An Effective Way of Teaching the Expression of Future Matters in English; Part Two: Objective versus Rhetorical Uses of Simple Future Tenses

Chapter One: Introduction, and Discussion of Predictions of Inevitable Results

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キーワード
① 未来表現 (expressing future matters)
1. Introduction

As reported in Gibbs (2003)\(^1\), the author has found it pedagogically effective to present the expression of future matters as a coherent closed system that is organized semantically around the principle of [degrees of] **executant-ownership** – which principle could also be expressed, more simply, as ‘executant-control’.

In analyzing any future matter that she needs to express, the first binary-choice to be made by the learner is to decide whether or not executant-ownership of that matter is possible: in the case of the group of expressions that I have numbered F\([\text{future}]\_1\ [a-d], no agent can have any control over whether or not that future matter occurs; and so all four expressions grouped as F1 have it in common that they produce utterances that are **predictions of inevitable results**. On the other hand, in those numbered F2\(-3\), **some** agent (regardless of whether or not this is also the executant[s]) has ownership of (and therefore control over) the future matter in question.

The next major binary-choice distinguishes F2 from F3: F2 comprises only the expression of the executant’s[executants’] complete ownership of the future matter: and this results in a **declaration of a plan**, through /be going to \(\rightarrow\):

**F2**: For our next vacation, we are going to go to Bali.

By contrast, those expressions I have grouped as F3 [a-c] all share the semantic feature of executant-ownership being (to varying degrees) **incomplete**.

In the case of F1 [\(a-d\)] (inevitable results), the standard of judgment for the first subsidiary binary-choice within this category is whether or not the **segment of future time** in which the inevitable result will come about is relevant; this distinguishes between, on one hand, F1 a and F1 d – to which differentiation of time-segment is relevant – and, on the other, F1 b–c – to which it is not.

**F1 a** and **F1 d** are then differentiated by whether the inevitable result will come about in the **same time-segment as ‘now’**, or not:

**F1 a**: Our baby will *not be born* until next March (inevitable result occurring *later*).
F1 d: Our baby is going to be born any day now (inevitable result occurring 'soon').

On the other hand, the standard that differentiates between F1 b-c, to both of which the two segments of future time are irrelevant, is the nature of the cause of the inevitable result: in the case of F1 b, this is an uncontrollable compulsion on the part of the executant:

F1 b: If you throw this ball for my dog, he will fetch it (inevitable result of uncontrollable compulsion).

And, in the case of F1 c, this cause lies in a determination that was originally voluntary, but has by now become so deeply-rooted in the mind of the executant that s/he no longer has any ownership of its inevitable result: it is a determination that is so strong that it has already become involuntary:

F1 c: I don’t care what you may say: I will buy that car (inevitable result of involuntary determination).

What distinguish F1 c from F1 b are two features: (i) in the case of F1 c, the auxiliary is always given emphasis (in both written and spoken discourse), while (with the exception of contradictions altered in dialogue) that in the case of F1 b never is; (ii) contextually, F1 c is only used to express resistance to some urging (by another agent) to abandon execution of the future matter being discussed, while F1 b, by contrast, is either neutral, or else conveys some degree of resignation as to the occurrence of the inevitable result:

F1 b: If you let him go to Umeda, he will only buy more clothes that he doesn’t really need (inevitable result of uncontrollable compulsion).

In contrast to F1-2, uses of F3 a-c, however, all result in utterances that are reports of schedules, and thus all have in common the implication that, while some agent’s ownership of the schedule reported is possible, executant-ownership of that schedule is actually (at least) incomplete.

And, in the case of F3 a, executant-ownership is so incomplete as to be zero:
**F3 a:** He is to spend the rest of his life in prison *(report of a rigid schedule that is executant-ownership-zero)*

Such a schedule, of course, is absolutely inflexible, and binds the executant’s freedom entirely; and all of the actual ownership of the schedule is understood to lie with some agent other than the executant.

On the other hand, **F3 b**–**c** have in common the fact that executant-ownership is incomplete only in the sense of being partial, because at least one other party to the agreement over the schedule reported likewise has partial executant-ownership. The standard that then distinguishes **F3 b [i–ii]** from **F3 c** is the degree of flexibility attributed to the schedule reported; schedules expressed with **F3 b** are implicitly ‘relatively hard to change’, whereas those expressed with **F3 c** are ‘relatively easy to change’:

**F3 c:** Apparently Joanna’s attending a conference, and so she won’t be able to come with us *(report of an executant-ownership-partial, flexible schedule)*.

By choosing **F3 c**, the Addresser here implies both that Joanna does not have complete ownership of her attendance, and yet also that she might well be persuaded to negotiate a change in this schedule, with whatever other agents happen to be party to that, and that her managing to accomplish this would be far from impossible.

Were the same Addresser instead to choose **F3 b i** (which is identical with **F3 a** in form but not situational implication), while she would not be denying Joanna any ownership whatsoever of the schedule, she would nevertheless imply that Joanna would find it relatively difficult to alter her own participation in it:

**F3 b i:** Apparently Joanna is to attend a conference, and so she won’t be able to come with us *(report of an executant-ownership-partial, inflexible schedule, enacted ‘once’)*.

**F3 b ii** differs from **F3 b i** in both *form* and *nuance*:

**F3 b ii:** Apparently Joanna attends a conference on Thursday, and so she won’t be able to come with us *(report of an executant-ownership-partial, inflexible schedule: ‘timetable’)*.
An Effective Way of Teaching the Expression of Future Matters in English (Gibbs)

The **form** that distinguishes **F3 b ii** from all of the rest of **F1 a ~ F3 c** is, as you can see, the use of the **Simple Present** tense to express a future matter; and the **nuance** here is derived from the use of this tense to characterize ‘matters that always happen, and therefore will happen this time, in the future, too’ – a type of future matter that I am, for convenience, terming ‘**timetable**’; and that nuance (be that in fact hyperbolic or not) is that, in the case of a person-executant, that executant and her schedule are so important, to some social group, that the schedule is effectively as relatively inflexible as is a time-table, or a code of laws, and affects similarly multiple other parties.

The coherent closed system thus constituted by **F1 a-F3 c** can be summarized with the following diagram:

In this paper, however, what the author begins to discuss is the way in which competent Addressers will apply this system not merely **objectively** – that is to say, so as to accurately reflect the **actual** nature of a future matter – but, instead, **deliberately inaccurately**, in order to secure one among a great variety of **rhetorical effects**.

Since part of what makes these rhetorical effects possible appears to be the nature of the way in which English actually expresses future matters, I shall first summarize my own view of this nature.
2. Basic grammatical features of F1, F2 and F3, and semantic reasons for these features

2.1. The present and the future

Of all the ways in which it is possible to express future matters in English, only F1 a–c use the explicitly future-tense auxiliary verbs, /shall/ and /will/. All other ways are adaptations of fundamentally present-tense verb-forms, implicitly referring to the future. And there seems to be a clear reason why this should be so.

On one hand, inevitable results occurring later on – F1 a –, inevitable results of an uncontrollable compulsion to do or be something – F1 b –, and inevitable results of an involuntary determination to do or be something – F1 c – may be said not to have any very clear relationship with ‘now’.

On the other hand, inevitable results occurring [very] soon – F1 d – obviously affect, for example, what we should do ‘now’. Again, a plan of future action over which the executant[s] has [have] complete ownership – F2 –, and also any kind of schedule – F3 –, already bind the executant[s] – if to different degrees – ‘now’.

And this must be the reason why F1 d, F2 and F3 a–c are all expressed with what are basically present-tense forms.

F1 d: This building is going to collapse at any minute.

F2: I am going to buy my friend lunch.

F3 a–b i: Next month, the two companies are to merge.

F3 b ii: The Emperor meets the President next Thursday.

F3 c: My friends and I are meeting for lunch.

But are even F1 a–c really so different? This question is what I shall consider next.

2.2. Another view of expression of future matters in English

Another possible way of thinking about how future matters are expressed in English is this: English does not really have any truly future tense – or not in the same sense in which, say, the Latin language does. Instead, all of its ways of expressing future matters are actually assertions, negations or questions about the time of utterance.

Above, we have already seen that this is clearly true of F1 d, F2 and F3 a–c. But it could also be argued that it applies equally to F1 a–c, too. This is because F1 a–c all express results; and these results normally have their cause in a nature or character that already exists,
‘now’ ²), and the emergence of such results is merely a matter of the passage of time, from ‘now’ onwards.

Thus, it seems possible to regard all expressions of future matters in English as, basically, forms of present tense, and to conclude that, fundamentally, English distinguishes just two regions of time: the present (inclusive of the future, which is in some way always already shaped by the present), and the past.

3. Objective versus rhetorical uses of expressions of future changes or states

3.1. Applying and ‘misapplying’ the rules

Because expression of future matters constitutes a closed system, the use of one particular form often gains extra communicative effect from also being an implicit rejection of one or more other forms, which could have been used instead, but are in fact not being used. So, in considering, below, some of the answers to the final learning-activity in present in Part One [Gibbs, (2003) pp. 21~22], we shall often compare the effects of different choices – wherever choice is possible.

This closed system can be used in either of two ways: one is to apply the criteria for choosing the forms of expression in a strictly objective, logical way – that is to say, according to the rules that I have summarized in 1., above. the other, however, is to deliberately break those basic rules for applying the system, in order to gain particular rhetorical effects.

3.2. Rhetoric and rhetorical effects

What do I mean, here, by ‘rhetoric’? By it I mean doing something with words – and very often thereby breaking one or another grammatical or pragmatic rule – in order to communicate something more than – or even quite different from – what is actually uttered – and very often so as also to allow the Addresser to avoid having to take ‘on-record’ responsibility for having sent the entire message that is received.

3.2.1. The example of irony

A very common example of rhetoric is, of course, the use of irony. One of the pragmatic rules of communication is, of course, to express the truth, or at least express exactly what one means. Irony is a deliberate breaking of this rule, in order not to prevaricate, but to communicate, and emphasize, the semantic opposite of what is actually uttered.

If A is wearing a bright red dress, with a bright yellow-and-purple pattern on it, and brilliant
green shoes, over tights striped in pink and orange, and B asks her, “Isn’t your outfit a bit on the drab side?”, that is an example of irony: B is uttering the opposite of what he really means, and wants A to think about – which is, of course, ‘You strike me as being garishly dressed’. He will choose irony, because the explicit content of what he is saying should surprise his Addressee, by being quite clearly untrue. So she can only conclude that, as people do not normally lie – or do not do so at least if the resultant utterance is going to be obvious as a lie – the Addresser must mean something else. But, as he has left this implicit, she has to discover it for herself; and doing this is more likely to make her think about it.

Irony, like very many other rhetorical maneuvers, has a further communicative advantage. For it requires the Addressee to grasp, and even – at least momentarily and experimentally – share, the Addresser's subjective view of what he has expressed. Once she has realized what her Addresser must really mean, the Addressee will notice that it relates in a particular way to what he has overtly uttered. That relation is one of reversal; this will alert her to the use of irony; and irony is customarily employed to index disapproval, or negative criticism, of what it is used in expressing. So she will think, ‘Oh-oh! So I don’t look so good in these clothes! Or not, at least, to my Addresser, B.’

3.2.2. The example of metaphor

Another common example of rhetoric is metaphor. If, in inquiring about a heavily-built man that looks like a Rugby forward, an American football defense player, or a professional heavyweight wrestler, and yet has a very patient expression on his face, an Addresser asks, ‘And who is that ox over there?’, in a room that contains not one single four-footed animal, his Addressee will, however briefly, be puzzled. For she has been asked a question that breaks two rules at once: one is the pragmatic rule of not asking questions that cannot be answered [in effect, such questions are a kind of lie]; and the other is the grammatical rule of not (usually) using /who/ of anything that is not human (or already personified).

So, unless she knows that this Addresser is given to seeing things that other people cannot see (e.g. ghosts, or hallucinations), she will again have to conclude that her Addresser has not said what he means.

This use of metaphor then causes her to ask herself what he really meant. As there is no actual ox before her eyes, and because he has used /who/, she will have to assume that her Addresser actually meant ‘someone that is like an ox’, and then use her conceptual schema for the general noun, /ox/, in order to pick out that ‘someone’.

As in the case of irony, the Addressee is presented with a puzzle, and has actively to solve
that puzzle. Her having to think about what the Addresser was trying to communicate will give that implicit content much more **impact** on her mind⁴.

(Like irony, and also many other rhetorical devices) metaphor also has the **communicative advantage** of requiring the Addressee to **grasp and even**, at least momentarily and experimentally, **share the Addresser’s subjective response** to what he has expressed. In order to distinguish which person the Addresser is asking about, the Addressee has to try to pick out, from among all the people before her eyes, the one that **might be said to most resemble** an ox.

That is to say, like the Addresser, the Addressee too can see everybody in the room, and, like the Addresser, she will have her own subjective impression of each person. It could well happen that, until she was required to try to interpret the Addresser’s question in order to answer it, she had already noticed the large and patient-looking man, yet no comparison to an ox had occurred to her mind. Her own subjective impression of him might have been quite different: for example, it might have been, ‘That man looks as though he would prove surprisingly good at handling little children;’ or, ‘In ten years’ time, that man is going to be grossly over-weight, with a big beer-belly.’ Nevertheless, in order to bridge the **gap**, between what her Addresser has **actually asked**, and what he must **in fact have meant to ask**, she has to ‘see through his eyes’. Even if the comparison to an ox is quite unexpected to her, /that ox/ is **her only clue** to understanding who her Addresser is asking about. And so she has, possibly for the first time, to try to take up the idea of an ox-like person, and apply it to everyone that she can see before her, with whom it might fit. In other words, she has to experiment, at least briefly, with applying not her own but **her Addresser’s** subjectivity, however different that may be from her own. And (as in the case of finding and expressing **empathy** for one’s Addresser) this increases the depth of interpersonal communication. At least during the moment at which the Addressee solves the puzzle of her Addresser’s use of metaphor, the Addressee has no choice but **to take on the subjectivity** from which it has sprung.

One result of this is that, having experimented with using her Addresser’s subjectivity, in place of her own, she may find that, though she had not previously realized this, it in fact agrees with her own – **Yes! That man is indeed just like an ox!** Thus, in many cases in which **rhetoric** is used, its communicative purpose is **persuasion**. It asks its Addressee[s], ‘Don’t you too in fact see things in just the way that I do?’ – the answer that it tries to elicit being, ‘Oh! So I do, too!’

### 3.2.3. Two of the reasons for which rhetoric is characteristically employed

The workings of both irony and metaphor are good examples of one of the chief reasons for
which Addressers often choose **rhetorical, implicit expressions** of what they really want to communicate, rather than choosing **objective, logical, explicit** expressions. That reason is that the **effect on the Addressee** differs.

An objective, logical, explicit expression does not require the Addressee to do very much **active work**, in processing it as information. Instead, her brain will do this automatically, and her will is not involved. Thus, she remains an **almost passive** receiver of that information.

On the other hand, a rhetorical expression is clearly a deliberate breaking of one or more of the rules that are normally obeyed by all Addressers; that is to say, obeying the rules of both grammar and pragmatics is the **Default choice**. Once an Addressee has noticed that one or more rules are being broken, she will seek to understand the **Special Needs** that have led to this breaking of it/them. Already her will is active, and her brain no longer on automatic-pilot – no longer still merely ‘mechanically’ processing what she hears or reads. (As in the example of the Faculty Meeting mentioned in note 3,) this in itself increases the impact of what is being communicated: Addressees may well become activated – in mind, and even in body, as well.

And a second reason for choosing a rhetorical expression is likewise exemplified by both irony and metaphor. As we have seen, solving the puzzle that a use of either always presents requires the Addressee to experiment with **taking on the Addresser's subjectivity**. This increases the chances of her discovering that her own subjectivity is similar, or even identical – or at least that she ‘can see what her Addresser means’. Thus, as exemplified above, use of rhetoric can be one very effective means of **persuasion**.

### 3.2.4. Expressions of future matters, and rhetoric effects: one pair of examples

On one hand, no rhetorical ‘mis-use’ of the English system for expressing future matters is itself inherently **ironic**. On the other hand, both **all** uses of **F3 a** and **some** uses of **F3 b ii** are inherently **metaphorical**.

**F3 a**: You *are to go up* to your bedroom, and *do* your homework.

Here, in fact, the Addresser has unilaterally decided upon this schedule, and is unilaterally imposing it upon the Addressee (probably her child). As we shall see, by using this, instead of using a direct command,

**Go up** to your bedroom, and **do** your homework!
the Addresser is in fact lying. She is, instead, saying, ‘The situation is as though some authority more powerful than I (such as God, or some god or gods, or the Goddess of Destiny), has unilaterally decided that you are to do as I am merely reporting to you, and is though I myself have therefore had nothing to do with deciding this schedule. (= So don’t bother arguing with me, since control of this situation lies beyond my own, personal ownership.’) This is not true; instead, what it conveys – and yet conceals – is the Addresser’s unbendable determination to impose her own will.

Again, any use of F3 b ii (‘timetable’) to express a future matter that has not previously occurred, and is not necessarily going to be repeated, yet to express it just as one expresses the contents of a timetable, is another use of metaphor: ‘Just as any aspect of the weekly Shinkansen timetable is very hard to get changed, so this scheduled meeting between the Emperor and the President of the United States is also very hard to change.’

In neither case is the Addresser admitting what is in fact true (e.g. a monarch can at least always claim sudden physical indisposition, and thus evade a schedule for which he has no political or ethical stomach); and, in both cases, her intended view of the situation in question is imposed upon her Addressee, by what processing the utterance entails for the latter.

So, what I am going to discuss and compare below, and also in forthcoming continuations of this series of chapters, is the communicative effect of both objective, logical applications of the system, and also ostensibly-illogical but rhetorically-powerful misapplications of that system, in order to activate the Addressee, and also to change, at least during a very brief period of time, the latter’s subjective understanding of the future matter being expressed; and also point out, where necessary, the paradoxical logic that secures these various rhetorical effects.

Here, we shall start with F1: predictions of future results that are ownership-impossible, and therefore inevitable.

4. Objective choices and rhetorical choices among F1 a~d

4.1. F1 a: Predictions of inevitable results occurring later

a) F1 a [OR F1 d]: You will find [OR are going to find] this problem rather difficult to solve.

In example (a), the cause of the involuntary result may be either the general nature of the
problem (its inherent difficulty), or the general nature of the Addressee (his inherent lack of cleverness, or of skill in solving this kind of problem).

The nature in question is often in this way ambiguous:

**F1 a?:** I shall never trust you again.

Here, it is hard to decide whether it is the nature of the Addresser or that of the Addressee that is to be identified as the cause that will prevent any future occurrence of the state that is expressed.

### 4.2.1. F1 a compared with F1 d

In the case of example (a), the objective choice between F1 a and F1 d will depend on how far off in the future the Addressee’s discovery of the difficulty of the problem is anticipated as occurring. If this is going to happen later yet within the same time-segment [regardless of the temporal scale of this segment] as comprises the time of utterance (‘now’), then F1 d is the normal choice.

Thus, in

**F1 a:** I shall never trust you again,

the choice of F1 a fits with /never/ better than would a choice of F1 d, for /never/ covers the whole of future time, whereas F1 d would refer only to a later point in time within the same time-segment as comprises the time of utterance.

### 4.2.2. Rhetorical use of F1 a

b) **F1 a [OR F1 d]:** I shall expect [OR am going to expect] you to come back by midnight.

Example (b) makes a more rhetorical use of F1 a: that is to say, it implies more than it explicitly states. The Addresser is probably the parent of the Addressee. By choosing F1 a, she implies that ‘it is the nature of anyone that is a parent to require her child to keep out of danger, and get enough sleep. This requirement is inevitable – and not a matter of my own choice.’ But, by expressing what is in fact her own desire as inevitable (‘ownership-impossible’), she is
implicitly giving the child an absolute command, over the execution of which the child-Addressee itself has zero-ownership: ‘You must be back by midnight.’ Moreover, the implication of inevitable result strongly suggests that this requirement is non-negotiable. (That utterance (b) is not an instance of the use of F1 b is shown by the fact that, if it is 23:30 at the time of utterance, the Addresser is more likely to choose F1 d, instead.)

4.2.3. Rhetorical use of F1 a compared with use of F3 a

Another (common) example of this rhetorical use of F1 a is this:

F1 a [OR F1 d]: You will go [OR are going to go] up to your room and [will OR are going to] do your homework!

Here again there is an extra, unspoken message: ‘You are a schoolchild; and it is inevitable for schoolchildren to do their homework nightly, in their bedrooms: that is in the nature of schoolchildren.’ Thus the Addresser can imply that not only does her schoolchild Addressee have no choice [= inevitable], she herself has no choice [= inevitable], either, in pointing this out. (The choice between F1 a and F1 d depends, of course, on during which time-segment – of ‘soon’ and ‘later’ – this event is supposed to take place.)

Compare this, however, with the effect of a use of F3 a, instead:

F3 a: You are to go up to your room, and [are to] do your homework.

This too is an implicit expression of an absolute order; and again the schoolchild Addressee is told that he has zero-ownership of this future schedule of which he is the executant. But, by expressing a schedule unilaterally imposed, the Addresser can suggest that the real owner of this schedule cannot be identified; we may say that it is presented as ‘ownership-opaque’.

In terms of pragmatics, this expression is more forceful, and first of all because it is harsher: the Addresser is expressing a unilateral imposition of someone’s volition upon the schoolchild; and secondly because it expresses the schedule as ‘ownership-opaque’; and therefore that schedule is presented as very much harder to re-negotiate than it is in the case of I want you to go up to your room, and [to] do your homework; for this latter utterance makes the source of the desire that it expresses explicit – so the child knows who to argue with, if it doesn’t want to do its homework – or doesn’t want to do it in its bedroom.
At the same time, in *pragmatic effect* it is, I think, weaker than the choice of \( F1 \ a \), because it implicitly acknowledges that the schedule originates with *someone*, known or unknown; so, if the child does not want to do its homework in its room, it may be able to find that someone, and to argue with them, or try and persuade them to change the schedule. By contrast,

\[
F1 \ a: \text{You will go up to your room and [will] do your homework!} \ (\text{Ownership-impossible})
\]

conceals all origin of the implicit command (the Addresser), by presenting this future process as an *inevitable result* originating in a general nature. The child is told that there is *no one* with whom she or he can negotiate such results, in order to try to prevent them from occurring. They cannot but occur.

\[4.2.4. \text{Rhetorical use of F1 a compared with F2}\]

If, however, the Addresser of example (b), above, chooses not \( F1 \ a \) but instead \( F2 \),

\[F2: \text{[uttered during the daytime] I am going to expect you to come back by midnight.}\]

she freely acknowledges her own *complete ownership* of this plan; so, pragmatically, this is much *weaker in impact*: since the Addresser has admitted to complete ownership, the Addressee may feel that s/he can persuade the Addresser to *change* that plan. Thus, few (pragmatically-wily) parents would make this choice.

\[4.3.1. \text{Other examples of the objective logical use of F1 a}\]

c) \( F1 \ a \): Snow will fall, later this afternoon.

d) \( F1 \ a \): Autumn will eventually come, and the leaves will drop from the trees.

These are both straightforward, objective (non-rhetorical) uses of \( F1 \ a \). The causes implied are, of course, natural processes, and therefore ownership-impossible.

\[4.3.2. \text{Extended F1 a compared with F2}\]

By the way, there is a commonly-used *extension* of this basic meaning of \( F1 \ a \), as seen in
The following example:

**F1 a**: The plane will land [OR will be landing] fifteen minutes ahead of schedule.

Obviously, the decision to land as soon as possible is under the ownership of the pilot of the plane (though he will have to negotiate that with the destination-airport flight-controller). Therefore, **F2 might seem** the natural choice:

**F2 [AND ALSO F1 d]**: The plane is going to land fifteen minutes ahead of schedule.

Indeed, because **F2** and **F1 d** are expressed with the same form of verb-phrase, if the announcement is made very close in time to the probable landing, then this might well be chosen.

There seem, however, to be several reasons why, if the landing is still further off in the future, **F1 a** is normally preferred to **F2**:

i) The plane is expressed as the **executant** of the plan. As a machine has **no ability to own a plan**, even incompletely, **F2** is not appropriate;

ii) The pilot represents the airline; and it is part of the **general nature** of airlines to try to deliver their passengers to their destinations **as quickly as possible** (and also to save fuel) so, ultimately, the pilot does not **really** have any ownership of when to land; and, again, **F2** is not appropriate;

iii) The **cause** of the plane’s being ahead of schedule can only be favorable weather-conditions, which are ownership-impossible phenomena; and **F1 a** reflects this situation, while **F2** of course does not.

5. **F1 b**: Prediction of an inevitable result of an uncontrollable compulsion to be or do something

5.1. The ambiguity of distinction between **F1 b** and **F1 a**

   e) **F1 b [OR F1 a]**: My daughter will be quite happy to drive you to the nearest station.
What this Addresser is in fact communicating is, ‘My daughter’s general character leads me to predict that she will not mind driving you to the station. She is not the sort of person who would register doing this as any inconvenience to her. So please do not worry about accepting this offer of a lift to the station.’ Here, the implication of ‘uncontrollable compulsion’ is a deliberate use of hyperbole – another example of a rhetorical choice of expression of a future matter: by exaggerating, the Addresser is trying to make her offer easier for the Addressee to accept.

f) F1 b [OR F1 a?]: If you are not careful, I shall certainly fall in love with you.

In example (f), what the Addresser is communicating is this: ‘I know my own general character, and I can predict that this character will compel me to fall in love with you, if you behave in a certain way towards me.’ So this appears to be an example in which the answer to the question as to which, of F1 a and F1 b, the Addresser intends is unclear. Since F1 b has obviously developed from F1 a, such uncleanness should not be surprising; and perhaps we should not think of F1 a and F1 b as separate categories, but rather forming one continuous cline, on which examples like (f) should be placed somewhere in the middle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>inevitable result of</th>
<th>inevitable accidental result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>uncontrollable compulsion</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

(f)

5.2. F1 b is characterized by a lack of limit on the segment of future time implied

That (f) is not, however, purely F1 a is suggested by the fact that this example does not seem to specify the time-segment later in the future, as F1 a always does: nothing here implies that the change in question could not happen within, say, the next fifteen minutes – or, equally possibly, a whole year from now. On the other hand, if you are not careful implies that this change is not universally inevitable, but, instead, will only happen under certain conditions. This suggests an element of F1 a, too.

The same lack of the sense of ‘later on’ (i.e. not in the same time-segment as ‘now’) [F1 a] rather than ‘soon’ (i.e. within the same time-segment as ‘now’) [F1 d] seems to apply in the case
of example (e), too:

\[ e) \text{ F1 b } [\text{OR F1 a?}]: \text{ My daughter will be quite happy to drive you to the nearest station.} \]

This sort of thing may well be said when a guest is *about to* depart from the Addresser’s home; and so expresses a future state that will occur ‘soon’, rather than ‘later on’. Thus, *grammatically*-speaking, the Addresser might be expected to use *F1 d*:

\[ \text{F1 d: ? My daughter is going to be quite happy to drive you to the nearest station} \]

*Pragmatically* speaking, however, the fact that very few Addressers would actually make this choice suggests that, in the case of (e), too, */will be O/ is in fact F1 b, and not F1 a.*

\[ g) \text{ F1 b } (\text{OR F1 a}): \text{ Your parents will be so happy once they have learned that you have got into Kandai.} \]

The same ambiguity also inheres in example (g); and, since */will be O/ can be replaced with */are going to be O/, if the parents are going to receive the news very soon from ‘now’, perhaps this is better identified as an example of *F1 a*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>inevitable result of</th>
<th>inevitable accidental result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>uncontrollable compulsion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3. *Unambiguous F1 b compared with F2*

\[ h) \text{ A: Who is going to help me? } \]
\[ \text{B: F1 b: O.K., I shall [help you].} \]

Example (h) is *clearly* an instance of *F1 b*, because, according to the rules of English pragmatics – and specifically of the area of pragmatics termed ‘politeness’ – when answering a
question, it is considered inappropriate *unnecessarily to change* the words that express information already supplied by the question – that is to say, what forms the Old Information of the answer. To do this suggests that there was something wrong with the original question, which is an implicit negative criticism of the questioner. So the Default choice in phrasing polite answers is *to use the same wording for the Old Information given by the question.*

Because Addresser A has used \textbf{F2}, \textit{I am going to help}, what Addresser B \textbf{ought} to have said is, \textit{O.K. I am going to help you}. But here, Addresser B has not obeyed this rule; and breaking it is obviously a Special-needs choice. So what are these Special Needs?

Imagine that you belong to a sports-club and you are a sophomore. As a punishment for missing a practice-session, the captain of your club orders you to clean up the whole club-room, on your own – and the room is large, and very untidy and dirty. Everyone else goes home, and you start doing this lonely and unpleasant work.

Suddenly your favorite senior comes back into the room, and puts down his bag. You ask why he has returned, and he replies, with an affectionate smile, \textit{I am going to help you}!

By choosing \textbf{F2}, he expresses his complete ownership of the future act of helping. That is to say, he implicitly reassures you that no one has \textit{told} him to do this; and also that nothing in his nature is compelling him to do it: he is doing it because he \textit{wants} to do it, and so has \textit{freely} decided to do it. In this case, the choice of \textbf{F2} may simply be an objective statement; or it may be a considerate fiction: in reality, the senior \textit{does} feels compelled, by his own character, to sacrifice his own free time to help you – perhaps because he ‘can’t help feeling’ that your punishment is unjustly severe. At the same time, he may fear that, should he express his actual lack of ownership over his act of helping you, you will find his offer harder to accept; and so he chooses, instead, \textbf{F2}.

On the other hand, in example (h) above, the Addresser that replies does \textbf{not} choose \textbf{F2} – and in spite of the fact that to do so is less polite. The reason for which he would do this is related to the reason for which your senior might \textit{indeed} choose \textbf{F2}. If this Addresser felt entirely \textit{free to choose} whether or not to help the Addresser that questions, he would indeed select \textbf{F2}. Yet he does not. Moreover, for whatever reason, he wants the Addresser that asks for help to notice and understand that he has \underline{not selected} \textbf{F2}. (Perhaps he wants to make the first Addresser feel some degree of sense of \textit{obligation} to him.) However brightly and enthusiastically he may seem to speak his answer, by choosing \textbf{F1 b} he will imply a certain degree of \textit{resignation due to inevitable weakness in the face of his compulsion} to help, which springs from the helpless kindness, or cooperativeness, of his \textit{nature}. (This resignation is also expressed by \textit{O.K.}, which, spoken rather slowly, with a falling intonation, implies, ‘I accept
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that [something] cannot be helped [= avoided].)

Again, we can see that this cannot be a use of F1 a, because it can be employed appropriately even when the future process is about to begin very soon, or immediately.

A different kind of resignation is implied by each of the following pair of examples:

i) F1 b: I shall do my best.
   ii) F1 b: I shall do what I can.

In communicative effect, /I shall do my best/ is very different from (iii):

iii) F2: I am going to do my best.

For, in example (iii), the Addresser expresses complete ownership of her future conduct, and thus implies a positive decision (i.e. plan) to do her best. On the other hand, in the case of example (i) the Addresser expresses her future conduct as a result that is ownership-impossible, and therefore inevitable, and that she merely predicts, from knowledge of her own character or nature: ‘as I am this sort of person, I will, I expect, do my best.’ Thus, no positive decision is implied, the utterance having, instead, some degree of implication of, ‘I can only do my best’; and this is the cause of the (slight, or possible) implication of resignation. But the object of this resignation is not a compulsion that is part of the Addresser’s nature, but instead that nature as a whole, as including the powers that will necessary in order to complete the task that now faces the Addresser. And it can also imply that the Addresser does not expect particularly wonderful results from using those powers.

This implication of resignation is stronger in this prediction:

ii) F1 b: I shall do what I can.

If the Addresser had chosen instead F2, /I am going to do what I can/, then, because F2 expresses a positive decision, it also implicitly invites the Addressee to expect some desirable or useful results. Because of its implication of resignation, however, example (ii) does not.

In that this communicates very little implication of any compulsion, this sort of use of /will ~/ is very close to F1 a; but, here too, we can tell that it is not actually F1 a, since both of examples (i-ii) might be appropriately uttered immediately before the Addresser goes into action.
5.4. **The characteristic use of F1 b to express offers and proposals to do something**

1) **A**: We’re very low on milk….

   **B**: **F1 b**: Then I’ll **pick** some **up** when I go to the supermarket.

2) **A**: We’re very low on milk….

   **B**: **F2**: Yes; I’m **going to pick** some **up** when I go to the supermarket.

Let us consider the appropriate answers to the following two questions.

(a) **When** did B discover that s/he had to buy some more milk? Is this the same point in time in both (1~2)? If not, how does this point in time differ, between (1) and (2)?

(b) What is the difference in **rhetorical effect**, between B’s reply in (1) and her/his reply in (2)?

My own answers to (a) are as follows. The points in time do differ, between (1) and (2): in the case of (1), until A mentions the problem, B has apparently been unaware of it – for *then/* means ‘since that is the case OR if that is so’; in (2), however, B already knows about it: *yes/* means ‘You are quite right’.

And my own answer to (b) is this: in (2), B has **already** made a **plan**, and **declares** her/his **resolve** to carry it out. B is effectively (*i.e.* **rhetorically**) saying, ‘I am in complete control of the situation; leave everything to **me**.’ This is what is very strongly implied by the choice, here, of F2.

The rhetorical effect of (1), on the other hand, is quite different. There, B uses not **F2** but **F1 b**. This is, of course, basically an expression of the result of an **uncontrollable compulsion**; and such expressions often imply resignation, in the face of the force of that compulsion. In this case, however, the nuance of resignation is **negligible**; instead, in using **F1 b**, B implies that s/he is the sort of person that **spontaneously** – almost **involuntarily** – meets the needs of the household that s/he shares with A; and, therefore, now knowing that that household is short of milk, s/he will **of course** act to remedy the problem. The rhetorical effect here is that of saying, ‘I know myself; so don’t worry: my character will cause me to buy us more milk.’

And, as politeness is just as important between intimates placed on a footing of mutual equality as it is in situations where the conlocutors are placed in some degree of mutual inequality of status, that the choice of **F1 b**, rather than **F2**, is an important one. For choice of **F2** may draw **a little too much** of A’s attention to B’s **competence** as co-runner of their household: again, ‘I am in control of the situation; leave everything to **me**.’ By contrast, the
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choice of F1 b merely says, ‘In the nature of things, more milk will be provided – by me, as it (inevitably) happens.’

As traditional accounts of grammar, too, do point out, F1 b is, in such ways as in (1), above, characteristically used to express offers and proposals to do something, usually for the benefit of someone else (and sometimes of the executant as well, as in (1), above). That is in fact the ultimate rhetorical effect of example (e), too:

e) F1 b: My daughter will be quite happy to drive you to the nearest station.

Next, let us examine a different example of the making of a proposal.

A is carrying a very heavy bag; and B catches A up from behind. B is stronger or younger than A; and so s/he suggests,

3) F1 b: Shall I carry that for you?

(If A is someone B needs to show greater respect for, s/he will seek permission, by asking, /May I carry that for you?; but this uses a modal auxiliary verb, and so is not directly related to the simple future tenses.)

But how would A feel, if B used either (4) or (5), below?

4) F2? [OR F1 d?]: Am I going to carry that for you?
5) F2: I’m going to carry that for you.

Of course, both (4) and (5) are effectually rude to A, though for different reasons.

In the case of (4), B seems to be asking a question of not A but, instead, her/himself: for only s/he knows her/his own nature well enough to answer such a question. And, by talking not to A but instead to her/himself, s/he is already being rather rude to A. What is ruder still, however, is, if this is a use of F2, her/his questioning of her/himself, as to whether s/he has or has not actually formed the supposedly voluntary plan expressed: s/he appears still to be trying to come to a decision; and, if this is, instead, F1 d, s/he is expressing a question about an inevitable result about to occur in the same time-segment as ‘now’, but (thus) one that is expressed as having no intimate relation (such as is suggested by F1 b) to either her/himself or A.
In the case of (5), however, the potential rudeness has an origin that is quite different: B declares total, because unilateral, ownership of who it shall be, that from now on carries A's bag. This takes the autonomy of A her/himself into no degree of account whatsoever.

On one hand, in the case of the senior’s plan to help you clean the club-room (see 5.3., above), his using F2 is polite to you, because he is your superior, and by declaring a plan of voluntary action of which he has complete ownership [F2], he is able to tell you that you are quite free to accept his offer, for nothing you can say is going to alter his decision.

But politeness towards social inferiors often requires strategies that are completely different from those necessitated by politeness towards superiors, customers, etc. One reason for this is that the superior has gently to make the inferior's urge to be polite (by refusing the offer of help) impossible to execute – that is to say, to gently remind the inferior that s/he has no ownership of the plan or schedule in question.

On the other hand, politeness towards superiors, in the case of offers and proposals that will be to the benefit of the superior requires at least three strategies: (a) avoiding infringing upon the autonomy of the superior; (b) avoiding any appearance of exaction of gratitude from the superior; and (c) avoiding any implicit accusation of selfishness as lying behind A's potential acceptance of the offer or proposal. And this is what the choice of F1 b in (3) successfully does:

3) F1 b: Shall I carry that for you?

Ordinarily – that is to say, in the case of both assertions and negations – F1 b concerns only the executant's uncontrollable compulsion. But, in the case of questions, both the potential executant (B) and another person (A) are simultaneously involved; and, so, in the case of such questions, F1 b's acknowledgement of (someone's) uncontrollable compulsion seems to be extended, from merely concerning the executant's compulsion, to comprise that of the recipient as well. Thus, B is possibly saying both, ‘(i) My own character may compel me to try to carry your bag for you’; and also (ii) ‘May not your own character compel you (graciously) to allow me to do so?’

Implication (ii) politely relieves A of any accusation of voluntarily imposing her/his burden upon B, and thus exacting gratitude from A; and therefore also successfully avoids making any accusation of selfishness. And implication (a) insists that B has no choice but to (at least wish to) carry A's bag; this too makes it possible to avoid seeming to exact gratitude. At the same time, the effective, if fuzzy, bypassing of either party's volition being concerned
created by the use of **F1 b** also **bypasses** the whole question of A's autonomy – rather than, as is **normally** polite, showing **specific respect** for this.

These several implications, combined, make (3) a very polite **offer**; for what is being proposed is expressed as **beyond the control of the volitions** of either A or B: if A accepts B's offer, that will be but an **inevitable result**; and B's offer itself is expressed as but another such result. Thus A is not expressed as potentially willingly exploiting B; and B expresses her/his **offer** not as an exertion of **unilateral control** [F2] over how A's bag gets carried, but instead something as **involuntary** as is, say, a sneeze.

And I think it must be for these reasons that offers of actions that may benefit others than the executant of the future matter referred to are so characteristically expressed using **F1 b**. The implication attendant on this use of **F1 b** are two-fold:

i) You can't be expected to be able to refuse my offer.

ii) I can't help making my offer – it is 'beyond my control'!

5.5. **What is usually called [the volitional future] does not, in fact, exist**

If, as traditional-style explanations of grammar so surprisingly still insist, /**will**/ [F1 a-c] **could indeed** be used to express a voluntarily-reached (**ownership-complete**) decision about a future change or state concerning the executant, /**Shall I carry that for you?**/ would inevitably be just as rude as /**Am I going to carry that for you?**/. But in fact it is not; indeed, it is **more than adequately polite**, as an expression of an offer or proposal.

With the exception of **F1 c** (/**Whatever you say, I will marry her, and be happy with her!**/), there is **no** expression of future matters that uses the auxiliary, /**will**/, and yet also expresses **volition**. And even **F1 c** places what was certainly **originally** a voluntary decision **now** well **beyond the bounds of the area over which the executant’s own volition** (or **ownership**) **extends**. (A **plan** may be changed, or abandoned; but an **involuntary determination** [F1 c] can no longer be abandoned, for its inherent force now surpasses that of the executant's mere will-power.)

With regard to this point, let us finally consider the following example, of another offer:

**A**: I cannot get an answer [on the phone] from **any** taxi-company….

**B**: **F1 b**: Then I'll drive you to the station.
The implication of B’s inevitable compulsion is (albeit pre-consciously) designed to make acceptance inevitable – because B is merely predicting what her/his character will compel her/him to do; and so this imposes little burden upon A, and again is thus a polite way of making an offer or proposal.

What the traditional theory of grammar (because it so rarely considers contextualized usage) seems to have failed to notice is that what it has, for so long, been calling 「意志未来」[the volitional future tense] (not the very emphatic F1 c, but simply the almost – yet not always – resigned F1 b) is almost only used when another person’s assent is in question. And, again, when another’s assent is at issue, it is more polite to make an offer of action for, or on behalf of, that person by expressing it as the result of an involuntary compulsion on the part of the executant: for, as exemplified above, doing so relieves the other person of any implication of selfishness, should s/he accept the offer in question. This would, again, not be possible, were the involvement of B’s volition in any way implied.

5.6. Speculative expression of F1 b

Finally, there is one expression that is used for F1 b, which softens the certainty of /will/ by adding the element of speculation to the prediction; by doing this, it also expresses the compulsion that is the cause of the result as less uncontrollable – /be likely to/:

F1 b: If you use his car without his permission, he is likely to be very angry.

This in effect acknowledges that there is a small potential that this prediction will not in fact come true.

I identify this as a special expression of F1 b, and not F1 a or F1 d, for three reasons:

1) the judgment that some change or state is ‘likely’ is based on an understanding of the essential nature, character, or tendency of the executant;
2) the potential for this happening inevitably is expressed as very large, if not complete; and
3) again, there is no implicit limit on when this state will come about. Thus, this is obviously an alternative expression of F1 b.
Summary

We can summarize the above observations concerning rhetorical ‘misapplications’ with the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetorical Substitute</th>
<th>F1 a</th>
<th>F1 b</th>
<th>F3 a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective choice ↓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>contingent decision disguised as inevitable result</td>
<td>plan of voluntary action expressed as uncontrollable compulsion</td>
<td>contingent decision disguised as ownership-opaque schedule</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Afterword

Limitations of page-space prevent me from proceeding in this chapter to a full discussion of the varied rhetorical effects to be gained from adapted uses of F1 c – predictions of inevitable results of involuntary determination – and the interesting semantic relations between F1 d – predictions of inevitable results happening ‘soon’ – and F2 – declarations of ownership-complete plans – (which share the same pattern of expression, /be going to /), and the personifying uses of F2 with executants that are entities that in fact lack autonomous volition; these are matters that I shall consider in the next chapter. Subsequent chapters will deal in greater detail with the relation between rhetorical choices of expression of future matters and degrees of politeness thus secured. But I hope the above has begun to suggest the complexity of, and the paradoxical logic directing, the ways in which competent users of English will deliberately break the rules that govern the objective application of the English system of expression of future matters, in order to convey to their addressees messages rather fuller than – or considerably different from – those that they overtly appear to be sending.

Notes
1) Gibbs, A. Stephen. 2003. ‘An Effective Way of Teaching the Expression of Future Matters in English; Part One: Objective Uses of Simple Future Tenses.’ Journal of Foreign Language Education and Research; Institute of Foreign Language Education and Research, Kansai University; Vol. 6 (pp. 1–26).
2) There are rare exceptions to this: for example, /If you make a chocolate cake, it will tempt me into
eating all too much of it, and so putting on weight. So make something else. Here, strictly speaking, no cake yet exists, and so no nature exists either, to be a cause. Yet I do not think this constitutes evidence that undermines the appropriateness of the view that I am suggesting here. The hypothetical situation projected by an if-clause has its own ‘now’, which is independent of the actual ‘now’ of the utterance: the if-clause here says, ‘Given a ‘now’ in which you have already made a chocolate cake, the nature of that cake will cause me to eat too much of it.’

3) There are, however, exceptions to this rule: an Addresser might say, ‘My fuckin’ dad! [= negative criticism]; he’s given me a sports-car for my birthday [= desirable change]!’ In a way, this might be called a use of ‘double rhetoric’ – ‘double’ meaning what it means in ‘a double negative’; unless the gift of a sports-car is an unpleasant burden to him, the Addresser must be using /fuckin/’, which is not usually a term of praise, in order to express his positive surprise at, and gruff gratitude and admiration for, his father’s generous act.

4) I myself have seen even a physical effect resulting from a use of metaphor, upon some 150 people all listening to an address concerning a political topic. It was a part of a Faculty Meeting; and most of the participants were slumped in their chairs, or ignoring the lecture and chattering to one another. And then the speaker used a plain and simple, but very surprising, metaphor to express his main point. At once almost everyone (including myself), sat up; and those that had been chattering stopped talking, and apparently started to think about what was being said. They had been challenged, and rose to this challenge.

5) The distinction between /shall/ and /will/ for first-person Subjects is, alas, dying out in the cases of both positive and negative statements; but, as yet, in questions, such as this, /will/ still seems ill-formed.

6) For a very interesting use of this phrase, see the movie, Dangerous Relations, which has a script adapted by Christopher Hampton from de Laclos’ Les Liaisons Dangereuses (1782).