4) **F3 b ii** State-verb: Remember: whatever plan he suggests, you **agree with** it.

4) **F3 b i** [OR F3 a?] State-verb: Remember: whatever plan he suggests, you **are to agree with** it.

5) **A:** **F3 b ii** Process-verb: What **do** we **do** now?

**B:** **F3 b ii** Process-verb: We **clean** the windows.

5) **A:** What do we do now?

**B:** **F3 b i** [OR F3 a?] Process-verb: We **are to clean** the windows.

In the above pairs of examples, is there any difference in communicative effect between these uses of **F3 b ii** and **F3 b i**? And, if difference there be, wherein may it lie?

There certainly **is** a difference, but it is one that is rather subtle; and it arises from the **scale of multilateral ownership** that is implied.

On one hand, **F3 b ii always** implies a **large number of co-owners**; on the other hand, **F3 b i** (and also, and **particularly, F3 a**) lacks any such implication. (And therefore **F3 b i** will tend to be preferred in cases in which the number of co-owner-executants of a schedule is relatively **small**.)

And this gives **F3 b ii** a **gentleness** of communicative effect – one that neither **F3 b i** nor **F3 a** has. For **F3 b ii** says – or certainly **can** in certain contexts say – in effect, ‘**So many** people **co-own** this schedule that it really **cannot be changed**. At the same time, this **great number of co-owners** means that no one particular individual or group is specifically responsible for **imposing** this schedule. We **all** just have to accept it, and – if we are its executants – obey it.’

By contrast, **many** uses of **F3 b i** – and, most specifically, almost **all** uses of **F3 a** – strongly imply that the schedule that is reported originates (at least officially) with, and so is **co-owned** by, a **very small number of persons** – or just **one** person or group – or just **one** supernatural and therefore all-powerful entity (such as fate). Paradoxically or not – since it seems so often true that there is ‘strength in numbers’ (cf. the ‘tyranny’ of the majority) – this very precision of focus upon the ownership of a schedule – a precision that is made possible by a **smaller** number of owners – appears to grant the subjects/executant[s] of that
schedule a degree of personal ownership of that schedule that is far less than that granted by F3 b ii.

Thus, the executants of any timetable are assured a small yet certain proportion of co-ownership, because, basically, a timetable (unless it is that of a hierarchical organization, such as an office, an institute of education, a hospital, or a prison) is owned by everyone that it affects. For, while on one hand it may indeed take some time to get a timetable changed, on the other hand, whenever a large majority of transport-users [co-owners] show, merely by their actual commutation-patterns, that more transport should be provided during certain parts of any weekday, then their demands may well soon be met.

Furthermore, as I have already pointed out, a timetable basically expresses a schedule of changes that is regularly repeated. This too gives F3 b ii a softness of impact that F3 b i utterly lacks: F3 b ii says – or certainly can in certain contexts say – in effect, ‘This individual schedule is only an instance of what is always done’. By contrast, F3 b i strongly suggests that, whether or not the co-owners of the schedule are also in fact the co-executants of that schedule, those co-owners have devised that schedule specifically for the executants – a nuance that is extremely strong in the case of F3 a:

F3 a Process-verb: You are to tidy your bedroom!

A third source of the greater softness of F3 b ii would seem to lie in its implicit transparency of ownership. As previously noted, F3 a expresses a schedule that is ‘ownership-opaque’; and F3 b i, because it is indistinguishable in form from F3 a, may be highly ambiguous as to transparency of ownership: when we hear or read that

34) F3 b i Instant-verb: At noon on Wednesday, the Emperor is to meet with the President of the United States.

the identity of form between F3 a and F3 b i can leave us uncertain as to whether it is the case that one or both of these important public figures in fact has even mere co-ownership of this schedule, or whether it is not in fact the case that some unidentified person or group that is in fact far more powerful than either of these two heads of state has anonymously [ = ownership-opaque] decreed that this schedule must be executed.

By contrast, we know who ultimately owns any ‘timetable’: its owners are, effectually, ‘all of us’.
Let us consider the effects of these differences in more detail.

1) **F3 b ii** State-verb: Since the President is now dead, the Vice-president governs the country, until a general election can be held.

2) **F3 b i [OR F3 a]** State-verb: Since the President is now dead, the Vice-president is to govern the country, until a general election can be held.

Though (1) does not concern a literal timetable, it does state something very similar: an individual instance of the following of a legal procedure that *is always followed* under certain conditions (the death of a President while still in office). Thus this schedule is certainly hard to change; but the law, like a timetable, is (theoretically) co-owned by everyone that has the right to vote: if necessary, it can be changed. And this also means that it has transparency of ownership. By contrast, (2), because it uses **F3 b i**, (or is it **F3 a**?) apparently implies two things: (1) that this schedule has been specifically devised for the individual Vice-president presently in office; and (2) that the real ownership of this schedule is far from transparent. Thus, (1) does not share most of the distinctive nuances of the use of **F3 a/b i**, in (2), above.

2) **F3 b ii** State-verb: This room remains untouched until the police arrive.

2) **F3 b i [OR F3 a]** State-verb: This room is to remain untouched until the police arrive.

*Forensic practice* differs again, from both a literal timetable and the law of a country. Nevertheless, it is what people who live in a particular society and culture have agreed is ‘the sensible thing always to do’, once a crime has been committed and then discovered. Thus it too is in a way a schedule of various acts, *etc*. The **F3 b ii** of (2) presents this schedule as the one that has to be followed ‘from now on’, because it is what is *always done*; and it is always done for reasons that are, in this case, neither market-directed nor legal, but logical: the police will have the greatest chance of identifying the criminal if the scene of the crime is left exactly as it has first been found.

By contrast, the use of **F3 b i** in (2) appears to be an indirect yet absolute command specifically directed at the Addressee[s]. This makes its potential impact on whoever is addressed that much harsher. At the same time, since the schedule is also expressed as
owned by a person [or group of persons] that remains unidentified, yet is felt to be the source of the schedule, this further increases its expressive severity.

4) F3 b ii State-verb: Remember: whatever plan he suggests, you agree with it.

4) F3 b i [OR F3 a?] State-verb: Remember: whatever plan he suggests, you are to agree with it.

Again, the sense of ‘this is what always happens’ of the F3 b ii in (4) contrasts with the nuance of ‘you, and you alone, must do this’ of the F3 b i in (4). In the case of (4), the schedule part of which is reiterated by the Addressee may in fact have a very small ownership: that of just the Addressee and the Addressee, or even only one of these; and it is very likely to have been devised in order to deal with the single future event of the Addressee’s negotiations with ‘him’. Nevertheless, the use of F3 b ii makes the effect of (4) seem much less tyrannical (= severe) than that of (4).

5) A: F3 b ii Process-verb: What do we do now?

B: F3 b ii Process-verb: We clean the windows.

5) A: What do we do now?

B: F3 b i [OR F3 a?] Process-verb: We are to clean the windows.

In B’s reply in (5), someone unspecified, or some unspecified group [= ownership-opaque], appears to have decided what schedule the Addressee and Addressee are to follow; on the other hand, B’s reply in (5) seems to express a schedule that is normally applied, in all relevant situations, and so just happens to have to be followed in this case, too. Thus, the effect of B’s reply in (5) is far gentler than that of his reply in (5).

7.8. Ironic use of a ‘timetable’

Here is a final, and more interesting, example of a highly rhetorical use of F3 b ii, seen in B’s reply, below:

6) A: F3 b ii Process-verb: What the hell do we do now?

B: F3 b ii Process-verb: We pray!

As the emphasis of /the hell/ in A’s question indicates, both A and B have found
themselves placed in a situation with which at least A no longer knows how to deal. That is to say, no ‘timetable’ – or schedule always followed – that is yet known to A seems to be appropriate to dealing with the predicament that she presently shares with B. So she asks B to identify and explain the schedule that will prove most appropriate to that predicament.

With the exception of repeated, fixed religious schedules, ‘praying’ is not something normally thought of as part of practical schedules. Therefore, by using F3 b ii, and yet doing this so as to suggest merely praying for help, B uses contrastive irony, in order to point out that, actually, there is no preexistent timetable whatsoever that can offer a solution to the problem of their present predicament. That is to say, ‘praying’ is no part of any customary schedule of practical action accepted by both Addressee and Addresser; and so presenting this act as a matter accepted custom (timetable) implicitly emphasizes that, in actual fact, there is no established ‘timetable’ at all that can any longer help either Addresser or Addressee.

Chapter Eight:
(F3 c) result of a schedule of voluntary action
that is relatively flexible

8.1. The semantic effect of use of F3 c

F3 c is another expression of future matters that, like F2, seems at first sight relatively uncomplicated.

On one hand, it expresses a schedule that is co-owned, and therefore not as easy to change or abandon as is any plan expressed with F2.

Thus, if Addresser A wants a date with Addressee B, and proposes the following,

A: F3 b ii: Why don’t we go to a movie tomorrow afternoon, and then ···.

yet B does not wish to do this, as Addresser she has two choices as to expression of her future conduct:

B\(^1\): F2: Sorry, but tomorrow I’m going to go shopping.
B\(^2\): F3 c: Sorry, but tomorrow I’m going shopping.

What it is here of interest to ask is which response (B\(^1\) or B\(^2\)) may be more effective in discouraging A from insisting upon the date proposed.
Since F2 strongly asserts complete ownership of the plan that it declares, as response B\(^1\) leaves its Addresser open to demands, from A, that she should abandon that plan, in favour of A’s own plan.

By contrast, B\(^2\) – equally clearly – implies that B has already committed herself to cooperating in executing a schedule of which B herself has incomplete ownership, and therefore that schedule may be more or less hard to renegotiate.

On the other, at the same time, while the subject/executant’s ownership of the schedule expressed is far from complete, and therefore does limit his or her freedom, F3 c seems to be preferred to F3 b i whenever the flexibility of that commitment is relatively great.

Here, let us try using a comparison:

1\(^1\) F3 c Change-verb: As far as I know, I am flying to New York, tomorrow.

1\(^2\) F3 a OR b i Change-verb: As far as I know, I am to fly to New York, tomorrow.

1\(^3\) F3 b ii Change-verb: As far as I know, I fly to New York, tomorrow.

Under what sort of circumstances would any Addresser choose example (1\(^1\)), rather than (1\(^2\))? Well, we can readily imagine a context in which, for instance, although the schedule has either been unilaterally imposed (normally requiring F3 a) by the Addresser’s boss[es], or is something that the Addresser has at least had some part in planning (normally requiring F3 b i), the Addresser is in fact very familiar with both her boss[es] and the nature of the company’s business, and therefore she can readily foresee that a last-minute change in this schedule is entirely possible. Or, again, we can also imagine a context in which, for example, the Addresser herself has proposed the schedule, and her boss or bosses merely have agreed to it, and are providing funds for her to carry it out. Nevertheless, something may occur early tomorrow, relating to the Addresser’s individual work-responsibilities, that will necessitate her abandoning this schedule; and she feels free to do this, if perhaps only after having gained from the other co-owners their formal consent to her doing this.

(And, as suggested above, most Addressers would choose (1\(^1/2\)), rather than (1\(^3\)), so as to avoid suggesting that their schedules were so important as to be multiply-owned.)

Let us next examine another example:

2\(^2\) F3 c Change-verb: In summer, my parents are taking me to Paris. (I myself
should prefer to go to New York.)

Again, this Addresser could already know either (1) that her parents often change their plans; or (2) that, because those parents love her, if she tries hard enough to persuade them to take her instead to New York, she may just succeed in doing so.

And now follows a second comparison:

3\(^1\) \textbf{F3 c State-verb: And tonight Mr. Kite \textit{is topping} the bill!}

3\(^2\) \textbf{F3 b ii State-verb: And tonight Mr. Kite \textit{tops} the bill!}

No competent Addresser would select (3\(^2\)) unless Mr. Kite’s being the star-performer (among the group of performers the performance-bill of which is mentioned) was the \textit{constant policy} (timetable) of that group – or unless the Addresser had need to express courteous respect for Mr. Kite. But, should the former be the case, \textit{tonight} then seems a little odd: \textit{of course}, or \textit{as always}, or \textit{as ever}, would be a more natural choice. For \textit{tonight} suggests either that this future performance is a \textit{one-off event}, or else that, on other nights, someone else \textit{usually} ‘tops the bill’.

On the other hand, (3\(^1\)) does not present this schedule as based on a \textit{timetable}, and instead suggests that anything could happen previous to the evening performance, to prevent the actual execution of this schedule.

By contrast, (4), following, would seem to be a choice based on an awareness of both conditions (1) and (2):

4\(^2\) \textbf{F3 c State-verb: Tomorrow night, I am probably \textit{remaining} at the office. I think my boss needs some help.}

That is to say, the Addresser-exeget will exercise her judgment as to whether or not to follow this schedule, of which she may well have \textit{almost} complete ownership, but cannot \textit{declare} as a \textit{completely-owned plan} – \textbf{F2} – because, (1) if her boss does prove to need help, she feels that she will \textit{have to} follow that schedule; if, (2) on the other hand, he turns out not to need anyone’s help, she herself has \textit{enough ownership} of the schedule to abandon it.
8.2. Is use of F3 c necessarily limited to expression of schedules that are to be executed ‘soon’?

Traditional explanations of grammar often claim that use of F3 c is limited to the expression of schedules that are to be executed ‘soon’. But how true is this?

As in the case of the difference between F1 a and F1 d, the distinction between ‘soon’ and ‘later on’ does depend upon the time-scale implied by the context: in terms of ‘this month’, ‘next Thursday’ may be treated as ‘soon’; in terms of ‘the next few days’, ‘next Thursday’ can equally well be treated as ‘later on’.

Certainly, some of the examples that we have already considered do concern schedules to be executed ‘very soon’:

F3 c As far as I know, I am flying to New York, tomorrow.

F3 c And tonight Mr. Kite is topping the hill!

F3 c Tomorrow night, I am probably remaining at the office. I think my boss needs some help.

What makes answering my initial question even more difficult is that F3 c is, fundamentally, a statement about the present. This element inevitably makes the distance in time [or interval] between the point at which execution of a schedule not to hard to change [F3 c] is going to be executed and the point in time of utterance seem (relatively) small.

Perhaps an effective test-case is that of deliberately combining with uses of F3 c one or other of the adverbs /eventually/ and /finally/, or else expressions of large intervals of future time, and seeing what does, or does not, result in an utterance in some way ill-formed.

[While * indicates an utterance that is unmistakably ill-formed, ? indicates one that, for its well-formedness, is highly dependent upon the temporal scale implicit in the context.]

5) ? F3 c My parents are finally OR eventually taking me [on] to Venice.

6) ? F3 c [uttered at the start of this year's summer:] Next summer, however, my parents are apparently taking me to Venice.

7) ? F3 c We are putting this on the market three years from now.

8) * F3 c She and I are meeting once more, in ten years’ time.

9) * F3 c In a century's time, Asia is uniting, just as Europe already has.
My own feeling is that each of (5-7) depends for its well-formedness upon a particular premise, concerning relevant time-scale, that is shared by the Addresser and Addressee: if that scale is mutually deemed to be relatively small, the utterance will be felt to be well-formed. In the case of (5), this scale is presumably the limited extent of one shared trip abroad; in the case of (6), the Addresser seems to be thinking rather in terms of his or her whole life – the span of which may be at least five decades; and, in the case of (7), ‘three years [from now]’ seems to be seen as a trivial – or certainly not surprising – interval of time.

By experimenting, however, with extending the interval of time, to, in (8) a whole decade, and, in (9), a century, the resultant sentences do seem somewhat unnatural; and therefore it seems wise to conclude that F3 c is best used when the interval between utterance and execution of the schedule is for some reason regarded as comparatively short. Nevertheless, this is more a constraint on the use of F3 c, rather than being a dominant element of its meaning (as in the case of, say, F1 d); what is far stronger is the sense that, though this is a schedule which is bilaterally or multilaterally owned, it is relatively easy to change or abandon.

Below, I have summarized the conclusions demonstrated in Chapters Four to Eight.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Objective meaning</th>
<th>Rhetorical use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>F1 a</strong></td>
<td>Involuntary result of the action of a particular nature; ownership <strong>impossible</strong></td>
<td>[Potentially highly courteous] acknowledgement of the entire <strong>autonomy</strong> of the subject/executeant, through expressing an <strong>inevitable</strong> future result*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F2</strong></td>
<td>Declaration of a plan of voluntary action; <strong>complete</strong> subject/executeant-ownership</td>
<td><strong>Personification</strong> of the subject/executeant of an inevitable result; attribution of <strong>complete</strong> ownership. <strong>ALSO</strong> expression of a result that is actually <strong>involuntary</strong>, as subject/executeant ownership-complete</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **F3 a** | Report of a schedule that is subject/executeant **zero**-ownership, and so **entirely inflexible**; (subject/executeant-acceptance **involuntary**)
(number of owners **small**) | Expression of a schedule as both **inevitable** (i.e. **entirely inflexible**) and ownership-opaque; **EITHER** avoidance of acknowledgement of actual **unilateral** ownership [by an agent not the subject/executeant], **OR** (in excuses for refusals) deliberate **implication** of such unilateral ownership, thus avoiding acknowledgement of subject/executeant **responsibility** for involvement in the schedule expressed; **OR** implicit attribution of an **inevitable** result to an agent not the subject/executeant, and having **unilateral** ownership of a schedule |
| **F3 b i** | Report of a **relatively inflexible** schedule; **incomplete** subject/executeant-ownership; **transparency** of ownership; (subject/executeant-acceptance **voluntary**)
(number of owners **small**; degree of subject/executeant ownership **small**) | Courteous expression of the subject/executeant as socially important* **ALSO**, lack of appropriate schedule |
| **F3 b ii** | Report of a schedule of voluntary action that is owned so **multilaterally** as to be **extremely inflexible** (‘timetable’)
(number of owners **great**; degree of subject/executeant ownership **small**) | * **Arrogant** or **self-aggrandizing** in effect, when used by the subject[s] /executeant[s] of himself/herself [themselves] . |
Chapter Nine: Conclusion

It is the present writer’s hope that Parts One and Two of this discussion of the expression of future matters have together demonstrated that the differences in semantic effect that distinguish the various means offered by English with regard to expressing future matters – and therefore the objective criteria applied (if usually only pre-consciously) by competent users of English in choosing among these means – can be identified as being (1) type of cause, (2) degree of ownership and of consequent flexibility, (3) kind of utterance, (4) degree of transparency of ownership, (5) degree of negotiability, and, finally, (6) relation to segment of future time.

If successfully grasped by learners, these criteria should enable them unerringly to choose the expression that is appropriate to the nature of a given future matter, and its relation to its context.

9.1. The criterion of cause

Firstly, there are clear distinctions among the causes of future matters, which allow us to organize the eleven expressions offered by English into three broad categories:

F1: the general nature or character of the subject[s]/executant[s]

F2: the will of the subject[s]/executant[s]

F3: a decision of which the subject[s]/executant[s] may or may not share co-ownership

Thus, the first question that learners should become accustomed to asking themselves is, “From which type of cause does this future matter spring?”

9.2. The criterion of kind of utterance

The above distinctions also determine the kind of utterance that must be used to express that future matter:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{nature or character} & \rightarrow \ F1 \rightarrow \text{prediction} \\
\text{will} & \rightarrow \ F2 \rightarrow \text{declaration} \\
\text{decision} & \rightarrow \ F3 \rightarrow \text{report}
\end{align*}
\]
For this reason, learners should find it helpful to approach choice of expression through a consideration of the kind of information that is to be communicated: “Am I merely predicting, stoutly declaring, or objectively reporting?”

9.3. The criterion of ownership

In this study, ownership (or control) has been demonstrated to be another key criterion: not only does this further clarify the distinctions among F1, F2, and F3, it also provides the key to distinctions within F3:

- Ownership-impossible $\rightarrow$ F1
- Complete ownership $\rightarrow$ F2
- Zero-ownership* $\rightarrow$ F3 a
- Co-ownership $\rightarrow$ F3 b i AND F3 c
- Multiple-ownership $\rightarrow$ F3 b ii
* at least by the subject[s]/executant[s].

Consequently, a third question that learners should become accustomed to asking themselves is, “Is ownership possible, and, if it is, who has it?” And a fourth is, “What is the relation between execution and ownership?”

These distinctions of course directly affect the degree of flexibility that is implied:

- Ownership-impossible $\rightarrow$ F1
- Zero-ownership* $\rightarrow$ F3 a
- Co-ownership $\rightarrow$ F3 b i AND F3 c
- Multiple-ownership $\rightarrow$ F3 b ii
- Complete ownership $\rightarrow$ F2

* at least by the subject[s]/executant[s].

And these implications of degree of flexibility influence the pragmatic effect of different future expressions, and thus concern learners also when acting as competent Addressees.
9.4. The criterion of opacity/transparency of ownership

And then there is also the matter of **opacity/transparency of ownership**:

- **Ownership-impossible** → F1 [not at issue]
- **Complete ownership** → F2 ownership-transparent
- **Zero-ownership** → F3a ownership-opaque
- **Co-ownership** → F3 b i AND F3 c ownership-transparent
- **Multiple-ownership** → F3 b ii ownership broad, yet ultimately transparent

*at least by the subject[s]/executant[s].*

Opacity of ownership may be either – as in implicit references to the workings of fate – more or less objectively apprehended and therefore expressed, or – as in the disguising of **commands** or **obligations** as **schedules** that are subject[s]/executant[s]-ownership **zero** – a mere rhetorical device. Nevertheless, learners need to become aware of the latter expressive option.

9.5. The criterion of degree of negotiability

Next, there is also the question of **degree of negotiability**:

- **Ownership-impossible** → F1 non-negotiable
- **Complete ownership** → F2 potentially completely negotiable
- **Zero-ownership** → F3 a non-negotiable
- **Co-ownership** → F3 b i AND F3 c possibly negotiable
- **Multiple-ownership** → F3 b ii possibly negotiable, if with difficulty

*at least by the subject[s]/executant[s].*

This, too, affects the pragmatic impact of each of **F1 a-d, F2**, and **F3 a-c**.

9.6. The criterion of relation to segment of future time

This is the key to the distinctions within both **F1** and **F3**.

While **F1 b-c** imply no particular relation to either segment of future time, **F1 d** places the future matter in that segment which is grasped as relatively close to the time of utterance
(“[very] soon”), and F1 a contrastingly situates the matter at a relative distance from that point in time (“later on”).

Again, while F3 a-b, like F1 b-c, imply no clear relation to either segment of future time, F3 c appears to place the future change in the “soon” segment.

9.7. Objective application vs. rhetorical

We have also seen that this system for expressing future matters can be applied either objectively or else rhetorically, and that rhetorical applications always involve (1) a breaking of the basic grammatical rules that govern this system, with the purpose of (2) communicating something that is not explicitly stated.

And finally, where relevant, we have noted that rhetorical applications often have a close relationship to expressions of politeness (and, occasionally, rudeness – or impoliteness).

Thus whenever the learner is, as an Addressee using English, choosing how most appropriately to express some future matter, all of these criteria have to be taken into account. If they are not taken into account by an Addressee, that Addressee may all too easily, and yet entirely inadvertently, convey to her Addressee either information that does not faithfully reflect her grasp of the future, or else an impression that she had not in the least intended to create.

Though at first sight this system may strike learners as being dauntingly complex, rather than seeing it as merely demanding, it must be more helpful to help them to regard it as a precise yet suggestive communicative resource. Each of the world’s languages offers different capacities for both precision of objective expression and also subtlety of nuance. Future matters form one area within which the English language is exceptionally rich, with regard to both.

(What this study has so far ignored is the criteria that govern the choice between (a) present tenses and (b) one of these nine options [F1 a-F3 c] concerning expressions of future matters, in the cases of the variety of types of subordinate clause that the English language offers. This matter is what I shall discuss in Part Three.)

Note

1) As we shall see below, the effect of using F3 b ii of oneself is usually rather arrogant: ‘My schedule is as important and unchangeable as a timetable.’ But, here, the Addressee is concerned about meeting the needs of the whole company for which he works; and it seems that the
importance of what he may or may not be able to do, for the whole company, justifies his use of ‘timetable’: for, if he succeeds, the company may make more money, and so no restructuring will be necessary (etc.).